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ABSTRACT
THE EXPANSION OF NOCS: WHAT STRENGTHENING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
MEANS FOR GLOBAL ENERGY
Alexander L. Fretz
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Francis Adams

The rise of National Oil Companies (NOCs) in the 20th century has been well
documented. However, little work has been done with respect to how these entities have evolved
in the 21st century. This study aims to measure the changing strength of contemporary NOCs by
comparing them to their privatized counterparts. Using this comparative analysis, the study will
explain the changing global energy landscape and the potential internecine effects on the
international system.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In June 2017, President Donald Trump delivered remarks at the Department of Energy
declaring “We’re here today to usher in a new American energy policy.”1 The President
explained that he is not only focusing on energy independence but expanded to include what he
calls “energy dominance.” Both statements highlight a critical misperception about American
energy policy – that if the US can become energy self-sufficient or even a significant net
exporter, then it doesn’t need to worry about world events that impact global energy markets.2
Yet reality sketches a different portrait, that prices in global markets are decided by the totality
of supply, regardless of any particular nation’s energy trading balance. Similarly, less prominent
public officials such as senators, house representatives, and governors maintain the promise of
energy independence and the public continue to rally behind the policy prescription. In fact, a
2014 survey conducted by the Center for American Progress found that 65 percent of Americans
say the federal government is doing “too little” when it comes to promoting independence from
foreign oil.3
Likewise, when asked about the global causes of fuel price increases consumers
demonstrate a skewed perception. According to the NACS Fuels Resource Center, every polled
age-group, excluding 50 and older, place greater blame on oil companies seeking profit windfalls
than they do pricing manipulation by the organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC)

The White House, “President Trump Vows to Usher in Golden Era of American Energy Dominance,”
Energy & Environment, June 30, 2017.
2
Alan J. Krupnick, “A Look at President Trump’s Energy Speech,” Resources for the Future, June 30,
2017.
3
Hart Research Associates, “Public Opinion on US Energy and Environmental Policy,” Center for
American Progress, December 5-9, 2014.
1
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or nations like Saudi Arabia or Russia.4 Even less blame is directed at global conflict like that in
the Middle East or at market speculation by oil traders.5 By contrast, experts and scholars have
recognized both the pivotal role National Oil Companies (NOCs), such as Saudi Aramco, play in
determining the global price for oil as well as the recent collapse in prices in 2014 as
“intelligently calculated to serve long-term economic interests.”6
These examples illustrate one of the striking features of the global energy industry – that
it has long been plagued by misperceptions on issues ranging from production and pricing to
geopolitics and security.7 This occurs on multiple levels of society from its political leadership to
the individual consumers. Consequently, there is little understanding when it comes to the rise of
NOCs and the overall significance of these events. However, this is not to suggest that the
emergence of NOCs has gone completely unnoticed. As previously acknowledged, scholars have
indeed explored the rise of NOCs and the associated implications concerning issues ranging from
geopolitics and security to the impact they have on their parent states such as rentier dynamics,
corruption, and non-democratization.
On the other hand, scholars rarely ask how the relative strength of NOCs has shifted
when compared to that of the privatized International Oil Companies (IOCs), who reigned
supreme over the global energy industry a mere half century ago. This dissertation primarily
explores the extent to which NOCs have strengthened relative to IOCs, the reasons for their
expansion, and how this defines governance in the global energy industry. Secondarily, it then
utilizes this analysis to make broader inferences about the structure of the global political

NACS, “What Consumers Say About Fueling,” NACS Fuels Resource Center, March 1, 2017.
Ibid.
6
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., “Saudi Arabia and the Oil Price Collapse,” Middle East Policy Council, Remarks
to a Panel at the Center for the National Interest, Washington, DC, January 2015.
7
Steve A. Yetiv, Myths of the Oil Boom: American National Security in a Global Energy Market (Oxford
University Press, 2015).
4
5
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economy and the relationship between global security and global energy. In other words, it seeks
to understand the extent to which globalization has penetrated and transformed the global oil
industry and more generally, the subsequent implications as they pertain to the debate over the
centrality of the State in the 21st century political economy.

Why the Oil & Gas Industry?
The world’s economy is massive, containing a vast array of industries and services, and
they all have their peculiarities. In the time since the end of World War II economic activity
skyrocketed under the hegemonic leadership of the US. Shortly thereafter, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and by extension the competing autarkic modes of economic development, trade
liberalization and market deregulation further expanded across the globe. These events combined
together with technological revolutions ushered in modern day globalization as we know it,
helping to nurture a sprawling global network of economic activity. Why then should one focus
one a single industry? What makes oil & gas more important than other goods such as coffee,
wood, or rubber? And why derive greater inferences about the structure of the global political
economy and the effects globalization from that single particular industry?
First, oil is fundamentally connected to most economic interactions that occur in the
modern world.8 Global oil trade accounts for a major part of overall global economic
consumption. In 2012, it accounted for 62 percent of it, up from 57 percent a decade earlier.9 It
dominates the transportation sector, including shipping, trucking, and flight-based transport, by a
substantial margin. The movement of goods and the massive outgrowth of global trade in the

Brian C. Black, “Oil for Living: Petroleum and American Conspicuous Consumption,” Journal of
American History 99 (June 2012): 40–50.
9
See BP, “Oil,” Energy Economics, Statistical Review of World Energy, accessed October 5, 2021.
8
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modern era is owed chiefly to oil. Electric vehicles have some potential to allow for a greater
mix of energy feed-ins, but they continue to struggle to penetrate markets and the technology is
less capable for larger transport needs such as in the aviation or shipping industries. For now,
transportation is likely to remain petroleum dominated. Beyond transportation, oil plays a role in
a multitude of unsuspected industries. Petrochemicals, which are refined from oil, are utilized in
the manufacturing of nearly all chemical products today. These range from plastics, fertilizers,
paints, medicines, to a whole host of other consumer products such as cosmetics. Unbeknownst
to most, oil is connected to everyday life in the most fundamental ways and will remain so for
the foreseeable future.
Second, oil can’t be substituted for economically. In economics, most goods tend to have
a substitute so that when there are disruptions in supply and/or prices spike, consumers can
simply switch to another good that meets the same need. For example, most people enjoy adding
milk or creamer to their coffee. One product can easily be substituted for the other, so if there is
a shortage or the price rises for one, people can simply use the other instead. However, this is not
the case with oil. When supply shocks and price spikes occur, consumers can’t simply replace
gasoline with another product in their tank. One cannot pump coal into their gasoline engines or
anything else for that matter. Because of this inability to substitute, prices can spiral out of
control relatively quickly and cause a great deal of economic damage not to mention bring
everyday life to a grinding halt in a short period of time.
Third, the oil industry is one that is extremely capital intensive. These kinds of industries
require high amounts of upfront investment as well as the maintenance of costly and expansive
fixed assets. This is especially so the more unconventional the project, which is why the Saudis
can extract a barrel of oil for around USD $7 when compared to the US, Canada, or Venezuela,
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who are all northwards of USD $20 per barrel.10 The capital intensive nature of the oil industry
makes it more vulnerable to economic recessions because it must continue to maintain fixed
assets, whereas labor intensive industries can simply lay off workers to reduce overhead. As a
result, sudden drops in prices or unexpected contractions in demand can cause problems for the
oil behemoths in a major way. For example, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the
subsequent drop in demand from the affected nations, the number of major IOCs significantly
declined due to mergers and acquisitions. Another good example is that of Venezuela. In
September of 2014, the Saudis decided to begin over producing which created a huge supply glut
and drop in prices for the following year and a half. The Venezuelan government began suffering
massive budget shortfalls and as of early 2019, is on the verge of collapse.
Fourth, oil’s vital nature has made it a valuable strategic resource often so sought after
that nations are willing to risk all-out war – going for broke, so to speak.11 This was first
observed during WWII when oil started getting used on a massive scale in both the civilian and
military ecosystems. It had already become so vital by the early 20th century that both the
German and Japanese war efforts largely depended on securing access to oil.12 Securing the
economic benefits of oil have continued to draw the attention of powerful states, even into the
twilight of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Iraq invaded Kuwait largely
based on grievances having to do with oil and with the strategic aim of obtaining its oil wealth to

Rystad Energy, “U Cube,” Oil & Gas, Upstream, accessed October 5, 2021.
Charles L. Glaser, “How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall
2013): 112-146; and Jeff D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
12
Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII
Meant Victory or Defeat (Morrow, 1987); and Dietrich Eichholtz, War for Oil: The Nazi Quest for an Oil
Empire (University of Nebraska Press, 2012).
10
11
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pay for the previous war with Iran.13 Similarly, oil is playing a role in the current tensions
between the US and Venezuela as the prospects of privatization of their oil sector has certainly
boosted US interests in seeing Maduro ousted.14 Since oil began proliferating throughout military
and civilian systems and as dependence has grown, it has been the focus of national and
corporate strategic interests alike and will continue to do so, at least for some time to come.
While there is a great deal of covariance among these reasons that oil is so vital, as long
as it remains a central commodity to the global economy, especially with regards to the
transportation sector, it will remain critical for all of these reasons. Ultimately this results in oil
having a peculiar allure that other resources and industries do not. It is no stretch to suggest that
those who hold notable power in the oil & gas industry have the ability to express an immense
amount of influence on the global stage. This is especially so concerning states that are highly
dependent on oil imports. Nonetheless, everyone hurts when supplies dry up and prices spike,
producers and consumers alike. Furthermore, there have been several studies confirming the
correlation between oil price spikes and economic recessions.15 For these reasons, studying the
structure of the oil industry can give us insights into more general trends on the global level as
well as providing for a more nuanced understanding of globalization and the centrality of the
state.

13

Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 19502010 (ABC-CLIO, 1994).
14
W.J. Hennigan, “Inside John Bolton's Month-Long P.R. Campaign Against Venezuela's Government,”
Time, January 30, 2019; Cira Pascual Marquina, “Privatizing Oil in Venezuela? A Conversation with
Victor Hugo Majano,” VenezuelaAnalysis.com, October 19, 2018.
15
See Robert U. Ayres, Benjamin Warr, The Economic Growth Engine: How Energy and Work Drive
Material Prosperity (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 217; and Apostolos Serletis, Oil Price Uncertainty
(World Scientific, 2012).
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Research Design and Definitions
This study employs the method of structured, focused comparison.16 It is “structured” in
that I formulate measures of “strength” for energy firms on the global scale and then use them to
guide and standardize data collection. The goal of this structure is to identify accumulations of
strength as it applies to these company types and lay the groundwork for a systematic
comparison. It is “focused” in that these indicators of strength are not a comprehensive take on
energy firms but rather are meant to give a general sense of relative strength when various
archetypes are compared to one another. The overarching research question of this dissertation
is: given that NOCs have risen to prominence in the last half century, to what extent have they
strengthened when compared to their privatized forbearers, and what implications does this carry
for the governance in the energy industry and the global economy as a whole? Or in other words,
to what extent has the forces of economic globalization penetrated this particularly critical sector
of the international economy?
The primary objective is to examine the full extent to which NOCs have risen when
compared to IOCs and to subsequently explain this phenomenon. To address this question, I first
examine the three major approaches to governance – globalism, neopluralism, and statism – with
the intent of providing a theoretical basis from which to examine the energy industry. Utilizing
these approaches also provides the foundation for the primary hypothesis relating to the research
question: if NOCs have continued to strengthen when compared to IOCs, then statism (rather
than neopluralism or globalism) best explains their rise to prominence and continued dominance.
After establishing a theoretical basis, I then organize the dependent variable by exploring each of

16

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of
Structured Focused Comparison (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 2005).
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the five indicators separately, incorporating descriptive data. I subsequently utilize the
comparative approach by examining how NOCs and IOCs perform when it comes to each
measure of strength.
Measuring power or strength in the study of international relations has been a matter of
confusion and debate for some time. Kenneth Waltz has noted that power’s “proper definition
remains a matter of controversy.”17 Similarly, Robert Gilpin describes the conceptual approach
to power as “one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations.”18 Generally
speaking, power or strength has been defined in two ways. It can be defined as the ability to get
another actor to do something they otherwise would not do;19 this is to say, the ability to achieve
one’s desired outcomes.20 This approach subsumes many concepts such as “soft power” which is
the power of attraction.21 The other approach to defining power or strength is to look at relative
capabilities. Under this rubric, hegemony is a preponderance of material resources,22 which is not
merely an account of military capabilities as realists would highlight,23 but also broader
economic capabilities as liberals and political economists would stress.24
I adopt the second approach in this dissertation, defining strength in terms of relative
capabilities. However, examining the capabilities of energy firms is a different matter than that
of states. Normally an analysis of the strength of states would incorporate variables such as GDP,
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in
Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press), 333.
18
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press), 13.
19
Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2 (1957): 201-215.
20
For an example of one such definition, see Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations (New York:
Pearson-Longman, 2005), 83.
21
Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).
22
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32–35; Robert
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29.
23
Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar
Moment," International Security," 31 (Fall 2006): 11-12.
24
John A. Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
2005).
17
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GDP per capita, national deficit, defense spending, and the number of alliances to mention a few.
But these kinds of measures do not translate for energy firms, though some are certainly richer
and more powerful than some states in the world. Comparing oil companies to one another, with
the purpose of uncovering their relative strength among one another and with respect to
archetype, will require examining different more industry-specific factors. Consequently, I have
formulated five indicators of strength to provide a useful portrait of the power and role of
national and private energy firms in the global oil industry. These indicators are (1) reserves, (2)
production, (3) unconventional capability, (4) spare capacity, and (5) efficiency.
The first two indicators, reserves and production, were chosen because they are the
fundamental measures of strength that have been traditionally utilized when analyzing and
ranking various energy producing nations and their companies, whether private or national.
These two indicators best capture the accumulation of material resources, which holds closely to
the adopted definition of strength. A study that seeks to make comparisons between firms, which
excludes these factors, would be fundamentally incomplete. The second two indicators,
unconventional capability and spare production capacity, are fundamentally related to the first
two variables in that they are a further, albeit more nuanced, comparison of oil reserves and
production. However, they were separated out as they vary drastically among company
archetypes and thus, for the purposes of this study, will provide insightful distinctions between
national and private firms. In these domains, I quantify the number of barrels of oil. For reserves,
the total number of barrels, and for production, the number of barrels per day.
The final indicator, efficiency, is important because it captures how effective these firms
are at translating their material resources into preferred outcomes. It is particularly critical for
parsing out the power balance between energy companies as some are able to do more with less
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while others seem to not do very much with a great deal more. This indicator is a necessary
check on the first two that calculate control over reserves and production. It is also key for
teasing out the relationship between the state and the firm, which in the case of NOCs is
paramount for examining the differences among these firms. After analyzing the NOC-IOC
comparison, utilizing the five indicators, I subsequently move on to the secondary objective:
explaining the findings and answering the research questions.

Findings

In comparing NOCs to IOCs, I find that, on the whole, NOCs have strengthened
substantially over time and have become the preeminent actors in the global oil industry or, in
other words, in controlling and producing global energy and benefiting from such power. There
are two key exceptions to unchecked NOC domination: (1) they are generally less efficient than
IOCs, except for NOCs that have achieved some level of privatization or benefit from a “handsoff approach” when it comes to their state controllers, and (2) they are far less involved in
unconventional oil and gas production, which is an important area of the energy industry. I
argue that this finding has three key implications.
First, the rise of NOCs has implications for the study of the state as the core political unit
in the global political economy. Powerful oil and gas states have become the key regulatory
authorities over the global energy industry and expressed unrivaled strength when it comes to
setting price as well as managing supply. This has major implications concerning the theoretical
debate on the decline of statism in modern politics. In fact, it suggests that while the forces of
economic globalization have done much to spread deregulation and privatization, the state
remains the dominant actor when it comes to global oil and gas industry. However, this is not a
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zero-sum game as many of the strongest NOCs have either undergone partial privatization or
state controllers have allowed for much greater autonomy when compared to the NOCs of the
previous century. While the subtle details of this shift will be discussed in further depth later, this
reality points to some states possessing the wisdom to take advantage of privatized models of
operation while simultaneously maintaining decision-making powers when deemed necessary.
Second, the internationalization of NOCs is an important development. The era of
economic globalization has allowed for national firms to try to integrate themselves globally.
Besides having become another instance of state-owned firms mimicking the behavior of those
that are privatized, it is particularly interesting because international operations have traditionally
been atypical of the nationalized model in the energy industry. Most NOCs arose during the era
of decolonization, making their establishment intrinsically connected to the idea of retaking
control of one’s resources from exploitative foreign companies. Thus, the instance of a
nationalized firm going abroad to exploit resources is somewhat counterintuitive. However, the
autarkic national model of governance lost influence with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This
has opened the way for a new form of national governance that seeks to take advantage of
economic globalization by internationalizing the operations of state-controlled firms. In the
energy industry this has become increasingly the case, which has serious implications for the
politization of energy and the structure of the global economy. For example, Chinese NOCs are
increasingly competing for already scarce investment opportunities. Traditionally speaking, the
American neoliberal model of global oil trade has characterized the structure of the industry.25
But as resources continue to dwindle, a new Chinese neo-mercantilist model may rise to compete
with the prevailing order.

25

See Andrew T. Price-Smith, Oil, Illiberalism, and War: An Analysis of Energy and US Foreign Policy
(MIT Press, 2015).
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Third, NOCs dominance over the world’s oil and gas reserves and production capacity
make them critical for investment and expansion of commercial activities and, in turn, for
meeting future demand and maintaining price stability. Whether or not all of the NOCs can meet
this challenge is less clear given their relative inefficiency compared to IOCs and given rising
global energy demand. This is especially the case for the worst performing NOCs, who often
have tremendous potential but suffer because of domestic politics like Venezuela’s PDVSA.
Nevertheless, as NOCs control the lion’s share of reserves, they hold a key bargaining position
with outside actors who wish to exploit these resources. In this sense, many NOCs,
internationalized NOCs, and IOCs stand to gain much by working with each another.26 More
importantly, the efficiency and technical capacity of IOCs can be a boon to NOCs, though much
more cooperation will be needed in the future. Indeed, NOCs are not situated well to exploit
unconventional oil and gas, while the IOCs can do so with greater effectiveness and efficiency.

Contribution to the Literature

In pursuing my aims, I hope to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, at the
broadest level, excellent work has been done on the political economy of states and their
constituent NOCs, most especially those of the Middle East.27 These studies focus attention on
subjects such as the relationship between oil wealth and economic development, rentier theory,

Saud M. Al-Fattah, “The Role of National and International Oil Companies in the Petroleum Industry”
USAEE Working Paper, January 2013.
27
Tim Niblock, ed., Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf (Routledge, 2015); Matthew
Gray, “A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf,” Center for International and
Regional Studies (2011); Ziad Hafez, “The Culture of Rent, Factionalism, and Corruption: A Political
Economy of Rent in the Arab World.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 2 (2009): 458-480; Michael L. Ross,
The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton University Press,
2012); Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” World Politics 51 (2011): 297322; Bassam Fattouh and Laura El-Katiri, “A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in the Middle
East and North Africa,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2015).
26
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and the impact of energy subsidies on the domestic economy.28 But relatively little attention is
given to the rise of NOCs within the context of the global political economy characterized by
economic globalization and, by extension, the debate over the governance in the global economy.
This study seeks to contribute to the political economy literature by drawing on this relationship.
Second, a growing and important literature exists on oil governance and security, but it
focuses mainly on issues such as oil and war, oil and terrorism, and oil and nondemocratization.29 I argue that understanding the changing role and strength of NOCs is salient
to questions of energy governance. This is chiefly because NOCs help buttress oil-rich states
and, more generally, powerful states with these firms at their disposal. This contributes to these
state’s capabilities on the global stage by allowing them to deploy their firms as foreign policy
tools through taking advantage of vulnerability interdependence, controlling production levels in
concert with other major producers to manipulate global prices, and granting the ability to
challenge the US-led liberal economic order and the petrodollar. Here I hope to add to the
literature on swelling illiberalism in the international system by highlighting the rise of NOCs
and their role in the broader trends toward wielding energy firms as political weapons, statedominated capitalism, and instances of neomercantilism.

Steffen Hertog, “The Oil-Driven Nation-Building of the Gulf States After World War II,” In Peterson,
J. E., ed., The Emergence of the Gulf States: Studies in Modern History (London: Bloomsbury Academic,
2016): 323-352. Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” In Giacomo Luciani, ed., The
Arab State (London: Routledge, 1990): 85-98. Hussein Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of
Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran.” In M. A. Cook, ed., Studies in Economic
History of the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 1970): 428-467.
29
Glaser, “How Oil Influences U.S. National Security;” and Colgan, Petro-Aggression; Yetiv, Myths of
the Oil Boom; Anca M. Cotet and Kevin K. Tsui, “Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross Country
Evidence Really Show?” American Economic Journal 5 (2013): 49-80; Michael L. Ross, “What Do We
Know About Natural Resources and Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41 (May 2004): 337-356;
Kevin K. Tsui, “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries,” The
Economic Journal 121 (2011): 89-115; Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics
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Third, insofar as scholars focus on NOCs, they have illuminated issues such as stateNOC interaction and the respective complexity of these relationships,30 including in specific
contexts such as China;31 NOCs as economic instruments such as for decreasing the effects of
rising oil prices on domestic gasoline prices;32 and the growing international reach of NOCs and
the subsequent effects.33 By comparison, less focus is given to how NOCs have changed over
time in terms of their relative strength, albeit with some excellent exceptions.34 I offer a
diachronic application to help fill that void. This approach both uniquely compares the world
largest IOCs and NOCs against one another but also specifically highlights the changing nature
of NOCs.

Dissertation Roadmap

This study consists of seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion, making
nine in total. Following the introduction, I engage in an exploration of the theoretical approach to
governance and apply it to the energy industry. The chapter discusses the three prevailing
theories to modern governance: the globalist, the neopluralist, and the statist. It then discusses
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the structure of global energy and which approach best explains the industry as it currently
exists. This is important for understanding the rise of NOCs as well as answering questions
having to do with the centrality of the state in modern politics and the fate of neoliberalism
moving forward.
The third chapter provides a quick history of the oil industry. It begins with the discovery
of oil in the late 19th century and its rise to prominence as the primary energy input in the early
20th century. Special attention is given to the original structure of global energy and the
domination of the industry by the Seven Sisters, and later the Supermajors, what this study refers
to as IOCs. This will help to underscore how much the structure of global energy has
transformed over the 20th century. The chapter discusses the rise of NOCs and OPEC in the mid
to late part of the century, which sees the proliferation of nationalized firms across the world,
with a few important exceptions like in Mexico or the Soviet Union. Finally, the chapter
discusses the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which had massive ramifications for the IOCs of the
world. This was a transformative event that reduced the Seven Sisters to what would become
known the Supermajors. This history is important for both providing a narrative backdrop and
for arranging the beginning point of the study, which seeks to measure and analyze the strength
of energy firms from the beginning of the 21st century to present day.
The fourth chapter will be dedicated towards the five indicators of strength, which form
the basis for my NOC-IOC comparison. The indicators are reserves, production, unconventional
capability, spare capacity, and efficiency. These variables are based on descriptive data and
utilize original figures with the purpose of representing the various forms of expressed strength
nested within the global oil and gas industry. Each indicator will systematically establish the
essence of the measure of strength as well as provide diachronic data points in order to sketch
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shifts in the power balance between firms more accurately. This quantitative assessment will
provide for a data-driven appraisal of strength, utilizing the definition of power in terms of
relative material resources.
The fifth chapter deals with the explanation of the continued expansion of NOCs in the
21st century. Fundamentally, this will be a qualitative analysis derived from the empirical
findings of the indicators of strength. The first explanation is the resurgence of the State, which
ties forces of resource nationalism and the reassertion of state authority over the energy industry
as an essential driver of NOC proliferation. The second, internationalization, focuses on how
NOCs have increasingly taken advantage of economic globalization to expand their operations
abroad. This occurs in the areas of upstream and downstream production, joint development
projects, mergers and acquisitions of foreign firms, and overseas research and development
centers. The third explanation is government policies, which deals with how States have adjusted
their approach to governance over time. Specifically, the proliferation to the “hands-off”
approach and the partial privatization approach to NOCs, which has significantly increased their
competitiveness globally. Finally, the fourth explanation, strategic value, highlights the political
and economic power States accumulate from their NOCs. This manifests itself in the form of
bargaining power between producers and consumers, control over pricing and supply
mechanisms in global markets for oil and regional markets for gas, and the strategic flows of
energy that affect levels of vulnerability in terms of interdependence.
The final three chapters delve into separate case studies. These focus on the NOCs of the
important nations of Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China. Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco has long
been one of the most prominent NOCs in the world and is in the midst of major transformations
that will certainly lengthen and magnify its centrality to global energy in the future. Its traditional
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dominance is being buttressed by the expansion of OPEC, growing levels of efficiency due to
government policies, expansion into unconventional technologies, and partial privatization.
Russia’s NOCs, Rosneft, Gazprom, and Lukoil, while traditionally dominating in the areas of
reserves and production as far back as the Soviet Union, have made some significant strides in
the modern era worthy of note. While the Putin era saw a renationalization of these companies,
the process followed the partial privatization model which has seen varying levels of success.
Similarly, they have internationalized and engaged in more unconventional methods than ever
before. Lastly, China’s NOCs, Sinopec, CNOOC, and CNPC, have burst onto the scene in the
last twenty years going from completely inconsequential players on the global stage to becoming
some of the worlds most prominent firms. This is primarily the consequence of a combination of
factors – A flurry of international mergers and acquisitions and the expansion of international
operations on a scale only matched by IOCs (1), varying levels of state interference among the
different companies that has seen Sinopec become one of the world’s most efficient companies
(2), and the strategic deployment of these companies as a means of both reducing China’s
vulnerability in terms of interdependence and accumulating the capability to undermine the USled economic order.
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CHAPTER II
GOVERNANCE AND THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

The various transformations that the energy industry underwent in the 20th century has
not only altered the structure of the markets, the firms that dominate, and the institutions that
comprise the industry, but invariably energy governance changes as a consequence. In other
words, energy governance is a macrocosm of these smaller more distinct features of the industry.
When they experience transformation, energy governance keeps in step, reflecting the new
structure of the industry. Major historical events such as the rise of NOCs, international energy
institutions, and globalization-driven externalities in the Southeast Asian financial sector all
contributed to a fundamental restructure of the energy industry. This history will be dealt with in
depth in the following chapter. For the moment, the focus will center on energy governance
itself, which has transformed as a consequence of the changing global economic order as well as
the rise of new prominent actors in the industry. These serve as top-down and bottom-up forces
that feed into what energy governance looks like in the contemporary period.
In addition to acting as top-down force that plays a part in shaping energy governance,
the prevailing economic models that are vying for supremacy within the context of the global
economic order also provide a frame with which this study can characterize energy governance.
The economic models or modes of governance that will be explored below are the globalist,
neopluralist, and statist. In terms of shaping energy governance, if the majority of the most
prominent producer and consumer states subscribe to one particular model, then their mode of
governing energy will follow suit. When it comes to providing a frame to analyze the structure of
energy governance, if both top-down and bottom-up forces are majority aligned with one
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particular model, then the claim that energy governance is characterized as global, neoplural, or
state-driven in nature is reliable. Concerning the bottom-up forces that influence energy
governance, the emergence of new actors in the industry, namely the rise of NOCs, is part of the
fundamental analysis of this study and will be examined more closely in chapters three, four, and
five. This chapter will operate on the basis of the emergence of NOCs in the mid to late 20th
century for the purpose of theoretical exploration.
A set of hypotheses will guide the inquiry moving forward: if NOCs have indeed risen to
prominence, then energy governance will reflect more statist modes of governance (1); if energy
institutions are the primary actors, then energy governance will look more like the neopluralist
model (2); and if markets and nonstate actors are diffusing energy governance, then the system
would be primarily characterized by globalism (3). While these hypotheses possess some overlap
with one another in terms of what they are seeking to explain, they diverge on the significance of
modern developments. For example, all three acknowledge the existence of energy institutions
but argue that they exist because of different reasons and serve separate purposes. Are they
mechanisms for state power? Do they represent nonstate modes of governance subsuming state
power? Or are they necessary nonstate entities that allow states to cooperate and adapt to a
globalizing world? Thus, this study will parse seek to substantiate the hypothesis that holds the
greatest explanatory power by first reviewing the literature on the theoretical approaches to
governance in the modern global economy and then following with an examination of energy
governance in particular.
Among scholars there exists a range in views concerning the global economy in the
modern era of globalization and what it means for the future of governance and state power. This
chapter will highlight the three primary theoretical approaches: Globalism, Neopluralism, and
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Statism. However, there is actually some areas of agreement among these scholars. Their ideas
coincide most around the transformative power of economic globalization in the modern era.
Proponents of each theory would agree that economic globalization has indeed made some
modes of governance more disparate, and also that supranational entities have risen in
importance as a result. On the other hand, there is more discontinuity when it comes to their
views on governance and state power, or more precisely, its capacity to express regulatory
authority.35 Specifically, the deviations among the theoretical approaches comes down to
separate interpretations of the state: its loss of the monopoly over modes of governance, the
nature of states’ interplay with international institutions, whether or not the state is at the mercy
of these processes, and the future of the state as the primary actor on the global stage.
The next three sections will highlight the perspectives of the theoretical approaches to
governance and the state. They will also highlight the structure of the industry including the
markets and associated mechanisms, energy institutions and their functionality, and the primary
actors. This examination will provide the theoretical basis for the following analysis of energy
governance and the hypotheses laid out earlier. Lastly, I will enumerate my contribution to the
literature on energy governance. Specifically, how an in-depth study on the rise of NOCs and the
relative power balance between IOCs and NOCs enhances the study of energy governance.

Globalism

Globalization scholars that are proponents of the globalist approach to governance
question the primacy of the state in modern politics.36 They argue that states have not just lost
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their monopoly over modes of governance, but that they are becoming more inconsequential than
ever. Some scholars argue rather extremely that the nation-state has become archaic. For
example, Kenichi Ohmae has posited that nonstate actors such as multi-national corporations are
replacing the nation-state as the dominant economic actors in the international system.37 On the
other hand, other globalists suggest more modestly that the waning of state power has led to a
rise in non-state actors’ capability to enforce regulatory authority that the state must now contend
with, when it can. For instance, Jan Art Scholte still sees the state as a prominent actor that
remains indispensable at certain sites of regulation, albeit no longer all of them.38 Similarly,
Susan Strange argues that the state is not disappearing, but rather that it is no longer the main
source of authority over societies and economies and faces challenges from rival sources of
power.39
Globalists see economic globalization as a force that is exacerbating the inability of states
to maintain dominant control over governance, which has given rise to multiple or many modes
of governance. James Rosenau has called it the multi-centric world, or governance with intricate
overlapping dynamics among multiple levels of regulatory authority.40 Scholte calls it the
polycentric world, which he defines as “governance that is multi-scalar and diffuse; regulation
that occurs at, and through interconnections among, municipal, provincial, national, macro-
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regional, and global sites.”41 Concerning the increasingly diffuse nature of governance, the
growing supranational sites of regulation are intrinsically opposed to state-centric governance,
pitting national sovereignty and international cooperation against one another,42 which is an
important point of distinction for the globalism camp. Therefore, globalization is not only an
uncontainable force that states are failing to reckon with, but a phenomenon that is necessarily
generating tension between state and non-state actors seeking to express regulatory authority at
various levels of the global economy. To put it simply, the regulatory monopoly traditionally
enjoyed by the state has diminished, despite its efforts otherwise.
The rise of supranational governance and of the importance of non-state actors is not
simply a consequence of economic globalization and the rise of transnational challenges, but also
a solution to enhance longer-run strategic solutions to modern global challenges.43 This is best
represented in the accent of supranational organizations that seek to regulate issue-areas such as
climate change, financial flows, the Internet, migration, and arms proliferation. These challenges
are “transnational” in that they require cooperation among many state actors within the
international system and cannot be solved by traditional means, or by unilateral action. This is
especially the case in the area of economics best represented in the financial contagion that took
place during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis or the 2008 Global Recession. During the 2011
Arab Spring, the spread of revolution was most certainly amplified by globalization both in
terms of economic causes and by media and the internet.44 Some globalists have pointed out that
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the lines between the private and public sectors have never been as blurred as they are now,
sometimes even beyond distinction.45 Yet these transnational issues have, for the most part,
tended to figure only peripherally in national elections.46 These challenges have left some states
paralyzed while others have proven better able to cope. Nevertheless, individual states are
finding it increasingly difficult to maintain control where they once did without much difficulty.
This observation provides the basis for the argument that there exists a fundamental friction
between the polycentric and state-centric nodes of governance.
Global governance, thus, has become a necessary end and not merely just a means to
provide nation-states with an additional tool for adapting to 21st century challenges. Alexander
Wendt, the purveyor of the constructivist approach to international relations, makes this
argument more transparently than perhaps any other scholar that falls into the globalist camp.
Wendt argues that a world state is ultimately inevitable because globalization has made the
nation-state incapable of solving two emerging challenges: technological advancement that is
exacerbating the Hobbesian state of nature and the Hegelian struggle for recognition among
nation-states in a global system.47 The idea here is that technological advancement is enhancing
vulnerabilities in the most powerful actors making even the weakest actors in the system
potential threats, capable of dealing a previously unimaginable level of damage. Additionally, all
of the actors on the global stage are not recognized equally in the same way that great powers
are, which is due to unequal distributions of resources and capabilities. This makes all
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international systems innately unstable regardless of the configuration. These two forces, not to
mention the proliferating transnational challenges, will compel the creation of a world state that
can achieve what the nation-state cannot.

Neopluralism
Neopluralism has long occupied space regarding governance.48 Concerning modern
global politics, Phillip Cerny pioneered a distinct version of neopluralism in his book Rethinking
World Politics which sets out to build the theoretical approach he calls transnational
neopluralism.49 The theory strives to elaborate on an alternative vision for the future, lying
somewhere between globalism and statism. A practical third way between the discredited ideals
of state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism, as described by Paul Hirst.50 Similar to the
globalist perspective, the neopluralist approach agrees that the processes of economic
globalization have given rise to polycentric or multicentric modes of governance and that states
have found it more difficult to monopolize governance as a result. However, state-centric and
polycentric modes of governance are not necessarily in opposition to one another. Rather, they
coexist and form instruments through which they can cooperate, international institutions or
organizations being one example. As Cerny points out, “those actors who will be most effective
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at influencing and shaping politics and policy outcomes are those who possess the most
transnationally interconnected resources, power, and influence in a globalizing world.”51
The transformations that Cerny refers to as “structuration” have also contributed to
advancing an ideological shift in international relations favoring neoliberalism, specifically the
idea of complex interdependence popularized by Keohane and Nye.52 They utilized the imagery
of a web when describing complex interdependence to underscore the various interweaved nature
of transnational connections between states at every level, while noting the relative decrease in
importance of unilateral action, military force, and power balancing. Thus, while the monopoly
of power that states have traditionally enjoyed has declined relatively, they have hardly become
inconsequential.
Consistent with the neopluralist approach, Nye advances the indispensability of
transnational power when it comes to solving problems that are supraterritorial in nature, such as
global migration flows or transnational terrorism.53 Although globalization scholars might refer
to suprastate actors, including both regional and global modes of governance, as nonstate entities
who “operate with some autonomy from the state,”54 neopluralists would argue that these
international institutions and organizations are the means by which both state and nonstate actors
shape politics. This is a departure from both the globalist and statist interpretations concerning
the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational governance. While the two other
approaches view this relationship as zero-sum, the neopluralist approach claims that institutional
mechanisms can overcome this contention.55 In other words, suprastate modes of governance are

51

Cerney, Rethinking World Politics, 106.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Longman, 2012), 269-272.
53
Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (Public Affairs, 2011), 118-122.
54
Scholte, Globalization, 186.
55
Michael Zurn, “Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International
Institutions,” European Journal of International Relations 6 (June, 2000): 183-221.
52

26

not opposed to statist modes of governance but rather they coexist and interact with one another
as an adaptation to the forces of globalization.
Concerning the dynamics between state and nonstate actors at various levels of
governance, Nye has pointed out that transnational actors and private systems “do not frontally
challenge the governments of sovereign states; they simply add a layer of relations that sovereign
states do not fully control.”56 Furthermore, states remain indispensable primarily because
suprastate modes of governance were created, are funded, and are predominantly influenced by
state actors, something the statists would agree with. Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley argue that
globalization has yet to lead to a complete domination of distinct national economies by
international capital and that government and societal actors are not subject to the vagaries of
global processes and the ever-expanding power of multinational corporations.57 Moreover, the
claim that sovereignty is being overwhelmed by the processes of globalization relies on a
“territorialized” view of state authority, which has not necessarily been the case historically.58
This is recognized by neopluralist scholars as well as traditional pluralists, who make the
argument that the existence of multiple layers or modes of governance not controlled outright by
the state is nothing particularly novel. They often point to the structure of Medieval Europe and
its overlapping structures of authority between kingdoms and the Papacy as well as within
kingdoms among the rulers and the aristocracy.
Rather than being subsumed by globalization, states are being transformed. According to
Cerny, supranational organizations such as international institutions are “at the heart of the
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transformation of the state itself into a competition state.”59 This claim coincides with the
observations of Richard Rosecrance, who pointed out that state power is becoming less
correlated with territorial expanse and more with economic comparative advantage.60 The
concept of state transformation, especially with regards to power and regulatory authority, is at
the heart of the neopluralist claim that states are coexisting with nonstate actors and it is the
interactions between state actors and suprastate modes of governance that is driving their
metamorphosis. Rather than relying on traditional systems of power such as global military
preponderance and financial statecraft, global economic convergence is driving states to compete
for control over transnational and regional markets as well as global resources.61 As it turns out,
the best way to engage in this global economic competition is by embedding oneself in various
regional and transnational institutions.

Statism

The statist approach is very much aligned with neorealist or structural realist thinking in
international relations. This is especially so when it comes to explaining the behavior of states,
their fundamental concerns, and their standpoint concerning increasingly disparate governance.
This is not merely to conclude that states are still the dominant actors despite globalization and
the growing importance of nonstate actors, which a statist would ultimately argue, but more
fundamentally that states are predominantly concerned with their security62 and that this informs
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their behavior concerning governance. Therefore, security concerns become an important
theoretical underpinning that informs the statist approach to explaining the nexus of state
regulatory authority and the emergence of more disparate governance.
Statists are far more like neopluralists than globalists when it comes to interpreting the
relationship between statist and suprastate modes of governance. Like the neopluralist camp,
statists do not view nonstate actors and international institutions as challengers to state
sovereignty. Their rise is a natural phenomenon that is the product of shrinking time and space, a
process of globalization. This simply gives rise to an increasing level of interactions among
states sufficient to engender an international society – When a group of states that hold similar
interests and values form common institutions that uphold sets of formal and informal norms and
rules.63 However, statists are distinct from neopluralists in maintaining that states have preserved
their power structures and will eventually use their regulatory mechanisms to assert authority
wherever and whenever they deem it possible, attractive, or necessary. In other words, states and
nonstate actors are not separate autonomous entities that compete or cooperate at sites of
regulatory authority, rather nonstate actors are subject to states and their national interests and
more specifically to the most powerful constituent states. This is primarily because they provide
the lion’s share of funding and also because suprastate governance is made relevant and
fundamentally legitimized by the participation of powerful states in the first place.
States choose to assert their authority if possible and when necessary but also will refrain
from doing so, based on their interests. As Stephen Krasner puts it, “states voluntarily extend and
retract authority over specific aspects of sovereignty in ways that enhance stability.”64 He points
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out that in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia states relinquished their authority over religion because
continuing to regulate it had become volatile beyond what was tolerable and it was contributing
too much to overall instability.65 Similarly, the statist approach views the rise of suprastate
modes of governance and the relinquishing of authority by states to nonstate actors in some areas
of governance as analogous to its retraction of power over religion three and a half centuries
earlier. Statists would also point out that following the Thirty Years War despite a retraction of
state authority over religion, these states would begin rapidly centralizing power at the expense
of the nobility producing the era of absolute monarchy. Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt
posit that a state will generally engage in the surrender of regulatory authority in modern politics
when it suits them using their concept of “contracting states,” arguing that states will engage in
incomplete contracts or arrangements that are intentionally ambiguous and subject to future
negotiation.66 This allows them to take advantage of various international arrangements while
preserving the capability opt out or renegotiate if circumstances change. Additionally, statists
contend that various modes of suprastate governance such as international institutions are
actually mechanisms through which the most powerful states can influence regional and global
politics.67 Moreover, these powerful states have established, legalized, continue to fund, and
ultimately legitimize international institutions without which they would cease to exist.68
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Concerning the position that economic globalization has diffused power such that states
no longer enjoy the regulatory monopoly they once did in the past, the statist approach rejects
this on a fundamental basis. For one, this is an overblown claim that simply lacks empirical
support.69 To be precise, statists are not disagreeing with globalists and neopluralists on the basis
of the claim that regulatory authority has become more diffuse in modern times when compared
to the early 20th century, but rather that this claim lacks historic perspective and as such is a moot
point. The statist approach claims that states never monopolized governance to begin with, which
is why Krasner uses the example of religion at the Treaty of Westphalia. Additionally, informal
systems have always existed as states have traditionally had trouble regulating both the flow of
ideas and of capital. For instance, the 1997 Asian financial crisis or the 2008 global recession
were far less problematic than the Great Depression was. These examples point to a
strengthening of the states’ ability to cope, which run counter to the arguments of the other
perspectives, which claim states have relatively weakened and are becoming outdated or that
they find it necessary to synergize with suprastate modes of governance in order to cope. As
Krasner puts it, the most important impact of globalization “will be to alter the scope of state
authority rather than to generate some fundamentally new way of organizing political life.”70
When it comes to the various aspects of society that the state no longer maintains
regulatory authority over, statists argue that this phenomenon ebbs and flows throughout history.
In modern times states have relinquished control in areas such as international financial flows,
religion, and individual identity, but they have earned net benefits as a result. Greater
international flows of finance have led to larger volumes of trade, foreign direct investment, and

69

Lui Hebron and John F. Stack Jr., Globalization: Debunking the Myths (Rowman & Litllefield, 2016),
105.
70
Krasner, “Sovereignty,” 20.

31

liquid capital mobility among OECD countries while simultaneously avoiding capital flight and
higher interest rates.71 Moreover, when observing overall government taxation and expenditures
as a percent of national income, activity has increased since the 1950s among the most
economically developed states.72 Despite individual identity becoming less monopolized by the
state, it remains the only viable institution that can enforce laws and protect the rights of citizens
in a reliable way.73 Thus, the citizenry will look to and affiliate with the institution of the state
when it comes to their rights and freedoms, rather than a nonstate actor or a suprastate
organization. There is also the resurgence of nationalism across the west to contend with, which
culminated in the 2016 election of Donald Trump, Brexit, and the rise in populist right wing
politics more generally across Europe. Regarding crises of authority and control, the strength and
development of individual states, especially amongst the strongest, play the greatest role when it
comes to mitigating crises. On the other hand, the greatest crises of authority and control have
surfaced among states who are isolated, undeveloped, and relatively less economically integrated
in the global economy. Thus, it is not strong states that have weakened as a consequence of
globalization but rather already weak states, not having the institutional capacity to cope, that
have further deteriorated.
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Energy Governance

The global energy industry before the 1970s was fully operated and maintained by the
western IOCs. The power to regulate at essential sites, like access to reserves, levels of
production, and the posting of prices, rested solely in the hands of these private multinational
firms. They were also, for the most part, allowed to act with relatively little governmental
oversight. This was truer of US companies than it was for their western European counterparts
but as a whole these companies enjoyed levels of freedom that accompanied the free market,
trade liberalization model of governance. In contrast, the modern energy industry has seen a
proliferation of nonwestern state-controlled firms that have risen to prominence. In some ways
this relative decline in power mirrors the narrative in economic development of the “rise of the
rest,”74 but with an important distinction. The rise of the rest in the energy industry looks similar
in terms of the nonwestern nature of the power shift but different when it comes to the structure
of governance.
According to the globalist approach, the rise of the rest occurred in congruence with and
to some extent because of economic globalization and the growing diffuse nature of governance.
Yet, governance in the energy industry favored the globalist interpretation during the pre-1970s
arrangement rather than afterward. These privatized multi-national corporations had a
stranglehold on resources across the world in various nations and monopolistic power over
supply and pricing mechanisms. This makes the structure of energy governance unique for a
couple reasons. For one, its more globalist structure coincided not with the wave of globalization
that hit following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, which sparked the growing
modern literature on globalism, but rather preceded it. One might even refer to it as a legacy of
74

Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (W.W. Norton & Company, 2008).

33

the first wave of globalization, occurring at the turn of century preceding the first world war,
although the primary resource input was still coal at the time. Secondly, the evolution of energy
governance over time has shown some signs of bucking the trend as time has gone on. Global
markets would grow freer following WWII as a result of Bretton Woods and the founding of the
neoliberal economic order and would experience their greatest expansion after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Conversely, the energy industry would see the rise of state control through NOCs
in the areas of reserves and production as time has progressed through the last century.
As a response to the rise of NOCs, the reassertion of state authority in local areas of
production, and the increasing politization of oil, western nations freed oil prices from being set
by companies.75 This is perhaps the most predominant globalist feature of the modern energy
industry. Specifically, the structure of the international markets themselves and their pricing
mechanisms. Without a doubt, the energy markets have become more de-territorialized in nature
than ever before and are fundamentally driven by forces of supply and demand, and to some
extent trader speculation.76 However, this more globalist feature of the energy industry is
mitigated by two major institutions as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Despite
discontinuity and cheating, OPEC nations tend to cooperate well enough to regulate supply,
which has a strong impact on price.77 This is especially the case concerning the Saudis as their
spare production capacity gives them a unique role of swing producer, enabling them to
temporarily override market forces when deemed strategically necessary.78 On the consumer side
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of the equation, the International Energy Agency was initially designed as a mechanism through
which countries could coordinate collective responses to major supply disruptions and price
spikes.79 The organization employs mechanisms such as strategic petroleum reserves both among
states and within the institution and coordinated joint-releases of oil stocks – strategies that help
keep price volatility under control.
The initial development of energy institutions occurred in congruence with the rise of
NOCs with the founding of OPEC in 1960, whose purpose was to raise oil rents for producers.
Later institutions would include the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1973, responsible for
encouraging policies among consumer that increase energy security; the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) in 1994, governing Eurasian gas in the former Soviet Republics in central Asia; the
International Energy Forum (IEF) in 2001, promoting producer-consumer dialogue; the Gas
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in 2001, raising gas rents for producers; the International
Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) in 2009, advancing energy efficiency
policies and technologies; and International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009,
promoting the adoption and sustainable use of renewable energy.
The neopluralist and the statist approaches would agree that the rise of both NOCs and
specific international institutions for energy governance is no coincidence. To be certain, it was
the founding of OPEC that allowed producer nations to cooperate and coordinate with one
another such that they were able to, over time, wrestle away control of the energy firms operating
within their national boundaries. Colgan, Keohane, and Graaf point out that institutional change
in the global energy regime have historically occurred at the cross-section of dissatisfaction and
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shocks and that the nature of the change depends on interest homogeneity among major actors.80
Regarding the founding of two most important institutions concerning energy governance: OPEC
and the IEA, this principle of punctuated equilibrium certainly rings true. The founding of both
were precipitated by high levels of dissatisfaction and shocks not to mention the nature of the
institutions are fundamentally characterized by the national interests of the major states
comprising them. In the case of OPEC, the dissatisfaction of producer nations following the price
cuts by the western controlled energy firms, the economic shock of sudden reduced revenues,
and the goal of the organization centering around raising rents for producers. In the case of the
IEA, Arab OPEC producers embargoed the west for its support of Israel, the economic shock
which is ironically referred to as the “1973 oil shock,” produced extreme dissatisfaction among
western nations and led them to create an institution promoting energy security for consumer
nations.
In critique of the globalist assertions, energy scholars have pointed out that “despite all
the buzz about energy sector deregulation, liberalization, and privatization, the role of the
government in shaping the energy sector remains crucial.”81 Others have recognized that the
current framework for energy governance is often chaotic, incoherent, and fragmented.82 While
international institutions seeking to govern energy have proven themselves pivotal at times,
mostly in the case of OPEC and the rise of NOCs, they are mostly nonbinding and voluntary in
nature as well as tending to focus on information and transparency for societal actors.83 Even
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OPEC itself, while giving lesser countries the ability to gain control over industries that were
previously controlled by nonstate actors, is plagued by inefficiency and discontinuity because of
the national politics of its member states.84
The overall ineffective and incomplete nature of the global energy regime has led to a
consensus among scholars that energy governance requires further development in order to meet
the challenges of the 21st century.85 Global energy governance is difficult to achieve primarily
because actors’ national interests rarely coincide enough to allow for a cooperative breakthrough.
Mike Bradshaw correctly points out the diverging interests among the three major economic
groupings of countries in the global economy: among the developed nations there is tension
between the decarbonization imperative and the affordability dimension; emerging economies
are primarily concerned with securing sufficient energy to power sustained development rather
than worrying about emissions; and the developing world simply needs reliable access to energy
regardless of how clean the source may be.86 To be sure, the rise of NOCs has only further
exacerbated these dynamics by increasing the politicization of the oil industry and further
interweaving national politics and energy policy.87 There is also regional political dynamics to
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consider, which vary greatly around the world and tend to interfere with global energy
governance.88
On the other hand, some energy scholars have pointed out that the global energy regime
has been shifting in focus in more recent years. Andreas Goldthau argues that there has been a
more general effort to establish energy governance instead of simply looking to ensure energy
security.89 This position holds that energy security tends to heighten the impact of national
politics because of the various needs of different countries based on their economic status. Thus,
statism in the energy industry can be transcended by focusing on energy governance more
generally, despite the centrality of NOCs.90 Of course this claim has yet to be realized, but
perhaps time will tell. The push towards global energy governance and away from energy
security is a relatively new one.

Contribution to the Literature

While the structure of the global energy industry has features represented by all three
approaches, there is some divergence in explanatory power. Globalism tends to hold the least of
the three, as it really only helps to understand the overall structure of trade and pricing
mechanisms of the global markets. International markets have become increasingly
deterritorialized and prices have been characterized by instances of volatility rather than stability.
However, the rise of NOCs and various energy institutions presents a frontal challenge to
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globalism in the energy sector. State actors through NOCs and through international institutions
have been able to dampen, and in some cases blunt, the forces of globalization, mostly regarding
market dominance by nonstate actors and price volatility.
Much of the debate among energy scholars has revolved around the assertions of
neopluralist and statist perspectives. Most neopluralists recognize the centrality of nation-states
in the energy industry via NOCs but argue that the energy institutions that provide for
cooperation among states have been and continue to be indispensable. These scholars, while
admitting to the impotent status quo of energy governance, claim that it is beginning to eclipse
the traditional focus on energy security alone. This renewed international emphasis on energy
governance is ultimately being driven by climate change imperatives. They also point out that
national interests tend to converge and allow for energy governance breakthroughs in times of
crisis, which climate change could prove the spark for.
On the other hand, statists point out the politization of oil via national politics and
regional politics diminishes the capability of energy institutions to foster cooperation.
Particularly because of the fundamental relationship between energy and development. Thus,
most of the world, including the emerging and developing economies, are unable to cooperate
with climate change imperatives without tremendous sacrifice. Additionally, energy institutions
have operated more as tools for powerful energy producer/consumer states than they are bodies
that foster cooperation among them. Statists also argue that most energy institutions are frail,
being mostly voluntary and nonbinding in nature, as well as fraught with discontinuity among
member states. They also point out that NOCs have, in many instances, become tools to buttress
national foreign policy interests, especially when it comes to Saudi, Chinese, and Russian NOCs.
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To be sure, cases can be made for each of the theoretical approaches, some more
effectively than others. This study aims to uniquely add to the literature on energy governance in
a few major ways. First, energy scholars tend to acknowledge the rise of NOCs and their
centrality in global energy, to varying degrees. This is especially so since the proliferation of
unconventional energy technologies in America, the partial privatization of some NOCs around
the world, and the rise of Chinese NOCs. However, few have explored NOC and IOC strength
over time with a focus on the momentous developments of the 21st century. This study will offer
a diachronic assessment of energy companies, which will parse out the various elements of their
strengths and weaknesses in global energy. Much has taken place since NOCs initial rise in the
1970s. This comparison to IOCs will allow for a deeper, more up to date, understanding of the
NOC-IOC dominance nexus. The debate on the structure of energy governance depends largely
on the true extent of NOCs rise to prominence, making this study salient.
Second, this analysis will position the structure of energy governance within the larger
context of the structure of governance in the global political economy. As American global
economic dominance wanes, the neoliberal order fostered by the Washington consensus is also
weakening. Consequently, the rise of China and resurgence of Russia, fosters a more state-led
model for economic development, and are beginning to challenge the neoliberal order. This has
led to a further blurring between the private and public sectors and has impacted the global
political economy in a couple ways. On one hand, the rise of state capitalism has contributed to a
further strengthening of NOCs in the 21st century as well as the partial privatization of some
NOCs. On the other, increasing state power in the energy industry has instigated a greater
strategic competition over resources and markets which has prompted the utilization of some
NOCs as foreign policy tools as well as internationalization among some NOCs. Placing the rise
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of NOCs, the relative power balance between IOCs and NOCs, and the structure of energy
governance within this larger context will offer a more circumspect explanation.
Third, this study will employ multiple case studies of the most powerful NOCs and their
constituent nation-states to fully explore the extent to which NOCs have ‘risen.’ Among NOCs
there is quite a bit of variance when it comes to the NOC-state interaction. Some states tend
towards rent-seeking and utilize the firm as an arm of the government, while others allow for the
company to operate with various levels of autonomy. This relationship will have a strong effect
on the NOC, contributing to its organizational efficiency and investment capacity. Offering an
in-depth look at the strongest NOCs and how their states utilize them will better illuminate the
nature of energy governance in a few ways. For one, the politicization of energy and state’s use
of NOCs as political arm of the government is particularly important. Using energy firms as a
lever to pressure other nations would suggest a serious challenge to the assertion of globalists
and support the claims of neopluralists and statists. On the other hand, if the most important
NOCs operate with high levels of autonomy and function, for the most part, like IOCs, then the
assertion that the rise of NOCs challenges the prevailing economic order and the claims of
globalists are less potent.
Additionally, studying the behavior of NOCs within the context of the international
institutions they belong to will further illuminate the relationship with its state. This will unveil
whether or not states are existing alongside these energy institutions or using them as
mechanisms to magnify their strategic interests. This would primarily be done through
examining NOCs within the context of OPEC, the single-most important institution involving
NOCs, which has seen its fair share of highs and lows concerning cooperation among members.
That being said, IOCs within the context of the IEA should also be examined since energy
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governance encompasses more than just the powerful NOCs. Although this will not be included
in the sections dealing with the case studies, it will be applied later on when explaining the rise
of NOCs and arriving at the implications for energy governance. Examining the relationship
between NOCs and states as well as energy companies in the context of institutions will further
parse out the structure of energy governance by pitting the core claims of neopluralists and
statists against one another, utilizing practical examples.

Conclusion

The ebb and flow of state authority has always been a complicated matter, made even
more so by modern economic globalization. This phenomenon has been best represented in the
three leading theoretical approaches that seek to explain the current trends and future structure of
governance in the modern global political economy. However, when it comes to energy industry,
the trends do not appear to be the same. While the rest of the global economy has become
increasingly dominated by multinational corporations, the energy industry has been flooded with
national firms that now compete with private firms. Similarly, an analysis of energy governance
reveals that it is less characterized by globalism when compared to other important sectors of the
global economy. Markets have indeed become more deterritorialized than in previous decades
and prices are generally determined by global supply and demand, but these elements have not
gone unchallenged. While oil is predominantly globalized, gas is much more regional as it is
mostly traded via pipeline rather than by tankers over maritime routes. Additionally, states have
developed national policies and international institutions in order to express some level of
control of supply and price, both on the producer (OPEC) and consumer (IEA) side of the
equation.
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Conversely, neopluralism and statism offer greater explanatory value for the rising
number and strength of NOCs in the energy industry. Both would point toward the establishment
of international institutions for producers and consumers to allow states to better express
regulatory authority over a more global and complex market. However, the neoplural approach
relies on the claim that these institutions are mechanisms for cooperation between countries and
energy firms to better cope with globalization. Meanwhile, the statist approach relies on the
claim that these institutions are merely mechanisms for magnifying state power and pursuing
national interests. The IEA fits more comfortably with the neoplural interpretation as it is highly
cooperative and primarily functions to help import dependent western countries cope with supply
shocks and price spikes. On the other hand, OPEC is better explained by statism as cooperation
among member countries is often fraught with rivalries and national interests drives much of the
members’ behavior. Statism alone best explains the initial rise of NOCs in number and strength
in the post-1970s era. Fundamentally, many states both stood to gain from and saw the
opportunity to reassert authority over a particular area of governance and therefore did so.
Exploring the full extent of the rise of NOCs in the 21st century, the balance of power
between IOCs and NOCs, and the features of the relationship between the most powerful NOCs
and their states, will ultimately be the deciding factor as to whether neopluralism or statism best
explain the energy industry. If states are cooperating alongside these national firms as a means of
coping with modern economic globalization, then political interference will not significantly
stifle commercial activities. However, if countries are seeking to utilize these companies as arms
of the state, then political and strategic interests will tend towards interfering with economic
interests. Chapter 4 will develop indicators of strength for energy companies and chapters 6, 7,
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and 8 will examine three important case studies of NOCs, which will provide greater revelation
as to whether the industry is becoming more neoplural or state-centric.
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY

This analysis of the global energy industry will ultimately focus on the major
developments that have taken place in the 21st century, the shifts in the balance of power
between IOCs and NOCs, and what this means for the global economic system and the many
nations that are central players. However, to fully appreciate the changes of the last two decades
it is necessary to survey the previous century. This period saw the birth of the industry’s
prominence when oil began to displace coal as the primary energy source of industrialized
nations during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of the western IOCs that
would dominate global energy for half a century, and the creation of NOCs during the era of
decolonization. These events are the basis by which the developments of the 21st century will be
judged.
When compared to the history of nations, empires, cultures and the like, one hundred
years of hydrocarbons seems relatively miniscule. Yet, in this last century the oil industry has
transformed the world in ways unimagined at its inception and has done so with more haste than
arguably any other resource in human history. The following synopsis of the history of oil will
focus on the three most salient points in time that have shaped the industry with respect to the
actors that comprise it. More specifically, the private and national oil firms, and the major events
that have contributed to their rise and transformation over time.
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The Era of Big Oil

The modern discovery of oil took place relatively recently by historical standards, dating
back to 1859, but its unveiling would fundamentally transform the world as a result. Following
oil exploration in Baku, the first permanent oil well was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania. Just a
few years later Nikolaus Otto invented the first gasoline engine, marking the rise of the
automobile as the fundamental means of transportation and thus revolutionizing social life,
business, as well as warfare around the globe.91 At the time it was difficult to grasp, but oil
would ultimately change the course of history by becoming the world’s most critical
commodity,92 and by becoming a core strategic resource. It would implicate global security and
economics to an extent that no resource had ever done before. For its part the US would ride this
tidal wave to economic prominence by becoming the world’s largest cumulative oil producer of
the 20th century.93
In the beginning, the large oil producing companies were private firms and their founders
were among the business barons of the “Gilded Age” in American history. John D. Rockefeller’s
Standard Oil Company was among the largest private oil firms in the country and by extension
the globe. Before it was broken up it controlled as much as 85 percent of oil refining and 90
percent of total sales in the US and even after its dissolution in 1911 the firm remained among
America’s top corporate powers.94 Meanwhile in Europe, two major oil companies arose to
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become the first truly “international” oil companies. These were British Petroleum (BP) and
Dutch Royal Shell.
In 1901, William Knox D’Arcy, a wealthy British investor in Australian Mount Morgan
mining, struck an oil concession with the Persian Shah Mozaffar Al-Din allowing him exclusive
rights to prospect for oil for 60 years. After burning through much of his fortune, he was forced
to sell a sizable portion of his rights to the Burmah Oil Company based in Glasgow. In 1908,
after finally striking oil, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was created with shares open
to the public. Six years later before the breakout of the first World War, the British government
purchased 51% of the company in order to secure oil for its royal navy, which was rapidly
shifting away from coal as the primary energy input. By 1954 APOC became British Petroleum
and is known today as BP.95
The Royal Dutch Shell group arose in 1907 out of the union of two European firms – The
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company of the Netherlands and the Shell Transport and Trading
Company of the UK – and was largely an effort to compete with the rising US oil titan Standard
Oil.96 For nearly a century it operated as a dual-listed company, eventually reaching a full merger
in 2005. The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company began in the Dutch East Indies, first drilling an
oil well in North Sumatra in 1890.97 Soon thereafter it had fully integrated both upstream and
downstream operations and was looking for a means to become the preeminent supplier of
European oil, but this would require a truly global capability. At the same time, the Rothschild
family invested heavily into Russian oil and commissioned the first oil tankers from Marcus
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Samuel, a British trader, who subsequently founded Shell Transport and Trading in 1897. A
decade later both companies saw the vast opportunities that working together offered and the
Royal Dutch Shell Group was formed.98
In the US, shortly preceding the breakup of Standard Oil, a massive oil discovery in
Texas began a US oil boom in earnest. In January of 1901 a well at Spindletop struck oil, the
gusher lasting for around nine days and with oil escaping at a rate estimated at 100,000 barrels
per day (bdp).99 Before this discovery oil had predominantly been used for lighting and as a
lubricant, but this discovery made mass oil production and consumption economically feasible
for the first time and would transform the US forever.100 This event would see two more major
US oil companies founded in Beaumont, Texas: Gulf Oil and Texaco. A group of investors
starting an oil refinery in nearby Port Arthur that same year would later form Gulf Oil
Corporation in 1907 via a merger with a number of oil companies, principally the J.M. Guffey
Petroleum and Gulf Refining Companies of Texas.101 Texaco was founded as the Texas Fuel
Company in 1902 and became the first US oil company to sell its fuel nationwide under a single
brand name.102
These seven oil companies came to be known as the "Seven Sisters" and would virtually
control global oil for the next half century.103 These International Oil Companies or IOCs as they
would later come to be known as were Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey

98

Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden, A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol. 1: From Challenger to
Joint Industry Leader 1890-1939 (Oxford University Press, 2007).
99
Robert Wooster and Christine Moor Sanders, “Spindletop Oilfield,” Handbook of Texas Online,
accessed March 12, 2019.
100
Yergin, The Prize, 69-71.
101
Craig Thompson, Since Spindletop: A Human Story of Gulf’s First Half Century (Literary Licensing
LLC, 2012).
102
Marquis James, The Texaco Story: The First Fifty Years, 1902-1952 (Literary Licensing LLC, 2012).
103
Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made (Hodder
and Stoughton, 1980).

48

(Esso), Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony and now ExxonMobil), Texaco (now
Chevron), Gulf Oil, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP), and Royal Dutch Shell. For its
part, the Italian NOC Eni tried to join the cartel but was rejected by what the head of the
company, Enrico Mattei, dubbed the Seven Sisters. British writer Anthony Sampson would
popularize the term not long after by writing his book about the Anglo-American dominance of
the global petroleum industry.104
These massive firms founded and developed by the oil barons of the Gilded Age would
bring about what energy analyst Daniel Yergin coined as the era of “Hydrocarbon Man” – a time
when global economic activity was hyper boosted by and growing ever more dependent upon the
benefits of the oil era, ranging from fuels for various combustion engines to plastics and
petrochemicals.105 The Middle East was introduced to the oil era as early as 1907, when the first
regional discovery was made in Iran by APOC. Subsequent discoveries around the Persian Gulf
was led by members of the Seven Sisters, usually forming Middle East subsidiary companies and
entering into concessions with the regional governments. Most notably, shortly before the
outbreak of World War II, Saudi Arabia and the Standard Oil Company of California struck a
sixty-year contract. This deal, the subsequent discoveries and expansion of production, would
ultimately build the foundation of one of the largest, most profitable and influential oil firms on
the planet: Saudi Aramco. As it was formerly known, the Arabian-American Oil Company first
discovered oil in commercial quantities roughly around 1938.106 As time went on however, the
Saudis gradually wrestled control away from the Americans,107 which would solidify their center
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stage role in the future of global oil as well as coloring the backdrop for crucial upcoming
developments.
Now if we fast forward to the contemporary outlook, the landscape of Big Oil looks
drastically different. No longer would the global oil industry be dominated by the Seven Sisters
or the IOCs, rather NOCs have become the central figures. While they remain wealthy and
important, their former power has been clipped, and their weakening is largely the result of the
rise of these national firms. For the most part these events go relatively unnoticed across the
broader public discourse as I have already mentioned, which is reflected in the public polling,
and highlights a major misconception in the US – that corporate greed emanating from the allpowerful western oil companies are to blame for our energy woes. Nevertheless, the rise of
NOCs would prove to be a meteoric turning point. One that would alter the structure of the
global energy system so much that 50 years into the age of hydrocarbons it would be
unrecognizable compared to when it began.

The Rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

With the rise of OPEC Big Oil, currently under the control of the group of IOCs known
as the Seven Sisters, was about to take a big hit. These events would ultimately fuel a transition
of power from the IOCs over to a new group of oil companies. Formerly their foreign
subsidiaries, NOCs arose out of the umbrella of IOC dominance. Countries whose resources
were being exploited would slowly renegotiate their stakes in these companies by banding
together through OPEC, eventually fully nationalizing the firms operating within their
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boundaries. In effect this would facilitate a transfer of power, seeing the rise of national firms to
dominate the oil industry and leaving their private counterparts in a precarious position.
Among the first major nationalizations was Mexico in 1938, preceding the major Middle
Eastern producers by about two decades.108 On one hand, this was the first nationalization of
many that would hint towards major structural changes to occur, fundamentally changing the
global oil industry forever. On the other, Mexico would neither become a member of OPEC nor
would it achieve notable status on the global stage as a critical producer, albeit the US would and
continues to import a fair amount of oil from Mexico. Nevertheless, this event remains a marker
that would point towards underlying pressures in the oil industry which would begin to manifest
throughout producer nations and would underpin the rise of OPEC and the nationalizations that
would follow.
The Seven Sisters that controlled global oil had negotiated roughly fifty-fifty splits with
most producer nations throughout Latin America and the Middle East. This arrangement had
worked without major problems for the majority of the twentieth century. However, Big Oil
intrinsically had interests that superseded those of the producer nations such as the economic
interests of their home countries. This would increasingly become a point of contention with the
producer nations and would reach a breaking point in the 1960s. During this period a global
surplus led Aramco, among other subsidiaries of Big Oil, to cut the price they paid producer
nations for their oil becoming the launchpad for the rise of OPEC.109 In Baghdad for a span of
four days in September 1960, representatives from the countries of Saudi Arabia, Venezuela,

Jonathan C. Brown, “The Structure of the Foreign Owned Petroleum Industry in Mexico, 1880-1938,”
in Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight, eds., The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century
(University of Texas Press, 2010), 26.
109
Heather Lehr Wagner, The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Infobase Publishing,
2009), 12.
108

51

Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait met to discuss the current status of their concessions with the western oil
firms and how they were going to move forward. By the end of their meeting, OPEC had been
formed with the chief goal of defending oil prices and eliminating price volatility with regard to
the interests of producer nations and securing a steady stream of income.110 Additionally, they set
out to renegotiate the fifty-fifty splits with the oil companies, taking the majority stake and
eventually reaching full nationalization.
OPEC quickly grew its membership over the next decade. Qatar would join in 1961 as
well as Indonesia and Libya the following year. The larger the group became and the greater the
cumulative production capacity, the more attractive joining was to other producer nations.
Especially in light of general trends towards decolonization and the perceptions fostered in
producer nations by the historical legacy of economic mercantilism and imperial domination.
Not long after the early birds joined OPEC, a new wave of states would follow suit over the next
several years. Abu Dhabi (now the United Arab Emirates) in 1967 and Algeria in 1969. Nigeria,
Ecuador, and Gabon all joined in the early 1970s bringing the size of the cartel to thirteen.
While OPEC membership grew steadily during the 1960s its power as a unified cartel did
not. Instead of acting in a unified manner with central goals such as setting a global price and
allocating production quotas, the individual members set about devising their own expedients by
which they could further wrestle away the revenues from oil companies operating within their
national boundaries.111 These conflicts between oil companies and producer nations would see a
lack of expansion in production in most OPEC states over the decade and contribute to their
weakness in terms of market share.112 Additionally, a number of factors contributed to
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discontinuity of the cartel: there was still a significant portion of production capacity that existed
outside of OPEC control, petroleum infrastructure networks were becoming more efficient and
cheaper to build, as well as rising political and economic competition among members from the
Persian Gulf. However, by the end of the 1960s the situation had changed substantially seeing a
notable tightening of the global market. This would set the table for the earthshattering events of
the 1970s which would bolster the strength of OPEC, its member countries, and the structure of
the global oil industry forever.
The tight oil market that followed the first decade of OPEC activity was a consequence of
two converging factors. First, the excess global production capacity had shrunk considerably as a
result of noncommunist oil consumption doubling over the previous decade.113 There was
considerable post-war economic recovery in western Europe in addition to a booming US
economy. These events led to a significant rise in income levels and an outgrowth in oil
consumption. Second, oil production in the US and Canada hit its peak around 1970,114
notwithstanding the unconventional oil boom that would take root in 2005. This peak in
production meant less flexibility on the part of the west to shift its consumption away from the
Persian Gulf should there be any breakdowns in negotiations. Furthermore, around this time the
US would eliminate import quotas which could be used as leverage by nations such as Saudi
Arabia.115 These factors would make possible the oil embargos against the US and the
Netherlands as well as constrictions against other western nations.
The 1973 oil embargo rose out of political grievances connected to the Israeli occupation
of Arab territories in the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights taken in 1967 during the
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Six Day War. The steadfast support of Israel with money and arms by the US made it a target of
Arab OPEC nations who were beginning to see oil as a viable political weapon.116 Especially
because the US at this point relied on oil for about half of its energy needs.117 When conflict
between Egypt, Syria, and Israel ratcheted up on October eighth, a mere two days later the OPEC
conference in Vienna concluded with the Gulf members establishing their aims to renegotiate the
terms of the previous agreement on price and supply. These events combined together to produce
a 30 percent rise in the price of crude oil on the global markets and a twofold increase in the
profit margins of oil companies.118 What followed was the most substantial peaceful transfer of
wealth to ever occur in history. Moreover, this event marked a critical turning point when it
comes to setting prices and controlling supplies. NOCs through coordination via OPEC seized
power and the IOCs never again had a say in the matter.
While OPEC nations and their NOCs where able to make some major gains, they also
jolted the consumers of the world into action. The response by the West to the oil shock in 1973
was to seek to protect itself from the possibility of oil being used as a weapon against them again
in the future. Greater cooperation among energy consuming nations was already gaining steam in
the West due to the economic effects stemming from prior events such as the initial founding of
OPEC, the Suez crisis in 1956, and the Six Day War in 1967.119 In 1974, the American initiative
for improved international cooperation among energy consumers would bear tangible fruits
marking the formation of the International Energy Administration (IEA). Its policy mandates

116

Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum (I.B. Taurus, 2004), 175.
Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the
1970s (Macmillan, 2016), 4.
118
Ibid, 178.
119
Marloes Beers, “The OECD Oil Committee and the International Search for Reinforced EnergyConsumer Cooperation, 1972-73,” in Elisabetta Bini and Giuliano Garavini, Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis
and its Economic Legacy (I.B. Taurus, 2016), Ch. 6.
117

54

would revolve around energy security and cooperation on issues such as “security of supply,
long-term policy, information transparency, energy and the environment, research and
development and international energy relations.”120 While the IEA has proven useful for OECD
countries in a myriad of ways over time, perhaps one of the most enduring countermeasures is
the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs) which are still used to this day. To be sure, OPEC was
able to make some serious gains for NOCs, particularly in the realm of price and supply, but this
ultimately came at a cost as consumer nations would find ways to balance their growing power.
OPEC has been referred to as one of the most powerful and infamous cartels to emerge in
modern politics and economics, but this should be viewed as an overstatement. For one, there is
a constant political tension between members. Take the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s or the
geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for example. Secondly, most members
generally tend to fall into the dove or hawk camp when it comes to setting prices, making
cooperation over price and supply quotas tedious work. Moreover, quota compliance among
members has proved difficult in the long run as the temptation to cheat runs high, most
especially when there is a budgetary strain.121 Lastly, the members don’t always share the same
geopolitical concerns, which can undermine collective action. Take the case of the 1973 Arab
embargo for example. The non-Arab members of OPEC diverted oil to the embargoed consumer
nations, undermining the potential effectiveness of the strategy.122 Ultimately, it did not achieve
its political aims of curbing support for Israel, partly because of this discontinuity.
To be sure, the rise of OPEC was a net positive for NOCs and their parent countries.
While OPEC didn’t create an all-powerful mechanism by which its members could unilaterally
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control global oil, it did produce two major outcomes. First, it provided the foundation by which
producer states would eventually fully nationalize the oil companies operating within their
national boundaries. This would bring the vast majority of supplies and production as well as the
associated revenues into their hands. Second, after the events in 1973 the power to set the global
price for oil through direct control of supply was permanently transferred over to NOCs. This
meant that oil production and global energy security was no longer a market affair but rather a
political one, colored by the national policies of producer countries. It also meant an about face
when it comes to the balance of power between private and national firms. Where once the
internationals occupied the preeminent position in global oil, from this point on it would be the
nationals.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis

The discovery of oil and the founding of the original IOCs, the Seven Sisters, was
significant. Even more so was the rise of OPEC and the creation of the NOCs, which
fundamentally reversed the balance of power in the oil industry from consumer to producer. Yet
we still do not have the complete picture. The current group of IOCs, known as the supermajors,
differs from the original group of seven. This was the result of a major global economic incident,
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 which was responsible for instigating that most recent
restructuring to take place in the oil industry.
In the second half of the 20th century, the economic growth of Southeast Asian nations
made up a lion’s share of the global economic growth.123 The Asian economic miracle was first
driven by the Cold War, seeing nations such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore
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aligning with the US-led neoliberal order, and later by the rise of China and its embrace of
capitalism.124 Alongside the string of economic booms that took place across the region came a
new insatiable demand for oil. In fact, many of the decisions to increase production quotas by
OPEC in the 1980s and 1990s were made with this in mind. But this habit would come back to
haunt the OPEC producers in November 1997.
The Asian Financial Crisis began in July with the collapse of the Thai Baht, eventually
spreading to other Asian currency and banking institutions by year end. Despite the surmounting
Asian financial contagion, the OPEC members convened in Jakarta less concerned with the
growing problems in the Asian markets than with the demand spike that preceded it.125 They
concluded their meeting with the OPEC ministers approving a ten percent production hike,
translating to 2.5 mb/d.126 This mistake saw a precipitous drop in oil prices well below the $18
dollar per barrel mark, the accepted norm at the time among oil companies and countries alike.127
The shocking collapse of oil prices sparked fitting headlines such as “Oil Shocked” and later
after the resulting glut, “Drowning in Oil” by the economist.128
Much can be said of OPECs lamentable decision to ignore the brewing storm in Asia and
to move forward with quota increases. For example, the fall in prices to around $10 dollars per
barrel caused OPEC producers to lose billions in potential revenue.129 Yet it was the IOCs that
would suffer to a greater extent. Initially IOCs tried to stem the hemorrhaging by slashing jobs
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and expenditures on exploration, production, and R&D. This resulted in a reduction of the
number of active US oil rigs from 392 in 1997 to just 111 a mere year and a half later.130 The
ripple effects of this incident would become so significant that they would cause a restructuring
of the major players in Big Oil unseen since the breakup of Standard Oil a century earlier.
With oil prices nearly cut in half, the previous strategies of oil companies fell short. Even
the industry’s most powerful firms found their resolve tested unlike ever before. One after
another, executives of IOCs all adopted a similar strategy, seeking to buttress efficiency and
contain overhead while simultaneously leveraging technical capability and human capital. As a
result, a tidal wave of mergers and acquisitions would hit the IOCs reducing the original group of
seven majors down to five as well as seeing a number of smaller prominent companies not listed
among the major seven being swallowed up further swelling the size of the leftover five. These
events would produce what energy analysts refer to as the creation of the “Super Major” energy
companies.131
At home in the US, history was made in two major ways. First, one of the biggest
mergers ever would transpire between Exxon and Mobil. Second, one of the largest foreign
takeovers of a US company would take place via BP’s acquisition of Amoco.132 The momentous
merger that took place between Exxon and Mobil in 1999 formed the preeminent IOC in the US,
ExxonMobil. At the time of the merger, this created the world’s largest oil company, increasing
Exxon’s market share by a whopping 23 percent, and the third largest company in the US in
terms of market capitalization behind General Electric and Microsoft.133 In 2001, Chevron would
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purchase Texaco for around $39 billion, amassing a market value estimated at $90 billion.134
Later that same year Conoco and Philips agreed to a $15.2 billion merger, creating the third
largest American oil company behind ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco (now just Chevron).135
In Europe, like in the US, a number of significant mergers and acquisitions would occur
that would vastly expand the size and scope of its traditional IOCs. Most notably, BP would
acquire a set of smaller firms including Amoco in 1998, which was important for reasons already
mentioned above, but also because of the sheer size of the merger. At the time, Amoco operated
in around 30 countries and owned an estimated $32 billion in gross assets, including five oil
refineries that processed one million barrels of crude a day.136 Over the next two years BP would
also acquire Atlantic Richfield Co. (Arco), Burmah Castrol, and Veba Oil. In 2004 Royal Dutch
Oil and Shell would finally merge into a single entity after nearly a century of operating as two
separate firms. The company’s stated purpose of the merger was “to achieve governance,
management, and fiscal efficiencies for the Shell Group,”137 likely driven by the crisis although
there was much speculation about the impeding scandal concerning the downgrading of their oil
reserves data.138
While the effects on the larger IOCs once a part of the Seven Sisters consortium of the
most powerful oil companies was transformative, numerous lesser-known IOCs were also hit
hard. IOCs such as Mitsubishi Oil, Nippon Oil Co., YPF, Getty, Enterprise Oil, Amerada Hess,
Enel SpA, Endesa, and many others did not escape the refining fires of the crisis. Perhaps one of
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the more significant mergers to hit the group of smaller IOCs centered around the French oil
company Total. In 1999, Total acquired the Belgian company Petrofina for $12 billion and then
subsequently the French firm Elf for $54.2 billion, catapulting these less notable IOCs to a
position of competitiveness with the likes of ExxonMobil, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell Group.139
The overall effects of the Asian Financial Crisis yielded about $200 billion in mergers
and acquisitions worldwide and sparked what energy Analyst Jeremy Rifkin would refer to as the
“transformation of Big Oil into Colossal Oil.”140 This new group of IOCs, the Supermajors,
would become the primary competitors of the NOCs that arose three decades earlier. While
many consider these companies relatively periphery actors when compared to the overwhelming
strength of the NOCs, in terms of reserves and production, the gains IOCs made during this
period in terms of market capitalization, operational efficiency, and technical capabilities would
breathe new life into these firms. Particularly, this would provide the basis for the
unconventional energy revolution that would shortly follow these events, and without a doubt
would not have been possible absent these gains.

Conclusion

The era of Big Oil was the foundation for the transformation of the West, allowing for
booming growth in economic output and the hyperlinking of regional economies around the
world through international trade. The outgrowth of interconnectedness from the local level all
the way up to the global that would define modern economic development and globalization
would not have been possible without the necessary hydrocarbons propelling automotive
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transportation, air travel, and shipping. Yet, the second half of the twentieth century did not
mirror the first, at least in terms of the prevailing actors in the industry.
The decline of Big Oil came on the heels of the rise of NOCs, primarily through the
founding of OPEC and the renegotiations of oil company ownership that occurred as a result.
Ten years after the organization’s founding the ability to set prices and control production was
permanently wrestled away from the IOCs that once dominated the industry. This has led to
several consequences that are salient to this study. First, States reasserted themselves over an
industry where market forces had previously dominated and they did so with little resistance
from the West. This was primarily the result of OPEC and the ability to manipulate prices,
though they struggle to act collectively at times. Second, the oil industry has become more
politicized. This hurts overall oil security but more importantly makes IOCs and their livelihoods
more subject to the power of NOCs. When OPEC makes a decision that could cause extreme oil
price volatility, IOCs must adapt or perish.
Perhaps no other example best points towards the vulnerability of IOCs to oil prices than
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Faced with little choice, Big Oil underwent a metamorphosis on
a magnitude that had yet to be seen historically, especially outside the US. Through a number of
mergers and acquisitions Big Oil had grown even bigger and IOCs became more resilient. The
accumulation of capital, maximization of efficiency, and a greater focus on technical capacity
would not only prove necessary for IOCs in weathering the stresses of the oil glut that followed
the events of 1997, but they would become the essential pillars of their future competitiveness.
These transformations would prove especially fruitful in 2006 when the US oil boom would take
off in earnest, powered by the unconventional capability of IOCs. Nevertheless, these events
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shaped the current landscape of global oil and provide us with a launchpad by which we can
thoroughly examine the comparison between NOCs and IOCs.
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CHAPTER IV
MEASURING THE STRENGTH OF ENERGY COMPANIES

The events of the 20th century had massive consequences for the structure of the global
energy industry and the world economy. Similarly, the first two decades of the 21st century
would be just as transformational. These more recent developments will be captured below but
not in the way that was done previously, as a historical survey. Rather as this study seeks to
measure the strength of energy companies and compare NOCs with IOCs, the more recent shifts
in power will be embedded in this fundamental analysis. To gauge the strength of energy
companies this study establishes five dimensions of power for both NOCs and IOCs: control
over world reserves (1), levels of global production (2), unconventional capability (3), spare
capacity (4), and operational efficiency (5). Each variable speaks to a different dimension of
power wielded by these companies that can allow for differentiation between all of the most
prominent individual firms as well as distinguishing between groups such as NOCs and IOCs.

Controlling World Reserves

The first indicator of the strength of NOCs deals with the distribution of control over
world reserves. This is one of the fundamental and most important measures of strength for
energy companies for a couple reasons. First, the proximity to your reserves counts for a lot.
Having the ability to operate within your own national boundaries means reduced costs
associated with operations and with transportation. This allows companies to scale their
operations to a greater extent, which is essential in capital intensive industries like energy.
Increasing vertical and horizontal integration is more necessary for competitiveness and
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companies that operate in various disparate locations suffer a competitive disadvantage. Having
to transport your resources over vast distances will also increase costs considerably. This has led
many IOCs to become more specialized in either upstream or downstream production because
they can’t centralize their operations in the way that a company like Saudi Aramco has.
Second, there is far less risk involved operating at home. This is mostly because foreign
territory can present long term uncertainty as a result of unpredictable politics. Being that the
energy industry is not only capital intensive but also requires long-term commitments, volatile
politics and general insecurity presents a challenge difficult to overcome for firms looking to
operate abroad. This can range from a foreign government suddenly turning hostile towards a
firm’s operations all the way to various political factions or nonstate actors engaging in acts of
sabotage. In a more general sense, operating abroad often requires difficult negotiations with
these states that can involve profit sharing on the low end to unscrupulous rent seeking on the
high end. These tendencies are a vestige of the era of decolonization inclining former colonial
territories to view foreign companies as exploitative and are consequently less favorable at the
negotiation table.
Third, since there are vast inequalities in the energy industry emanating from the
distribution of reserves as well as the wide variation in technical capability among energy firms,
there is a strong impetus for engaging in partnerships. Having sizable reserves, especially when
they are recoverable by using foreign technology, is important for attracting investment from
partners abroad. Thus, companies operating at home are in stronger positions to appeal to
potential partners as well as increasing opportunities to learn from international companies in a
technical capacity. Essentially, the more reserves that an energy company has control over, the
better positioned it is to be a major player in the industry.
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NOCs rose as a result of and continue to be bolstered by the nationalization of energy
assets, which is a smaller component of a larger phenomenon: resource nationalism. This will be
discussed in length in a later chapter as one of the explanations of preponderant NOC strength.
Consequently, NOCs expanded most rapidly during the period of decolonization in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s as the previous chapter on the history of the oil industry has already
underscored. However, more recent nationalizations in the 1990s and 2000s indicate that the
trend of resource nationalism continues to influence the policies of countries that have significant
reserves. The specific examples will also be covered in detail later. For now, suffice it to say that
NOCs have continued to expand their influence over the world’s oil reserves beyond the era of
decolonization and the initial expansion of NOCs associated with the rise of OPEC. This trend
has been ongoing in the energy industry even up to contemporary times as recent as the rise of
Chinese NOCs, which has taken place in the last ten years or so.
The cascade of nationalizations that took place in the previous century produced the
monumental disparity in control over the world’s hydrocarbon reserves that we observe now in
modern times (See Figure 1). Before the 1973 oil crisis, the Seven Sisters operated and
controlled around 85% of global oil reserves. The early nationalizations resulted in Western
IOCs being placed in a relative marginal position, controlling less than 10% of oil and gas
reserves for decades.141 By contrast, NOCs have since maintained a near monopoly on
hydrocarbon reserves. At the turn of the century their strength was at its zenith as NOCs
controlled a staggering 96% of global oil reserves.142 Since then IOCs have gained back some
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ground as a result of unconventional oil discoveries and the development of new technologies to
exploit these resources. The fruits of the unexpected increase in North American reserves saw
IOCs increasing their share as high as 16% by 2010 but has since leveled off to around 14% and
remained stagnant.

Figure 1. Control Over Oil Reserves by NOCs & IOCs
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When accounting for both oil and natural gas and incorporating the top 30 companies
globally, the data continues to reflect the observed disparity (see figure 2). States that have
multiple oil companies have been compiled together into a single national measure. When it
comes to the sheer size of reserves, the NOCs of Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia stand atop the
world and by a notable quantity at that. The compilation of US IOCs still possesses only about
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half as much as Saudi Aramco and about a fourth as much as Russian NOCs. If broken up into
the standalone individual companies, their relevance would become even more negligible. For
example, ExxonMobil and Chevron, the two largest US IOCs, control around 20 billion and 11.1
billion barrels of oil respectively.143 This would move both companies much further down the
list, occupying space somewhere between Kuwait and Egypt in significance. The same could be
said of Canadian IOCs, which would independently exist alongside companies like BP, Eni, and
Total.
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The total energy reserves controlled by a company is the most fundamental indicator of
strength. The firms with the largest reserves will be strategically placed as absolute necessities
for the supply of energy that will power the global economy. As it turns out NOCs dominate this
dimension of strength with near monopolistic power. Even the unexpected and impressive boom
in North America has done little to reduce the stranglehold NOCs have on the pool of global

Data covers NOCs’ and IOCs’ control over gas and oil reserves for years 2018/2019; Data for Russia,
the US, China, and Canada is combined data for the top 3 oil companies respectively.
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reserves. Additionally, it is well recognized that massive investment to develop these reserves
will be necessary to meet the forecasted rise in global demand. According to BP’s 2019 Energy
Outlook, global demand for liquid fuels is expected to grow by about 10 mb/d, plateauing around
108 Mb/d in the 2030s.145
While the unexpected availability North American oil will initially play a strong role in
meeting demand growth, these reserves are expected to reach their ceiling relatively quickly.
Ultimately, NOCs still control the lion’s share of global energy reserves and the majority of
future increases in global energy supply will mostly be met by OPEC countries,146 making them
the most “critical in determining the path of the energy market.”147 This will allow NOCs and
their national controllers unassailable strength in two major ways. For one, they will become the
centers of global investment for supply growth. Even IOCs themselves will be forced to partner
with NOCs as their supplies dwindle. There is also the dimension of asymmetrical
interdependence to consider. Because developed economies are highly dependent on energy
consumption and are difficult to decarbonize, NOCs will benefit greatly both politically and
economically as a result. Even in their most environmentally optimistic projections, the
“sustainable development scenario,” the IEA forecasts that oil and gas will continue to be the
primary sources of global energy consumption to 2040 and beyond.148
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The Level of Global Production

While examining the distribution of control over world reserves is important, the second
indicator of NOC strength, production, is equally important. Reserves and production are related
to one another, for obvious reasons, but they also differ in a couple important ways. First, while
controlling a large reserve oil can allow for a greater level of production, this relationship is not
necessarily causal. For those companies whose reserves are located at home, there are a number
of factors that can disrupt the reserves-to-production relationship. There is a myriad of political,
social, and economic phenomena that function as intervening variables such as instability,
recession, regulation, and environmental concerns to name a few. Additionally, the technology to
discover reserves tends to outrun the ability to technically and economically recover them. This
is especially the case for NOCs, who lag behind the IOCs in R&D investment more often than
not. However, IOCs are not necessarily better positioned as their reserves are, in many cases,
positioned offshore or in foreign countries. This can present difficulties for investment and
expansion of production capacity for the same reasons as discussed above regarding reserves.
Moreover, even though they often possess more advanced technologies and are more effective at
converting reserves to production, there are considerably higher costs associated with these kinds
of operations.
Second, controlling the majority of reserves yields oil companies potential longer-run
influence, while levels of production yield some influence over short-run energy dynamics such
as month-to-month supply. Countries that possess considerable reserves have more staying
power as they are central for meeting future demand. However, transforming reserves into future
production is contingent on a number of factors that are very difficult to predict such as
investment, future market supply and the growth of demand, the presence of conflict,
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international or otherwise, unexpected technological breakthroughs like the American energy
boom, and in the case of NOCs, the government’s domestic budgetary decision-making. On the
other hand, high levels of production confer more strength in the present. Companies with high
levels of production will be more profitable and as a result better positioned and more adaptable
when there are sudden supply shocks, price spikes, or economic recessions. Additionally, the
power to use energy companies as foreign policy tools has been well documented by both the
Saudis and other OPEC producers as well as Russian NOCs more recently. Since energy is so
critical for the modern economy, consumers are far more vulnerable to producers than the other
way around. Therefore, high levels of production confer some serious short-run power. This is
more so the case for NOCs since IOCs are essentially economic actors and not involved in the
state apparatus in the same way NOCs are.
Since the 1960s NOCs have produced the majority of the world’s oil and gas production.
While they have traditionally dominated the global energy market since this point in time,
especially regarding control over reserves, their position has not been as strong as it is when it
comes to production. This trend has not changed very much in the 21st century, which has
fluctuated between around 71% and 73% of global production (see figure 3). Between 2000 and
2010, NOCs almost exclusively made up the increase in global production. The following five
years saw a dramatic increase in production for IOCs by about 7 mboe/d, as the American energy
boom was well underway. This has slowed since 2015 and is expected to peak at some point in
the next five years. During this period NOCs production has remained relatively flat, which is
mostly the result of the increased levels from IOCs. While there are reports of some NOCs
investing to increase their production capacity,149 they have kept their current production levels
Nidhi Verma and Promit Mukherjee, “OPEC Urges Producers to Ramp Up Investment Amid
Shrinking Spare Oil Capacity,” Reuters, October 16, 2018.
149
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steady for the most part. This is because of the unexpected rise in American production, which
forced OPEC producers to lower their production in order to defend global price. Of course, this
excludes the oil glut that took place between 2015 and 2017, a borderline unilateral Saudi policy,
that will be examined in more detail later.

Figure 3. Levels of Oil & Gas Production by NOCs & IOCs
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Figure 4 further breaks down levels of oil and gas production by the largest companies in
the same time frame. Similar to the figure dealing with reserves the companies of the US,
Canada, Russia, and China were compiled into a single unit of measurement. On the NOC side
of the equation, the most notable gains were made by Russian and Chinese NOCs, Saudi
Aramco, Brazil’s Petrobras, and the Iraqi Oil Ministry. Iran’s production, in light of the
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tightening of US sanctions and the revocation of oil waivers,150 will likely plummet for the
foreseeable future. This will soon cancel out the impressive gains made by Iran’s company,
NIOC, since the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration in January of 2016.
Additionally, despite holding the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela’s production has fallen
significantly in the last twenty years, mostly as a result of poor economic policy and extreme
political instability. This highlights the difficulties associated with converting reserves to
production and the various intervening variables that can disrupt development.
On the IOC side of the equation, while the production of IOCs has drastically increased
on the whole, the gains are quite lopsided. According to the data, the US and Canadian IOCs are
solely responsible for the observed rise in production made by private firms in the 21st century.
Meanwhile, the other major IOCs – BP, Dutch Royal Shell, and Total – have actually fallen
during the same period. This underscores the significance of the American energy boom as it has
not only made up for falling IOC production elsewhere, but also propelled the titanic increase of
10 mboe/d in the last two decades.
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Figure 4. Largest Oil & Gas Companies by Production
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In terms of production, NOCs are slightly less preponderant when compared to reserves.
Nevertheless, they are in a commanding position, controlling over 70% of global production.
Admittedly, this represents a relative decline when compared to the to the last three decades of
the 20th century, which saw NOCs’ production making up around 80%-85% of the global share.
However, the reduction in percentage of global production is partly voluntary and was also
somewhat necessary. As North American production has increased, NOCs were faced with the
dilemma of either continuing with their current production numbers and seeing global prices fall
or reducing their production levels so that prices remained higher. Additionally, NOCs are
responsible for providing rents to their home governments because of their status as national
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entities not to mention they are often the primary source of income for their countries. As a
consequence, NOCs usually tend to be more hawkish when it comes the price of oil.
While NOCs opted to reduce their production levels and at the present time make up a
smaller relative share of global production when compared to the last few decades, on the whole
they remain in a very strong position. This is primarily because their high levels of production
and politicization of their business model allow them to increase and decrease production based
on political and economic strategy. On the other hand, IOCs always produce as much energy as
possible and allow market forces to curtail or buttress their activities. Of course, the privatized
model tends to offer more net benefits, which we will explore in a later indicator of strength.
However, the national model does have its benefits at times. Here we can observe that when it
comes to controlling the global supply and by extension the price of energy, a difficult task in the
era of globalized markets, NOCs allow countries to coordinate and manipulate the market in
accordance with their perceived strategic goals.
This ability also allows NOCs to play for time. According to future projections expanding
global demand will slowly soak up the increased production from North America. Therefore,
NOCs will still be the primary energy suppliers for the global economy in the long run. They will
be capable of slowly increasing their production levels whenever necessary to maintain a
favorable price. In fact, energy forecasts are predicting that despite North American production
meeting global demand over the next decade, OPEC production will almost exclusively become
the source of incremental supply growth during the 2030s.151
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Unconventional Capability

Since the rise of unconventional sources of energy and the ability of companies to utilize
cutting edge techniques to exploit them in the last decade, the ability of firms to engage in these
activities has become an important indicator of strength. Unconventional energy refers to
hydrocarbons that are far more difficult to extract when compared to conventional energy
resources. In a historical sense, hydrocarbons that were “conventionally” exploited by energy
firms were the largest deposits of oil and gas discovered and the easiest to commercialize.
Generally speaking, this is because infant industries often have the least technical know-how at
this point during their life cycle. However, as time goes on and activity is expanded over time,
companies often improve the efficiency with which they operate as well as develop new
techniques, which often open up new possibilities for the industry as a whole. When it comes to
energy, history has proven many times that unexpected technological breakthroughs have played
a major role in pushing back peak energy and overwriting current projections for the future state
of the markets.152 Nevertheless, our conception of conventional versus unconventional is defined
by this dynamic, that is, the more difficult and expensive a particular resource deposit is to
develop, the more it is considered “outside the norm” or “unconventional.”
Unconventional energy production has been around since the early days of the
hydrocarbon revolution. For example, in WWII Germany the synthetic oil industry, based on a
number of chemical processes, allowed the nation to refine high octane fuel for its armor and
aircraft from the nation’s vast coal resources.153 This was fundamentally driven by the scarcity of
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conventional hydrocarbon reserves in Germany, which is necessary for creating an environment
conducive for commercializing unconventional technologies. This goes hand-in-hand with the
earlier principle of how we categorize conventionality. Which is to say, commercial opportunity
drives our categorical conceptions, and furthermore, incentivizes the development of
technologies that can unlock resources that were previously considered outside a reasonable
investment of time, capital, and effort. Moreover, it is scarcity that fundamentally drives the
extent to which these economic incentives are magnified.
In the US, which has become the premier global unconventional energy superpower,
commercial incentives would not begin to appear like they did in Germany until the second half
of the 20th century. This is primarily because the US had been one of the world’s leading
conventional producers since oil was discovered in Pennsylvania in the late 19th century.
However, as the conventional reserves of the US began to reach peak production and the national
consumption continued to skyrocket, the economic incentives for unconventional energy would
start to present themselves. The Department of Energy would begin investment and research in
1976 and through the next few decades that would lay the foundation for the American energy
boom that took off after the turn of the century.154
While unconventional capability is related to reserves and production for obvious
reasons, it is also different because it speaks towards a pivotal point of distinction between
energy companies: technical efficiency. This term refers to a company’s ability to economically
deploy advanced techniques or methods in the recovery of resources. In terms of liquid
hydrocarbons or petroleum, unconventional energy refers to extra- or ultra-heavy oil, tar sands,
shale oil, gas-to-liquids (GTL), and coal-to-liquid (CTL) technologies. In terms of natural gas, it
US Department of Energy, “Shale Research & Development,” Department of Energy, accessed June
20, 2019.
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refers to tight, shale, and offshore gas as well as coalbed methane. The rise of unconventional
energy has the potential to rearrange the global energy landscape, and already has to some
extent, making this new dimension of strength significant. In fact, the North American energy
boom is the prime example of the power of unconventional energy. On the other hand, the boom
has been thus far contained to the US and Canada. Unless unconventional capability spreads to
other vital regions, its revolutionary potential will remain limited. As of right now North
American IOCs have been the only handful of companies with the ability to make notable
inroads into this new dimension of energy.
Despite being thus far limited, the global potential of unconventional energy is
staggering. On the supply side, global energy reserves have grown significantly in the last twenty
years (see figure 5). So far, the 21st century has seen two massive spikes in oil supply: around
150 billion barrels from 2002-2004 and about 300 billion barrels from 2010-2013. In total, world
oil supply has grown by 643 billion barrels since 2000, representing a 39% growth. For
perspective, in 2019 Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves were 266 billion barrels, less than half of what
has been added as a result of the rise unconventional energy. Natural Gas reserves have grown
more steadily and modestly over time when compared to oil. Between 2003 and 2004 natural gas
saw its most drastic increase, jumping by over 500 Tcf. Since the turn of the century global gas
supplies have risen by 28% or by about 2000 Tcf.
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Figure 5. World Oil & Gas Supply Since the Unconventional Energy Boom
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Figure 6 details the rise in oil reserves by region, which indicates the areas of the world
that are benefiting more so from unconventional energy. The more notable shifts have taken
place in the western hemisphere, predominantly in North America and Latin America. Since
2000, these two regions’ reserves have increased by 163.2 billion barres (74%) and 239.6 billion
barrels (73%) respectively. While Latin America has benefitted more so in terms of quantity,
these gains have gone relatively unexploited because of the primary beneficiary of these new
reserves – Venezuela. In the last twenty years Venezuela’s oil reserves have risen from 72.6
billion barrels to 302.8 billion barrels. Its additional reserves total a staggering 230.2 billion
barrels, making up 96% of the entire regional increase and representing a 76% increase of its
own previously impressive supply. For perspective, this has jettisoned Venezuela over even
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Saudi Arabia (266.3 billion barrels) as the nation with the greatest supply of oil. Unfortunately,
because of poor policy decision-making during the Chavez era and the mounting political and
economic ruin under Maduro, Venezuela has not taken advantage of the golden opportunity it
has been offered. In fact, during the same time frame the states oil production has fallen by
nearly 2 mb/d, the equivalent of the total annual production of countries like Mexico or Nigeria.

Figure 6. Regional Growth of Oil Reserves from Unconventional Additions
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While unconventional oil has powerful untapped potential for Latin America, the
revolution is in full swing to their north. Thus, the unconventional revolution has been dubbed
the “North American energy boom.”155 In terms of reserves, Canada has been the main
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benefactor, increasing from 4.9 billion barrels in 2000 to 167.4 billion barrels in 2019. This has
mostly come from the vast tar sands that were not previously recoverable. Canada has jumped to
a commanding position on the list of nations with the largest oil reserves, passing Iran (151
billion barrels) and Iraq (143 billion barrels) and only trailing Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.
However, it differs from Venezuela when it comes to production as Canada has been far more
successful at exploiting its newfound source of wealth. Since its major unconventional
discoveries oil production has risen by about 2.5 mb/d, which nearly matches the entire annual
production of Kuwait, a traditionally important OPEC producer.
The US has benefitted in terms of reserves, seeing an Increase in supply by nearly 19
billion barrels, but it is production that has made the more outstanding gains. American oil
production rose from 5 mb/d in 2008 to well over 7.44 mb/d in 2013,156 and then surpassed the
10 mb/d mark in 2017.157 Production has so far topped out at over 10.96 mb/d for 2018
amounting to a colossal growth of around 6 mb/d in total production since the beginning of the
boom,158 putting the US in contention for the position of world’s top oil producer alongside
Saudi Arabia and Russia. In its central scenario, the EIA projects the boom will continue to set
annual historical records through 2027, nearly reaching as high as 15 mb/d, and remaining above
the 14 mb/d mark through 2040.159 For perspective, the increase in American oil production per
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day far exceeds the amount of oil that Iran exported daily prior to US-led sanctions that were
imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear pursuits. That’s a truly massive rise in oil production
in a world that consumes around 95-100 mb/d.
When it comes to gas, relatively smaller quantities of total reserves have been added
when compared to oil, yet the potential economic boon to energy companies and potential
political influence gained by producer nations are just as potent and perhaps even more so for a
few reasons. First, gas is not traded internationally to the same extent as oil. Because gas is
primarily moved through pipelines rather than marine tankers, the markets are less globalized
and more regional. Therefore, consumers are more dependent on regional trade partners for those
specific resources produced by a particular company. In short, there is less likelihood of an
energy company’s product being substituted for or replaced by a different source from other
producers in the market. Of course, with the international trade of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)
on the rise this could change over time. The US and others are already showing signs of
increasing investment in LNG terminals to support additional exports.160 But for now, gas
markets remain more localized than globalized and this supports an asymmetrical
interdependence that favours the producer.
Second, Gas has been more advantageously dispersed among nations that do not have
much conventional alternatives to speak of. When it comes to oil, there are still very large
conventional deposits that are inexpensive to extract putting depressive pressure on economic
incentives to pursue unconventional oil. However, this is not the case with gas as unconventional
deposits have so far proven to be abundant in nations that have little to no conventional sources
to serve as distractions. Consequently, nations with unconventional gas will be more likely to
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take advantage of their resources. Third, there is also the environmental dimension to consider.
Gas can be more revolutionary because it burns cleaner than any other fossil fuel. This makes it
capable of addressing the consumption of the OECD nations, the emerging world’s needs to
propel continued economic development, and the developed world’s environmental imperatives.
Most conventional gas is categorized as either “associated,” existing alongside oil
deposits, or “non-associated” as a standalone deposit. In the 20th century most of the world’s gas
reserves resided in Eurasia and the Middle East, predominantly in Russia and the Persian Gulf
States, as associated natural gas. The unconventional energy revolution has produced new natural
gas superpowers, flipping this previous arrangement on its head. China, Algeria, and Argentina
all individually possess more shale gas than the United States or Canada, which is significant
(see figure 7). Moreover, China’s supplies are colossal (over 1000 Tcf)—nearly double the size
of the US reserves. Mexico has comparable reserves to both the United States and Canada, all
coming in between 530 Tcf and 630 Tcf. Australia and South Africa also have significant
quantities, with 429.3 Tcf and 389.7 Tcf respectively. Adding to the quantity of the old guard,
Russia and the UAE have both discovered between 200 Tcf and 300 Tcf. Additionally, if Saudi
Arabia’s projections are confirmed this would add a whopping 600 Tcf, which is nearly the same
amount as the US.
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Figure 7. Top 20 Largest Shale Gas Reserves by Country
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Despite the major discoveries outside of the US and Canada, little production outside of
North America has been added thus far. Generally speaking, NOCs have tended to perform very
well in terms of proven reserves but less so when it comes to converting reserves to production
since their rise in the mid-20th century. Their technical efficiency has tended to lag behind the
IOCs, whether speaking of conventional or unconventional energy. For the most part, publicly
owned industries have always been less efficient than their private counterparts, primarily
because of rentier dynamics. Combine this tendency together with the higher costs associated

Assessment contains data for only 44 countries as exploration is thus far highly limited. Saudi Arabia’s reserves
are an estimation released by the oil minister and seismic surveys have not been made public.
161
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with unconventional energy production and it becomes easier to see why the boom has remained
a north American phenomenon.
Unconventional techniques are difficult and costly across the board when compared to
conventional methods, however the economic disparity is more substantial when it comes to oil
specifically. This is because most conventional gas came in the form of associated deposits.
Conversely, there are large reserves of conventional oil that stand alone and provide for a stark
comparison to unconventional production methods (see figure 8). Most of the world’s
conventional oil that has already been exploited or that remains to be developed in the Middle
East and North Africa ranges between $5 USD and $25 USD per barrel in production cost. This
usually refers to oil that is mostly “light” and “sweet” as opposed to “heavy” or “sour.” Other
conventional production, ranging between $5 USD and $65 USD per barrel, represents heavier
or more sour varieties of oil. Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods, both CO2 and non-CO2,
can be as expensive as some conventional oil on the high end but is generally more expensive on
lower end by about $5-$10 USD per barrel.
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Figure 8. Recoverable Reserves and Production Costs by Extraction Method and Oil Type
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Arctic oil can be as expensive as any of the most expensive methods, which has limited
its growth over the years, but some sources have been exploited on par with conventional oil and
tends to be about as competitive as unconventional oil. This has allowed arctic oil to remain
somewhat relevant during times of low prices and economically worthwhile when prices float
upwards. Extra- or ultra-heavy oil and bitumen as well as light-tight oil are at the heart of what is
referred to as the “unconventional energy revolution” or the “American energy boom” by
analysts. These techniques, ranging from as little as $45 USD to between $85 USD and $100
USD per barrel, make up the majority of unconventional gains to date. This is largely due to new

86

discoveries of “tight oil” and shale gas in the US162 as well as the extra- or ultra-heavy supplies
of Venezuela.
Tight oil refers to oil found within reservoirs with very low permeability, including but
not limited to shale. Permeability is the ability of fluids, such as oil and gas, to move through a
rock formation.163 Hydraulic fracturing shoots pressurized, chemically tipped liquids into
compact, underground rock formations to discover oil. Horizontal drilling provides access to this
energy from the side, where more reservoir rock is exposed, providing much better results with
far fewer drilling wells and attempts. The technical expertise required to economically engage in
unconventional energy exploitation, specifically utilizing hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling, is underscored by figure 8. Therefore, energy companies with greater technical
efficiency can deploy these methods at lower cost, granting them better unconventional capacity.
This explains why North America has been the primary beneficiary of unconventional energy as
US and Canadian IOCs have proven the most capable at developing their technical efficiency.
Figure 8 reveals another important dynamic of unconventional energy that deserves
mention – the relationship between price and supply (recoverable reserves). As stated earlier,
commercial incentives play a defining role in our categorical understanding of resources and
society’s interest level in pursuing more expensive alternatives. This relationship between price
and recoverable reserves is a demonstration of this principle at work. When the price of a barrel
of oil increases, the total amount recoverable reserves expand. It is no coincidence that the rise of
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unconventional energy in the US coincided with a decade of unusually high oil prices, setting an
all-time historical high in 2008 of $163.80 USD per barrel.164 In a sense, the sustained high oil
prices became the fertilizer that fed the growth of unconventional energy in the US, who had a
host of alternative sources of exploitable energy now open to them. This reveals the role that
price plays when calculating the significance of unconventional capability as well as its potential
for becoming a greater, global phenomenon.
While the price of energy is important for unlocking additional reserves and sparking a
potential foray into unconventional operations, a company’s technical efficiency is the defining
dimension. Look no further than the expansion of unconventional production in the US and
Canada but not in other well-endowed nations as an example. This is because increased
operational experience, improved business strategies, and the development of more advanced
techniques allows firms to lower their own individual production costs and sustain operations
under greater external pressure. This is particularly important when, for instance, price is not
presently conducive towards commercial activity. For all the talk about the significance of price,
it has proven to fluctuate wildly at times which makes expensive operations like unconventional
production a risky investment. In fact, there was much speculation that the 2014-2017 Saudi oil
glut was targeted towards US unconventional producers in part.165 The logic here being that if oil
flooded the market and pushed prices low enough, then the US unconventional production would
collapse. However, US companies were able to respond to the pressure by increasing their
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technical efficiency to such an extent that in some cases production costs were cut by fifty
percent, remarkably falling under $30 USD per barrel in some instances.166
While unconventional energy presents energy companies with a lot of potential
opportunity, there is also another drawback that must be accounted for aside from the higher
costs: the relative longevity of the wells. As was pointed out earlier, conventional deposits are
usually more economically viable because they contained the easiest oil to refine and, more
importantly, because they were the largest singular deposits of reserves that could be exploited
over the long-haul. The latter distinction is especially important when comparing conventional
and unconventional production. The IEA has found that production from unconventional wells
falls to twenty percent of peak production after about three years, whereas the same level of
decline takes around eleven years for conventional wells.167 These diminishing returns on
investment place a premium on the technical efficiency of companies, especially when
accounting for the potential volatility of prices.
When it comes to unconventional capability, IOCs are in the strongest position for a
couple of reasons. First, the traditional conventional reserves were mostly nationalized in the
1960s and 1970s during the rise of NOCs and OPEC, which explains why they tend to dominate
when it comes to reserves and production. Having relatively little access to cheap alternatives,
IOCs have focused their efforts on unconventional development. Second, IOCs sport a more
efficient business model as privatized companies. They are free of government rents and the
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interference of political considerations when it comes to business decision making. Thus, they
can harness their profits towards innovation and increasing the efficiency of their operations.
Unconventional capabilities will prove a source of strength for IOCs going forward
mostly because of global energy demand. According to projections, global economic
development and energy consumption are showing little signs of slowing. This will only
continue to put upward pressure on energy prices. Over the next decade in particular, as liquid
fuel consumption will increase by 10 mb/d over the next decade, US tight oil production is
expected to play the major role.168 Global demand growth for natural gas will also play a major
role in buttressing the unconventional dimension of energy. By 2030, industrial consumption of
energy is expected to push natural gas upward, displacing coal as the second most consumed
source of energy behind oil.169 The IEA projects that LNG trade will double in response, most
directed towards China as it is leading the world in consumption growth.170 The upward pressure
on prices and the projected centrality of North American tight oil and shale gas points towards
the rising role unconventional capability will play as a dimension of strength for IOCs.
While unconventional energy will certainly continue to be a source of strength for IOCs,
it comes with a few caveats. The aforementioned shorter life span of the unconventional wells,
which is important, can generally be mitigated for. More notably, the short-lived nature of
unconventional energy extends beyond the ground-level analysis and takes on a more systemic
form; that is, the current regional limitation of the boom to North America. While the position
IOCs have certainly been bolstered for the time being, US and Canadian reserves can only last
for so long. In fact, data is suggesting that the current status quo will be mostly a temporary
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boost as unconventional production is expected to reach its peak between 2020-2025 and
seriously taper off by 2040.171 Unless the IOCs can spread the scope of unconventional energy to
other important regions like South America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, the predictions pointing
towards OPEC’s return to unchallenged dominance by 2030 will likely hold true.
On the other hand, if IOCs are able export the boom globally, the potential is massive. As
these firms are the leading innovators of unconventional technologies, they therefore stand to
greatly benefit via partnerships with NOCs. However, this task presents a number of challenges
not to be taken lightly. In Europe, prospects are dim as many EU countries have banned fracking
because of environmental imperatives.172 Southeast Asia also presents concerns because of
geopolitical tensions. Since most of the discovered unconventional reserves are located in China,
it will be difficult to forge partnerships with Chinese NOCs amid the current political and
economic environment. South America, while being the best option, is also problematic.
Venezuela now has the largest supply of oil in the world but is in shambles politically and
economically not to mention the recent souring of relations with the US. Argentina presents the
most hopeful opportunity as it is making headway towards emulating the American boom but its
largest company YPF is a NOC that lacks the technical efficiency to do so effectively. In 2017,
two major deals were completed with ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell, which were major
steps forward.173 This example aside, the prospects of exporting the unconventional boom
globally remain an uphill battle. If left to fizzle out, unconventional capability will suffer as a
dimension of strength in the longer run. Conversely, it has shown tremendous potential in the
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short term and, if exported globally, could seriously restructure the balance of power in the
energy industry.

Spare Capacity

Though very much related to overall production levels, it is important to understand how
spare capacity is distinct from production and how it lends itself to a different dimension of
strength. Spare capacity is the amount of production capacity that is currently offline but can be
utilized relatively quickly and whenever necessary. Essentially, it is the difference between the
company’s total production capacity and current production. It is important to distinguish
between overall production levels and spare capacity because it enables an energy company to
become what is known as a “swing producer,” possessing the ability to reflexively increase and
decrease production levels. Depending on the levels of spare capacity, an energy company can
manipulate the global supply and the price of energy in accordance with its strategic interests.
This is a phenomenon that occurs particularly in the oil market and almost exclusively among
NOCs, usually member countries of OPEC.
After the rise of OPEC, western nations and the IOCs moved to globalize the oil markets
as there was little trust in these new NOCs and their controlling governments regarding the
power to set the price of oil. Consequently, OPEC countries sought to manage the global supply
by coordinating with one another through setting production quotas, which would afford the
organization the price controls that it desired.174 OPEC currently accounts for around 40% of the
world’s crude oil production and about 60% of the oil traded globally.175 Because of their pooled
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market share and their policy of increasing and decreasing oil production among its members,
OPEC can significantly influence the international price of oil. Thus, when production quotas are
reduced among the member countries, a portion of each of their production capacity remains
idle.
This idle production capacity is what is referred to as spare capacity and is considered a
source of strength primarily because of the control over price it affords. It is no secret that
developed economies are highly dependent on energy imports. Additionally, there is a strong
negative correlation between energy prices and economic growth. Cheap energy spurs growth
while expensive energy has been linked to recession.176 Alongside the influence over consumer
nations, there is also geopolitical power where other producer nations are concerned. This arises
from one nation’s ability to make up for another’s production elsewhere. For example, Saudi
Arabia announced that it, along with other OPEC producers, would increase production to cover
for any global supply losses stemming from the re-installment of sanctions on Iran during the
Trump administration.177 Considering the longstanding tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran,
this has proved a useful tool for helping to isolate their regional adversary.
The ability to maintain a considerable spare capacity can certainly prove a serious source
of strength for energy producing countries or groups of countries. On the other hand, it is one of
the most difficult dimensions of strength to sustain for two main reasons: opportunity costs and
ever-expanding global consumption. Energy infrastructure are generally long-term investments
as well as extremely capital intensive. It is difficult to muster the will to allocate immense
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investments if merely to expand offline capacity that exists as a tool for political and economic
influence. Additionally, construction of the necessary infrastructure can take years, which pushes
the payoff even further into the obscure future. There are opportunity costs associated with the
initial investment, as it forgoes spending in other important areas, as well as those relating to
production and the potential economic returns. It is very difficult to sit by and allow newly
constructed production capacity to sit idle. Generally speaking, when capital inputs are high for a
particular investment, the need to receive a return on that investment looms large. This tends to
preclude IOCs from engaging in this behavior and makes it highly strenuous for NOCs,
especially when the government’s revenues are dependent on those rents or if it is suffering from
budget shortfalls. The economic costs are steep but so is the political upside.
In addition to opportunity costs, the ability to control oil price requires a considerable
cushion of spare capacity, making the strength afforded by spare capacity a constantly moving
target. As global demand increases over time, more production capacity is required in order to
maintain prices. Between 1980 and 2016, global oil consumption increased from 63.1 mb/d to
97.1 mb/d and projections suggest demand could reach 110 mb/d by 2040.178 This constant
pressure forces companies to constantly invest towards expanding overall production capacity or
see their spare capacity dwindle. Of course, the picture is not completely negative. Other
variables such as economic recessions can intervene in their favor. Whenever economic growth
slows or retracts, the consumption of energy follows suit. Events such as the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis, the 2008 Global Recession, and the Coronavirus Pandemic economic
lockdowns massively reduced the global consumption of oil and temporarily relieved the
pressure on companies to quickly expand capacity.
For data on global consumption see EIA, “International Energy Statistics;” for future projections see
figure on BP, “Energy Outlook 2019,” 85.
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Figure 9 demonstrates how falling OPEC spare capacity in the last two decades resulted
in a tightening of the oil markets and the slow erosion of OPEC’s control over price. Generally
speaking, when OPEC has had more spare capacity prices have tended to be lower. This is
because higher prices reflect more global consumption and a dwindling supply. Between 2000
and 2002 spare capacity was higher and prices were lower than at any other point during the last
two decades. This was an outcome of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Similarly, after the global
recession in 2008 and the subsequent reduction in global consumption, prices fell sharply and
spare capacity spiked. Despite this general trend, both price and spare capacity dramatically
decreased between 2014 and 2017. This is a prime example of the ability to utilize spare capacity
to either economic or political ends. During this period, Saudi Arabia rapidly increased its
production (resulting in the observed decrease in spare capacity) as a strategy to punish its
strategic adversaries—Iran for its regional instigation, Russia for actions in Syria, and the US for
threatening its market share via the unconventional boom.179
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While spare capacity rose sharply in the wake of the global recession in 2008, which was
expected, one distinct trend has arisen in the last two decades: the gradual decline of OPEC spare
capacity. This is primarily because of negative geopolitical developments among OPEC member
states. The collapse of Venezuelan production, the Iraq war, and economic sanctions on Iran
have taken large portions of production off the table. Thus, other OPEC members have been
forced to bring more of their spare capacity online in order to make up for these losses. To some
extent, the rising production in North America and Canada in the wake of the unconventional
boom alleviated some of this pressure, but on the whole it has not been substantial enough to
make up for the massive levels of production that would come from the massively endowed
nations of Venezuela, Iraq, and Iran. Alongside the troubled members, many other OPEC nations
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have neglected the necessary investments that would expand production capacity and allow for
additional spare capacity. As a consequence, one of the primary sources of power that NOCs
have been able to wield since the 1970s has slowly diminished.
The relative rebalancing of market share in favor of IOCs has led to a number of
consequences, chief of which is the rise of what has been called the “Vienna Group” or
“OPEC+.” By December 2016, OPEC released its “Declaration of Cooperation,” announcing
that non-OPEC producers including notable countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mexico
would be aligning themselves with OPEC producers.180 The historic meeting between OPEC and
non-OPEC NOCs reached an agreement on production cuts with the express goal of regaining
power over the global oil market and price management.181 OPEC’s market share had declined to
about 41.5% in 2016 and was being forecasted to drop even further into the 2020s, with some
projections holding it would fall as low as 36%.182 However, with the incorporation of such
notable NOCs into the fold, OPEC+ would control an unprecedented market share of around
55%, a level of market power that has led some to declare the foundation of a new supercartel.183
With cooperation along the lines of production cuts in OPEC+, primarily between Russia
and Saudi Arabia, spare capacity has begun rising again, reaching about 3.8 mb/d.184 This is
equivalent to the levels not seen since after the 2008 global recession and before 2001, when
OEPC spare capacity was at its highest over the last twenty years. Figure 10 illustrates the spare
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capacity of the top 5 oil producers among OPEC+ member countries. Saudi Arabia, as it
traditionally has, dominates this dimension of the energy market as it has roughly 2.2 mb/d of
idle production or 56% of the cartels’ spare capacity. Both Russia and the UAE as well as
Kuwait and Iraq have around 0.5 mb/d and 0.3 mb/d respectively.

Figure 10. OPEC+ Spare Capacity
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Source: Data obtained from IEA, “IEA Statement on Global Oil Markets,” IEA News, April 23,
2019.

The potential control over world energy markets OPEC+ will command is certainly
staggering, well exceeding the past heights of OPEC’s strength. With market share ballooning to
over half of global production while simultaneously maintaining levels of spare capacity that
match the highest recorded levels in the last twenty years, OPEC+ will have unprecedented
levels of power over the global markets. To put this in perspective, Saudi Arabia was able to sink
the price of oil from a high of $106.20 USD per barrel in June 2014 to a low of $27.45 in
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February 2016 by simply producing 726 kb/d more in the same period.185 OPEC+ will have more
than five times that amount of spare production capacity at its disposal. Needless to say, this
signals a very strong shift back in favor of NOCs when it comes to spare capacity despite the
continued strength of North American production.
However, there is reason to be sober when projecting the overall influence OPEC+ will
be able to generate. For the same reason the original OPEC struggled, this new international
organization will likely suffer from cooperative issues, specifically the incentive to cheat.186 The
incorporation of Russia, a nation with belligerent tendencies and a long history of using energy
as a foreign policy tool,187 has many experts suspicious about the long-term viability of
cooperation. One energy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has already
pointed out that Russia has displayed highly opportunistic behavior, doing the bare minimum to
satisfy the Saudis while exploiting high prices and geopolitical events at every turn.188 Despite
the potential conflicts of interorganizational national interests, it is difficult to see the group
Completely dissolving due to cooperation issues. The fact remains that the potential strength of
OPEC+ is substantial and while the addition of Russia may increase the likelihood of occasional
organizational conflicts, the members are unlikely to cast aside the potential influence they can
wield through cooperation.

For the price of oil see “WTI Crude Oil Prices - 10 Year Daily Chart,” Macrotrends, accessed July 24,
2019; and for Saudi production levels see EIA, “International Energy Statistics.”
186
For more on cheating among OPEC member countries see Sel Dibooglua and Salim N. AlGudhea,
“All Time Cheaters Versus Cheaters in Distress: An Examination of Cheating and Oil Prices in OPEC,”
Economic Systems 31 (September 2007): 292-310; Douglas B. Reynolds, “Modeling OPEC Behavior:
Theories of Risk Aversion for Oil Producer Decisions,” Energy Policy 27 (December 1999): 901-912;
and James M. Griffin and Weiwen Xiong, “The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC,”
The Journal of Law and Economics 40 (October 1997): 289-316.
187
For a comprehensive look at Russia’s use of energy diplomacy see Anita Orban, Power, Energy, and
the New Russian Imperialism (Praeger Security International, 2008).
188
Andrew J. Stanley, “Russia: The OPEC+ Opportunist,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 6, 2019.
185

99

More importantly, the formation of OPEC+ represents a massive shift back in favor of
NOCs. IOCs have been the originators and the primary beneficiaries of the North American
energy boom. This was beginning to threaten the market share of the original OPEC countries.
We have seen the Saudis pour oil onto the market, which was partly aimed at drowning the
boom. When that strategy failed, they simply looked to bring more NOCs into the fold. The
addition of Russia is especially significant because of their production levels and their
contentious politics. Russia has traditionally been one of the “big three” oil producers, alongside
the US and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, an alignment between two of the three is notable. There are
also the numerous examples of energy coercion that suggest Russia will be keen to utilize the
power of OPEC+ in a hawkish manner. In the past, Saudi-led OPEC has been overwhelmingly
dovish as a consequence of their alliance with the US. This could very well change under the
leadership of a Saudi-Russo partnership. Needless to say, with the addition of Russia and others,
NOCs now wield more power in the area of spare capacity than ever before.

Operational Efficiency

Wielding strength in terms of reserves and production, conventional or otherwise,
provides for a core analysis of an energy companies’ comparative position to their privatized or
nationalized counterparts. However, all companies are not necessarily created equal, even among
similar archetypes. There is much that separates these firms from one another when it comes to
performance and, ultimately, outcomes. This is because various elements such as corporate
structure, operational (vertical or horizontal) integration, and government intervention
(taxation/rents or regulations) all influence how efficiently an individual company can function.
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To be precise, this is different from what this study has referred to as technical efficiency
in the earlier section on unconventional capability. Of course, the two are somewhat related as
they both are dealing with issues of efficiency as well as performance and outcomes. However,
the two deserve distinction in that technical efficiency deals specifically with a company’s ability
to innovate and its overall technical expertise. Companies that have high levels of technical
efficiency tend to be highly oriented towards R&D and are usually on the cutting edge in the
industry. Moreover, they are generally known for deploying the most sophisticated machinery
and engaging in the most effective technical methods.
On the other hand, operational efficiency is more about the fundamental integrity of the
company. In other words, it underscores the firm’s ability to engage in the basic economic
operations associated with its particular industry without being hamstrung by intervening factors
like the ones listed above. In the energy industry, this is an important indicator of strength
because of the capital intensity of the front-end investments that are necessary for commercial
activity. Therefore, high levels of profitability are paramount for success, requiring that these
companies structure themselves as efficiently as possible in order to get ahead. Operational
efficiency is particularly significant because it underscores how well they will be able to exploit
their reserves, the long-term viability of their current operations, and their ability to expand over
time.
NOCs have historically been much less efficient than IOCs. In fact, many studies over
the years have reached this conclusion.189 However, despite the conclusions that NOCs are
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generally less efficient than their private counterparts, there is a great deal of variation among
them. Additionally, NOCs’ efficiency as a group has risen in recent decades, requiring a closer
look at the literature. As it turns out, many of the studies examining NOC efficiency have noted
that while factors such as corporate structure and managerial skills certainly influence the level
of efficiency, “it is ultimately the government that affects the performance and strategy of
NOCs.”190 The more a company must account for high rents or regulatory interference, the less
likely it will be efficient.191
Therefore, the wide variation in efficiency among NOCs goes hand in hand with the
controlling state’s goals and policies, which also vary from country to country. There exists a
profound difference in the performance and strategies of Saudi Aramco when compared to that
of Mexican PEMEX, for example. There are a few NOCs, save a few examples such as Saudi
Aramco or Norway’s Equinor (previously Statoil), that are considered to be efficient enterprises
comparable to IOCs.192 Changes in efficiency among NOCs are also reflected in the evolving
policies of their governments over time. Take for example Venezuela’s PDVSA and Russia’s
NOCs (Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil). In the case of PDVSA, government nationalization in 1976
as well as mismanagement and high rents under Chavez has run the company into the ground
essentially collapsing under low oil prices in the wake of the global recession in 2008 and the oil
glut in 2014-2016.193 On the other hand, Russia’s NOCs were burdened with various
noncommercial activities and performed with far less efficiency throughout the 1990s after their
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re-nationalization. However, Gazprom and Rosneft have increased their efficiency in recent
years as a result of changing Russian policies.194
While many NOCs have had considerable difficulties expanding production while having
to balance between commercial and non-commercial responsibilities, others have been more
effective. Perhaps one of the biggest developments in the world of NOC efficiency is the rise of
what are called pNOCs or partially privatized NOCs. These are national companies that allow for
investors to purchase shares in the company, though the controlling country is careful to
maintain the majority stake. This is an interesting strategy among countries with nationalized
energy companies because through increased capitalization they can both buttress their overall
commercial capabilities while maintaining control over operations and decision-making at the
same time. As a result, pNOCs have given rise to a new class of national companies, some of
which are comparable to the most efficient companies in the industry. 195 One study, examining
the changes in operational efficiency of IOCs and NOCs between 2001 and 2009, finds that
NOCs have generally increased their efficiency over the decade. Experiencing some marginal
ups and downs, IOCs have remained roughly unchanged in efficiency. Most notably, the
dramatic increase in the efficiency among pNOCs has put them on par with IOCs.
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Figure 11. Changes in Efficiency by Company Type, 2001-2009
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Privatized NOCs such as Sinopec, PTT, and Equinor produced the same efficiency score
as the most efficient IOCs (BP and ExxonMobil).196 Moreover, as figure 11 illustrates, when
comparing the entire group of IOCs to that of pNOCs over the decade, both groups had roughly
similar efficiency scores by 2009. Furthermore, this represents an upward trend for the trajectory
of all NOCs’ efficiency that began in 2005. However, pNOCs have shown themselves far more
resilient in the face of plummeting oil prices and global recession, which began in 2008. In this
period, the efficiency of NOCs leveled off to their previous 2005 levels; meanwhile their
privatized counterparts continued their upward trend, closing the gap in efficiency between IOCs
and themselves by 2009. More importantly, pNOCs were able to increase their efficiency
between 2007-2009, a period in which even the IOCs lost efficiency.
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While partial privatization has had a net positive effect on NOC efficiency, its positive
effect still varies by case. Figure 12 underscores the wide range of efficiency between and among
IOCs, NOCs, and pNOCs. For instance, China’s Sinopec has benefited from partial privatization
to a far greater extent and much faster than has Russia’s Lukoil or Rosneft, which reflects the
greater autonomy enjoyed by Chinese NOCs. This means that the extent to which partial
privatization will improve NOC efficiency still depends on the NOC relationship with the
government. That is, political considerations can still stifle commercial activities even if a NOC
is partially private.
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Figure 12. Structural Efficiency of the Largest 25 Oil & Gas Companies
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When it comes to operational efficiency, IOCs still maintain their position of relative
strength, albeit less so than in the past. Private companies are simply lighter and more flexible,
less encumbered by the non-commercial burdens that come along with public ownership. To be
sure, NOCs are no longer the inefficient enterprises that energy scholarship had become
accustomed to in the late 20th century. While mostly dependent on the wisdom of the controlling
government, some NOCs like Saudi Aramco and Chinese NOCs have made considerable
progress and compete on the same level as the most efficient IOCs. On the other hand, some
NOCs have made marginal improvements or none at all. Even worse, there are NOCs such as
Venezuela’s PDVSA that have completely collapsed as a result of crippling government
interference.

Figure based on the Data Envelopment Efficiency Score model; Red - National oil companies (NOCs), Blue –
International oil companies (IOCs).
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Perhaps the most impactful evolution of NOCs when it comes to operational efficiency is
the rise of pNOCs. On the whole, the dramatic increase in performance of pNOCs has played the
most significant role in raising the profile of NOCs around the world and indicates the increased
blurring between public and private enterprises. However, the most important element
influencing the operational efficiency of a company remains the level of government
intervention, regardless of whether a NOC is fully owned and operated by the state or it is partial
privatized. This is made apparent in the top performance of Saudi Aramco, which is still fully
nationalized. Additionally, partial privatization has produced more marginal benefits for Russian
NOCs, further highlighting the dampening effects state policies can have. As a result, it remains
difficult to conclude decisively that the rise of pNOCs will seriously redistribute the balance of
power in terms of structural efficiency.
To be sure, both NOCs and pNOCs have made considerable strides in the previous
decade, especially when compared to their first thirty years. If anything, this reflects the growing
wisdom of national bodies in their policies towards the companies under their control. More
governments are restraining themselves, moving more towards hands-off policies, and allowing
their companies to flourish. Ultimately, this has somewhat eroded the undisputed IOC
dominance in this dimension of strength.

Conclusion

According to the indicators of strength that this study has utilized in its analysis of NOCs
and IOCs, the national firms have been more effective at increasing their power over time in the
energy industry. However, their dominance is not monopolistic nor their control unassailable. A
more nuanced view is required in order to yield an appropriate analysis and is necessary for a
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suitable explanation of NOCs’ expanding influence in global energy. The indicators have
revealed that NOCs dominate in the areas of reserves, production, and spare capacity, as well as
having made impressive strides when it comes to operational efficiency. IOCs, on the other hand,
have found new life in unconventional energy as they completely control this area of the
industry. This has allowed for some gains in the areas of reserves and production, though the
strength of NOCs remains overwhelming. Additionally, IOCs have experienced an erosion of
relative strength in the area of operational efficiency, which was one of their traditional areas of
dominance.
As long as economic growth and development are powered by hydrocarbons, NOCs’ and
their controlling states will be the most essential actors in the area of global energy. While
environmental imperatives have gained steam in western countries, there remains no suitable
substitute for hydrocarbons outside of nuclear energy. Thus, projections still weigh heavily in
favor of the continued use of hydrocarbons up to and beyond 2040. As a result, the NOCs that
control the overwhelming majority of the world’s oil and gas reserves will be the most critical
energy suppliers and the lifeblood for sustained global economic growth for the foreseeable
future.
Despite a dip in their global share of production over the last decade, NOCs still control
the overwhelming portion of supply. To be sure, North American production has surprised the
world, but this unexpected and rapid growth has only modestly shifted the share of supply.
Moreover, projections for unconventional production suggest a two-decade shelf life set to
expire by the 2030s. Burgeoning production levels has led to more downward pressure in the last
decade when compared to the previous. While NOCs’ production will take over once North
American production tapers off, this has had mixed effects on NOCs in the present. Countries
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like Brazil and Iraq have proven resilient and have even grown their operations under the more
demanding circumstances. Powerful producers like Saudi Arabia have attempted to fight back
and use their spare production capacity to place added pressure on the IOCs. Others, like
Venezuela have completely collapsed in the face of lower prices.
In the area of unconventional energy, IOCs have carved out a niche for themselves.
Reserves once considered not economically recoverable have, through innovation and a
conducive price environment, been opened up to the companies with the capability to exploit
them. This has massively rebalanced the energy endowments of many countries, albeit not
necessarily in favor of IOCs. However, unconventional energy has overwhelmingly benefitted
IOCs with respect to production. Moreover, IOCs have an opportunity to export their capabilities
globally through partnerships. NOCs do not have the technical capabilities to take advantage of
unconventional reserves and therefore IOCs have gained a new path they can pursue in the
future. Admittedly, these new opportunities face many political challenges and much work is still
required if serious progress towards a global unconventional boom is realized. At the same time,
the IOCs have undoubtedly secured a source of strength in the industry going forward.
Spare capacity had always been an exclusively held NOC strength, but a dwindling one
in the face of increasing global demand and shrinking market share. When many members of the
original OPEC agreed to defend their existing share and overproduce, they achieved mixed
results. Consequently, more NOCs were recruited into the fold and a new supercartel commonly
known as OPEC+ came into being. Nearly all the prominent NOCs have now aligned in policy to
recapture this dimension of power. This has resulted is an unprecedented position for NOCs in
the area of spare capacity.
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Operational efficiency has traditionally been a strength of IOCs, but NOCs have made
tremendous progress in this area. At the same time, it is important to recognize that overall gains
have been unevenly distributed and are mostly the result of hands-off government policies.
Increased activities such as mergers and acquisitions as well as partial privatizations have also
played a significant role. However, when companies are overburdened by non-commercial
policies, they struggle to compete. Ultimately, the wisdom of the controlling government will be
the deciding factor. To be sure, the ability for some nationalized entities to perform on the same
level as their privatized competition underscores the shifting balance of power in the industry.
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CHAPTER V
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF NOCS

The initial rise of NOCs and OPEC in the 20th century was best explained by a host of
political and economic factors such as the statist reassertion of power over respective national
energy sectors. This coincided with the post WWII US-led neoliberal economic order eclipsing
the previous century’s European mercantilist system as well as the western response to the rise of
NOCs that globalizes the international energy markets and pricing mechanisms. Additionally,
western countries formed the IEA as a response to the 1973 oil shock, a neoplural solution to
international energy crises. While these factors led to the most dramatic shift in dominance over
the global oil and gas industry’s history, they do not specifically explain why NOCs have
remained powerful or why some have significantly risen in prominence despite the magnifying
forces of economic globalization in the 21st century. In the previous chapter, the indicators of
strength revealed a number of fundamental truths concerning NOCs over the last two decades,
their resilience in some cases, and their continued expansion in others. However, they do not tell
the entire story. The rise of NOCs in the 21st century requires fresh explanations, especially since
there have been profound geopolitical and global economic changes since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
First, the spread of democracy and free markets via US-led global institutions as well as
the forces of economic globalization have not been as successful at expanding privatization and
deregulation as much as one might assume.198 The resurgence of Russia in the post-Soviet era,
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the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings,199 the continued illiberalism of the undeveloped and
developing world,200 and the rise of China eclipsing the mature Asian Tiger economies, have all
contributed to a blunting of neoliberalism and economic globalization. Furthermore, they have
contributed to a resurgence of statism in the global economy. While state capitalism is a larger
phenomenon dealing with increasing state authority in the free market spanning a multitude of
industries outside of energy, it is greatly reflected in the expansion of nationalizations that have
taken place since the turn of the century. As a result, the recent wave of nationalizations, renationalizations, and rise of new powerful NOCs have been aided by renewed resource
nationalism, which is a distinct phenomenon stemming from the resurgence of state power in the
global economy.
Second, the era of globalization has reduced barriers for wealthy and powerful
corporations to go multinational.201 As a result, many globalists concluded that the international
system was benefiting and increasingly becoming populated by a strengthening class of MNCs at
the expense of state power and regulatory authority.202 However, the expanding power of MNCs
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globally has also included those that are controlled and operated by national governments.
Consequently, nationalized corporations including NOCs have increasingly extended themselves
beyond their country’s borders, blurring the distinction between energy companies that are
national and international. The internationalization of NOCs is a new development in the global
energy industry and takes shape in three primary ways: foreign direct investment, M&A activity,
and collaborative R&D. These activities have given rise to increased global competition as well
as cooperation among national and international energy companies, both of which have resulted
in an overall expansion of NOCs’ capabilities.
Third, in the second half of the 20th century a number of global factors served to
encourage crippling economic policies by a number of governments. The strength of the Soviet
Union and the popularity of socialism and the command style economy, the import-substitution
model of industrialization across the developing world, and the era of decolonization all
encouraged strong government constraints on commercial activities which tended to stifle the
efficiency of nationalized entities. This filtered into the energy industry as much as or perhaps
more so than others considering the strategic economic value of energy. For decades NOCs
struggled to compete with IOCs because of efficiency problems. Yet, impressive gains have been
scored in this important area by NOCs more recently and this is perhaps one of the biggest
developments in the energy industry aside from the American unconventional boom. This leap
forward is mostly the product of the changing relationship between the state and the NOC and
has manifested the increasingly hands-off policies states have adopted towards their energy
companies. Consequently, the 21st century has seen a new class of highly efficient NOCs,
capable of competing with the world’s most efficient IOCs.
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Fourth, hydrocarbons and the energy we obtain from them are the undisputed critical
resources in our world. The modern industrial economy is fundamentally dependent on energy
inputs in order to produce units of GDP. Furthermore, economic development, dominance, and
by extension national power are all fundamentally tied to control over or access to these inputs.
Thus, power relationships among states and over geopolitics in general are tied to energy
resources. As a consequence, these resources hold immense strategic value and are alluring to
national governments unlike other industries. This means that countries will likely prefer to
express control over their energy industry so that they might benefit from the various areas of
state power including regime stability, military capabilities, and foreign policy. Each affords the
state additional strength in different ways, but all serve to increase the attractiveness of control
over one’s energy industry and this bolsters the NOC model around the world.

Resurgence of the State

Since the end of WWII, the establishment of the new world order at Bretton Woods, and
the policy formulation known as the Washington consensus, the world slowly began to conform
to what has been called the Neoliberal economic order.203 From its rise out of agrarianism and
transformation into an industrial and commercial superpower,204 the US would rise to guide the
west away from the former European-led international order characterized by mercantilism and
imperialism and into the neoliberal order. The superpower status of the United States following
the conclusion of WWII and the founding of the neoliberal order would also set the stage for the
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next global international competition with the Soviet Union, involving a struggle for supremacy
between very different models for political and economic organization of the international
system. Capitalism and socialism spread across the globe geostrategically, pushed by various
policies emanating from the two superpowers which are best represented by the Washington
Consensus and the Communist International.
In the developing world, this meant that the path to modernity and industrial economic
development could best be accomplished by either the state or the market. Consequently,
developing states adopted one of two different industrialization policies known as import
substitution or export orientation.205 As the 20th century came to a close a number of revelations
became apparent to the world concerning the relative success of these different pathways to
modernity. This included the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disastrous results of China’s Great
Leap Forward, and the general economic outpacing of closed economies that followed import
substitution policies in Latin America, India, and Africa by open economies that followed export
orientation in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. As a consequence, many in the
West were eager to proclaim the triumph of liberal democracy and of global capitalism.206
However, this supposed victory and much of the imagined progress associated with it has
either been undone, challenged, or was at best surface level. To be clear, the collapse of the
Soviet Union was significant and without a doubt it would not be capable of rising again to its
former superpower status to challenge the US in the way that it previously did. In this sense,
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liberal democracy and global capitalism did triumph. However, much of the liberalization and
privatization achieved under Boris Yeltsin in Russia was thoroughly undone when Vladimir
Putin came to power and the country has since fallen back into authoritarianism and has
renationalized a number of industries.207 Additionally, much of the spread of democratic
institutions outside of the West has resulted in the proliferation of illiberal democracies that at
best are just mimicking the institutional process208 and are riddled with corruption.209 Scholars
have also pointed out the relatively quick relapse into authoritarianism of the Middle East
following the Arab Spring210 as well as the troubling rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe and
Southeast Asia.211
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Most importantly, the rising challenge to western liberal democracy and global capitalism
has presented itself in the form China’s expanding power and influence.212 The magnitude of the
challenge has yet to reach levels comparable to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and may
never, but one glaring similarity is worth noting. China sports a hybrid command-style centrally
planned economy that operates with far greater degrees of freedom relative to those of the
previous century. This allows for both a retention of state regulatory authority and the enhanced
competitiveness of a free market.213 This is highly attractive for many countries across the world
that are either skeptical of western democracy or are in the hands of corrupt politicians and
autocrats that wish to hold on to their power while also pursuing modernity. Thus, while the
spread of liberal democracy has had a spotted record, the advance of economic liberalization in
the era of globalization has been more successful.
The realization of the failures of stringent statist command economics has led to an
embrace, to various extents, of economic liberalism and deregulation among many autocratic
regimes and illiberal democracies. Simultaneously, these same forces pressing for a rollback
favoring state power in some areas have also created new demands and opportunities for state
interventionism in others.214 Thus, the 21st century global political economy has witnessed the
rise of a hybrid model that many scholars have come to refer to as “State Capitalism,”215 which
can be generally understood as a market-based economy that operates under an umbrella of state
authority and regulatory capacity. This new economic model has been championed
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predominantly by China, but also by countries such as Russia, Brazil, India, Turkey, and South
Africa. State capitalism and the actors employing this model increasingly penetrate global
markets by interacting with private investors as either majority or minority shareholders in
publicly traded corporations or as financial backers of purely private firms.216 More alarming is
the increasing number of authoritarian regimes that have established sovereign wealth funds,
rapidly expanding their ability to intervene in the corporate sectors of other countries.217 In
addition to sovereign wealth funds, many of these regimes have also increased their control over
the military-industrial and penal complexes, which holds a range of serious implications with
respect to ethics and human rights.218
Among the many industries in which states have been expanded their strength, the energy
industry is a chief example. In the mid to late 20th century this was primarily driven by resource
nationalism and was weaved into the greater political transformations of the time, most notably
decolonization. Some scholars have argued that the rise of NOCs, OPEC, and the 1973 oil
embargo were more fundamentally connected to gaining national control over resources and
reforming the neoliberal order established at Bretton Woods, rather than the outcome of the Yom
Kippur War.219 Similarly, the resource nationalism of the 21st century continues to be a blunting
force against neoliberalism,220 though the phenomenon is being driven more by the resurgence of
the state and the rise of state capitalism than being embedded within decolonization as was the
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case in the past.221 Moreover, the new resource nationalism has not limited itself to a specific
region or to a smaller subset of resource-rich, formerly colonized territories, but rather has
proven to be a global force taking root across Latin America, the former Soviet Union, Africa,
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even in western democratic countries like Norway or
import dependent countries like China.222
While there are a number of important continuities between statist policies of the last
century and contemporary state capitalism, there are also major differences. Primarily, states
look for ways to maintain primacy and regulatory authority while simultaneously allowing for
degrees of freedom in the market, whereas in the past the goal was to establish total control over
the market. Resource nationalism is not too dissimilar. Overarching narratives like reestablishing national sovereignty over important resources and viewing international companies
as exploitative entities persist, but the implementation of national control is not as
asymmetrical.223 As a result, states have pursued renegotiations to obtain majority ownership in
various projects or consortiums that develop oil and gas fields, whereas in the past they generally
sought complete ownership and control of resource development and intended to expel outside
firms over time.224 Interestingly, the influence of state capitalism on resource nationalism has
produced a more measured strategy on the part of states who want to reassert national control
over resources via NOCs.
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In Latin America, IOCs such as ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Total SA, Equinor, BP,
and Chevron were forced to concede their controlling stakes to the Venezuelan firm PDVSA
during the Chavez era.225 Bolivia and Ecuador also moved toward nationalizing their oil industry
in 2006.226 In the former Soviet Union, similar developments have taken place in Russia and
Kazakhstan. Under President Vladimir Putin his goal of renationalization of hydrocarbon
resources was finalized when he introduced legislation that made foreign investment in resource
rich areas more difficult.227 As an example, Royal Dutch Shell and TNK-BP were forced to sell a
51 percent stake in the Sakhalin-2 oil field to Russia’s Gazprom in 2007.228 For its part,
Kazakhstan suspended the development of the Kashagan oil field in 2006, a project being
developed primarily by Italian Eni and French Total SA, and has only recently begun to restart
production as of May 2019.229 As a result, Total SA has announced it will significantly reduce its
share of the consortium.230 Additionally, the Middle East and Africa remain critical for oil and
gas development and resource nationalism continues to play a significant role in the political
backdrop of the two regions.231
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On the other side of the equation, IOCs have faced a number of difficulties in accessing
desirable oil fields and have been forced to renegotiate their shares in those they already held.
Because NOCs and their controlling governments have been increasing their hold over the
reservoirs that IOCs want to invest in, they have been forced to prospect in more unconventional
plays such as tar sands and shale oil. For example, Oil Change International estimates that
ConocoPhillips has derived 71 percent of its liquids reserves from Canada’s tar sands over the
past 10 years.232 That reliance on tar sands is also evident at ExxonMobil (51 per cent), Shell (34
per cent), Total (26 per cent) and Chevron (7 per cent).233 On one hand, this has led to the
unconventional boom and the recent strengthening of IOCs concerning production and reserves
reflected in the data from the previous chapter. On the other hand, all of the projections point out
the temporary nature of unconventional plays. Couple this together with the increasingly
complex nature of the projects, which require more investment,234 and IOCs have much to worry
about in the coming decades.
The 21st century expansion of NOCs both in terms of number and in importance has
coincided with the resurgence of the state in world politics. Globalization, while serving to
diffuse state authority in some areas, has opened up opportunities to expand state strength in
others. The energy industry is one of these areas of the global economy, where the state has been
gaining strength rather than losing it. This is explained in part by the rise of state capitalism and
the resurgence of the state in the international political economy. Consequently, resource
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nationalism is being expressed in a new way where states are not as hostile towards foreign
companies but rather seek more favorable partnerships where they can maintain majority control
but also take advantage of highly capable private companies in the global market. With private
companies being partially or even completely shut out from most of the desirable sites of
production around the world they have turned to unconventional energy. This helps explain why
the data reflects a continued dominant control over reserves and production by NOCs and also
why IOCs have seen a temporary boost in these areas more recently.

Internationalization
The expansion of NOCs in the 21st century, having taken place during an era of
unprecedented economic globalization, have been presented with new opportunities that have
contributed to their increasing capabilities and areas of operation. Similar to how states have
been enabled by economic globalization so too have NOCs. However, states and their NOCs are
not exactly one in the same, though they are intricately related, and these firms can function as
arms of the state in some cases. Therefore, it is important to draw distinctions when relevant.
Globalization has opened up new opportunities for states and for their NOCs but in different
ways. In the previous section I explained how the rise of state capitalism produced knock-on
effects for the energy industry, strengthening NOCs as a consequence of the resurgence and
transformation of resource nationalism. This section will focus on how economic globalization
has directly affected NOCs, while setting the state to the side.
Powered by market liberalization and reduced protectionism around the world, the
modern global economy has become increasingly dominated by multi- or international firms. But
as we saw in the last section, these forces have been benefitting both autocratic regimes and
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illiberal democracies as much as, and perhaps more so, than liberal democracies. Likewise, many
nationalized and partially privatized firms have swelled with the rising tides of economic
liberalism and have significantly increased their competitiveness to the extent that they now can
compete with the traditional western-style privatized firms. In fact, many scholars have argued
that the contemporary rise of internationalized NOCs is best contextualized against the backdrop
of the intersection between the transformation of global business and emerging economies.235
The reduced costs associated with operating internationally has afforded NOCs the opportunity
to expand beyond their national boundaries.236 Consequently, a handful of NOCs have
increasingly accumulated a global footprint in the 21st century, which can significantly
strengthen an NOC when part of a well-conceived strategy. Examples range from fully
nationalized firms like Saudi Aramco to partially privatized firms such as Norwegian Equinor.
However, it is important to point out that while a number of NOCs are scoring important gains,
this is not the case for many others.
The internationalization of NOCs can be defined loosely as the expansion of overseas
business operations, investment activity, or R&D. In the broadest sense, this term highlights how
some NOCs are beginning to look more like IOCs, despite government oversight. Whereas in
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past decades the camps of western IOCs and NOCs embodied separate ends of a spectrum, now
many NOCs appear to be scattered across the spectrum with some looking a lot more like IOCs,
some less so, and many still like the traditional NOC. In the energy sector, the motivations for
international investments mirror that of multinational firms, though they manifest in different
ways. These three primary motivations are resource-seeking, market-seeking, and strategic assetseeking and have been thoroughly studied in the international business literature.237 Generally
speaking, resource-seeking behavior deals with upstream investments such as exploration or
extraction, market-seeking behavior concerns downstream investment like gasoline refining or
petrochemicals, and strategic asset-seeking refers to industry expansion where firms aim at
cross-border M&A activity that allows them to acquire important intellectual know-how and/or
technologies that enhances their competitiveness.238
In the last two decades, NOCs have been most aggressively pursuing internationalizing
strategies in the areas of global upstream investment and cross-border M&A. This has allowed
NOCs to significantly increase their influence over various resource-rich regions of the world
including Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East as well as helping NOCs to close the gap
with IOCs concerning technical expertise and overall global competitiveness. M&A activity has
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had a profound impact on increasing the international competitiveness of NOCs,239 because of
the impact of technology transfers. Combine this together with historic levels R&D among
NOCs that has surpassed that of IOCs for the first time ever according to one study,240 and it
becomes easier to explain how NOCs have closed the efficiency gap vis-à-vis IOCs. In fact, the
literature on the internationalization of emerging country NOCs has acknowledged the
relationship between the global competitiveness of these firms and technology transfer as well as
their expanding capability to invest in recent years.241
The expanding reach of NOCs into overseas upstream production has occurred at an
equally rapid rate. A great deal of this activity will be gone over in greater detail in the case
studies, but for now consider one of the most important targets in recent years for international
investment in the energy industry: Iraq. During the era of Saddam Hussein UN sanctions
prevented much of any economic interaction with the outside world throughout the 1990s and
early 2000s. But with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which deposed Hussein’s Baathist regime,
Iraq was opened back up to the world. The pivotal moment came shortly after the surge in Iraq
restored national stability and the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between
the US and Iraq came into effect in 2013.242 This agreement would promote strong economic ties
and integrate Iraq into the global economy. The country’s potential for oil production is

Gasford Aleksander, “Internationalization of National Oil Companies: Asset Acquisitions and Asset
Swaps,” Master’s Thesis prepared for the International Business Program, St. Petersburg State University,
2016.
240
Ben Thuriaux-Aleman, Sam Salisbury, Paolo R. Dutto, “R&D Investment Trends and the Rise of
NOCs,” Journal of Petroleum Technology 62 (October 1, 2010).
241
Pauline Jones-Luong, “Crude Ambitions: The Internationalization of Emerging National Oil
Companies,” Mershon Center of International Security Studies, Globalization Speaker Series, Ohio State
University, October 17, 2013.
242
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “United States of America and the Republic of Iraq
Announce Progress on Entry into Force of Trade and Investment Framework Agreement,” Press Release,
June 3, 2013.
239

125

enormous given its vast, relatively undeveloped reserves. This is the case because the Iran-Iraq
war in the 1980s, the Gulf War and subsequent sanctions in the 1990s, and the US invasion in the
2000s had all prevented the nation from developing their oil fields in any significant way until
recently. According to current projections from the IEA, Iraq will account for 40% of global oil
supply growth over the next two decades, hitting the 8 mb/d mark by 2035, making it the second
largest global exporter.243 These factors have made Iraq the crown jewel for international energy
investment over the last decade and this will continue at least until the 2040s.
At first some IOCs did well in Iraq, given America’s influential role in the country’s
politics. Since 2003, the US has invested in Iraqi energy capacity building programs, including
spending $4.6 billion on the power section and $2.1 billion on the oil sector.244 These efforts
bore fruit when four export platforms came online south of Basra in 2012, each of which having
the capacity to export 900,000 bp/d.245 After the US withdrawal in 2011, America has continued
to cooperate with Iraq on energy issues as part of the Strategic Framework Agreements. A
number of IOCs and smaller international oil service companies have benefitted during the initial
opening of Iraq. Notably, Royal Dutch Shell and Halliburton joined together to develop one of
the world’s largest oil fields, the Majnoon field, a contract that has gone to KBR more
recently.246 Others that have operated in Iraq on some level include Baker Hughes,
Schlumberger, and Weatherford. In 2010, ExxonMobil along with Royal Dutch Shell signed an
agreement with Iraq to redevelop the West Qurna oil field, another massive reserve numbering at
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about 8.7 billion barrels.247 Additionally, ExxonMobil was also awarded six separate production
sharing contracts in the Kurdistan region between 2011 and 2013.248
In the last decade, most of the energy contracts in Iraq have been awarded to NOCs
despite America’s penetration. The most notable NOCs have been those from China and Russia,
but predominantly China. The IEA has projected that by 2035 Iraq will produce 8 million bpd
and that about 80% of Iraq’s future oil exports are destined for Southeast Asia, mainly China.249
Moreover, nearly a third of the future oil production in Iraq is projected to come from fields that
either are directly owned or co-led by Chinese companies. To continue to fuel its rapidly
expanding economy China has sought to ensure long-term access to Iraqi oil. Since 2009, its
economic cooperation with Iraq in the areas of trade and energy have expanded at an
unprecedented rate. The UN sanctions from the Saddam era severely crippled Iraq’s energy
industry, but since 2012 it has been producing oil at the highest rate since Saddam seized power
in 1979.250 Between 2009 and 2014, exports to China more than tripled accounting for more than
9% of total imports and making Iraq China’s fourth largest supplier behind Russia (15.8%),
Saudi Arabia (12.4%), and Angola (10.4%).251 China has kept its imports from Iraq steady since
2015, ending a five-year skyrocketing rate of import growth.252
To underscore China’s success despite the American occupation, CNPC renegotiated the
$3 billion oil service contract for the al-Ahdad oil field that was originally signed under
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Saddam.253 The contract was signed in 2008 despite all negotiations and oil contracts being
suspended following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as the US troop surge drawing
to a close just a few months prior to the signing. This would make it the first oil contract that Iraq
awarded to a foreign company since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.254 Chinese overseas
activity has been notably robust in the last two decades and will be detailed to a greater extent in
chapter 8. Concerning Iraq, Chinese NOCs have been the most active foreign companies since
the regime change.
For their part, the Russian NOCs have also been noticeably elevating their interactions in
Iraq’s energy industry in the post-Saddam era. Similar to China, their activity began shortly after
the US troop surge in Iraq came to an end and well before the US withdrawal in 2011. This
includes many joint projects between Russia’s Rosneft and Crescent Petroleum. In April 2009,
Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited Russia, the first visit by an Iraqi leader since 1981.
Shortly after the negotiations, Gazprom Neft won a monumental contract to develop the 2billion-barrel Badra oil field and gain a 30% stake in the project, the largest stake of the
consortium.255 This field was discovered in 1979 but had gone unexploited until this contract
began in 2010. It is scheduled for a twenty-year period with the possibility of a five-year
extension. In 2016, Gazprom completed its tenth production well and third processing line to the
central processing facility, raising the potential output capacity to 115 kb/d.256
In September 2009, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko led a Russian delegation to
Iraq for the purpose of long-term cooperation in the energy sector. According to Shmatko, the
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visit “opened a new page in energy cooperation between the two countries,”257 with the main
task being to “create conditions for increased trade and diversifying forms of cooperation.”258
The delegation and Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki agreed to implement a number of joint energy
development projects including the major Kirkuk-Biji pipeline and other pipelines as well as
Russian companies modernizing existing and building new power plants across the nation. Just
as with the Chinese NOCs, investment by Russian NOCs in Iraq will be covered in greater detail
later. However, involvement between Russian firms and Iraq’s energy industry has only
increased since 2009, making it the second most heavily invested behind China.
A handful of other energy firms are also active in Iraq, most of which being NOCs. Aside
from ExxonMobil and BP, the other twenty companies currently operating in Iraq are either fully
owned and operated by national governments or are partially privatized NOCs.259 Of course,
Iraqi Kurdistan is more slanted in favor of IOCs, where fifteen of the twenty-seven companies in
operation are privately held,260 primarily because of the close alliance between the US and the
Kurdish. Nevertheless, most of the contracts for the most significant oil fields in Iraq have gone
to NOCs. Moreover, the trend of increasing NOC dominance has continued more recently. In
late 2017 and early 2018, Iraq offered contracts on 11 blocks in border regions and offshore oil
fields, of which not a single IOC won licensing.261
NOCs have benefitted greatly from the decreasing barriers to international economic
activity due to the forces of economic globalization. Since the turn of the century, more NOCs
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have expanded their activities beyond their national borders than ever before. The
internationalization of NOCs has produced a more competitive type of national firm that has
come to challenge the traditional oil majors and IOCs more generally in many areas that were
once completely dominated by these privately held firms. The most recent example of Iraq is
telling. As one of the last countries with vast reserves of undeveloped, cheap oil and gas, sizable
investments on the part of IOCs might have been expected, especially since the US and its
western allies were the occupying force. In fact, many throughout the world viewed the move as
an attempt by the west to secure the oil wealth of Iraq for itself. However, it turns out that for the
most part NOCs have benefitted more from the opening of Iraq, rather than the IOCs. Most,
notably, Chinese and Russian NOCs have largely outmaneuvered IOCs, which will likely bolster
these company’s profitability going forward.
The internationalization of NOCs has benefitted far more than just those from China or
Russia and their global reach has penetrated numerous countries other than Iraq. While not all
NOCs have been able to integrate themselves globally, those that have are benefitting greatly.
These new international NOCs have become as competitive as IOCs, which helps to explain why
the data on efficiency has reflected a closing gap between the different firm variants as well as
why top tier NOCs have become more numerous in the 21st century.

Government Policy

Of the numerous transformations that NOCs have undergone in the last couple of decades
perhaps none have been as consequential as their relative increase in freedom from the various
noncommercial burdens that they generally shoulder. This has allowed NOCs to become more
competitive in general as well as giving rise to a new type of NOC—the partially privatized
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NOC. These firms have been able to behave more like private companies because they are less
hindered by their governments than in the past. The ability to restrain itself from interventionist
policies is somewhat counterintuitive to the nature of governments that operate and control their
national industries given nationalization is often a policy prescription of statist ideologies. Thus,
a state’s aptitude for simultaneously maintaining control over their energy industry while
demonstrating self-restrain will play a determining role in the performance of their NOCs.
However, the leaders of these countries did not initially display this wisdom.
In the wake of decolonization and driven by early resource nationalism, many new states
in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America saw a quick path to wealth and economic
development by taking control of lucrative resources within their national boundaries.262
However, this led to what has become known as the “rentier state” in the resource curse
literature. They are most known for achieving high levels of economic development but are
typically dependent on rents from a single sector of their economy.263 The rentier state also
suffers from deficiencies such as non-democratization, lopsided economic development, Dutch
disease, bureaucratic overgrowth, kleptocratic governance and nepotism, corruption, and
vulnerability to price swings.264 However, it should be pointed out that studies have
acknowledged the resource curse as more of a conditional phenomenon rather than an absolute
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one.265 This suggests that the relationship is more correlational than causal and that interactions
between the state and the NOC are significant.
Contrary to the previous century, many governments who have nationalized energy
industries have allowed their firms to operate with less noncommercial burdens. In many cases,
states have shown far greater restraint in seeking heavy-handed control of their NOCs. In Latin
America, this seems to be a change in policies that reflect learning from the past. More recently,
some NOCs in the region have continued to operate under government agendas and with
noncommercial priorities such as Venezuela’s PDVSA, while others have begun to operate with
greater orientation towards private enterprise such as Brazil’s Petrobras, Colombia’s Ecopetrol,
and Argentina’s YPF.266 These recent transitions represent a notable policy shift across a region
that was more known in the past for nationalizing industries and implementing protectionist
development policies such as import substitution.
In other regions such as the Middle East and Asia, NOCs also seem to be operating with a
greater inclination towards commercial concerns. Some scholars have referred to this greater
freedom despite government control as “coopetition,” meaning the co-existence of cooperation
with and competition between increasingly entrepreneurial NOCs and their home governments
that can be either supportive or interventionist at times.267 This takes shapes in different ways
based on the unique demands of individual states and regional dynamics. For example, South and
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Southeast Asia have large populations, developing economies, and are relatively resource
starved. Therefore, governments tend to be more interventionist and push geopolitical goals such
as investment in upstream development in high-risk scenarios to gain more access to needed
energy imports. However, there is less rentier behavior and state dependence on these revenues
because of greater levels of economic development, so firms are able to reinvest windfalls and
spur on growth. In the Middle East, where many states are not as populous but are resource rich,
countries and their NOCs must manage global prices and supply, rentier behavior is stronger
because of lopsided development, and government intervention is more concerned with
production levels and how to allocate funds. To be sure, state intervention still occurs for
different reasons in various places, but what all of these NOCs and their states have in common
is this: a greater freedom on the part of the NOC and far less propensity for the state to intervene
than in the past.
The previous chapter discussed how NOCs on the whole have been increasing their
efficiency when compared to IOCs, with a smaller set of partially privatized companies (the
pNOCs) becoming equally as or nearly as efficient, and how this is an indicator of increasing
NOC strength. The increasing competitiveness of both categories of NOCs, as well as the
emergence of pNOCs, is fundamentally tied to governments lightening the burdens of
noncommercial obligations and the propensity for interventionist policies. The result has been
increasing competitiveness among state-owned enterprises such as Saudi Aramco, China’s
CNPC and CNOOC, Malaysian Petronas, and Qatar Petroleum as well as the emergence of new
pNOCs such as China’s Sinopec, Russia’s Gazprom and Rosneft, Brazil’s Petrobras, and
Norway’s Equinor (Statoil).
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In the case of Brazil’s Petrobras, this transition from strict government control to greater
commercial freedom has yielded striking results. The company was founded in 1953 making it
one of the world’s first NOCs. Petrobras was given exclusive rights over upstream exploration
and production while IOCs were locked out of the nation’s energy industry with the exception of
downstream development.268 The foundation of Brazil’s NOC, as well as other state-owned
enterprises in industries such as iron ore (CVRD) and steel (CSN), were part in parcel of a larger
strategy based on import substitution. The company further expanded into downstream in the
1960s to both grow the firm’s capabilities and to decrease reliance on foreign IOCs.269 In the
1990s, alongside the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise in popularity of economic
globalization, Brazil initiated an ambitious program of market liberalization and privatization of
their state owned enterprises including their energy industry and the NOC Petrobras.270 The
country did away with monopolistic control over its energy industry, issuing a $4.3 billion IPO
on the NYSE in August 2000, though it retained a controlling interest in the company.271
Since the opening of the industry to foreign competition and the partial privatization of
Petrobras, the firm has significantly increased its competitiveness on a global scale through
cooperative R&D272 and by becoming a pioneer in offshore drilling techniques.273 It also became
a leading technological innovator by impressively increasing R&D investment by 23% per year
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between 2003 and 2010.274 Alongside its global leadership in innovation, Petrobras has grown to
become truly global in its reach, operating more than 100 production platforms offshore and 16
refineries and is directly present in 27 countries.275 Moreover, during the same period Brazil
changed its policies concerning the company, oil production began to increase notably. Between
1990 and 2018, production increased by 2 mb/d,276 making it a significant player on the global
market. When it comes to Brazil’s Petrobras, much has changed in a short period of time.
Struggling to make substantial progress in the first forty years of its life span, so much has been
achieved in half the time. Brazil’s change in policy towards their energy industry and Petrobras
in the 1990s has brought the firm out of obscurity and transformed it into one of the world’s top
energy companies in the 21st century.
Norway’s Equinor is also a strong example of how a nationally owned enterprise has
benefitted from governments adopting a less heavy-handed approach to managing their NOCs.
Founded in 1972, Statoil was meant to be a strong political instrument of the state as well as a
hard line against the IOCs. Quickly it would grow to become Norway’s dominant energy
company through oil rents on transportation primarily, a model they picked up from
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.277 At its inception, the mantra “national governance and control,” the
first of the ten points produced by the parliament’s industrial committee in 1971, would form the
foundation for Norwegian Oil Policy and the fundamental relationship between company and
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state.278 Many would describe the move as another instance of resource nationalism. However, in
the 1980s and 1990s, as the global influence of neoliberalism was increasing, Norway was
realizing that efforts to completely localize their energy industry was leading to inflated costs,
leading to less profitability on the part of Statoil and dwindling revenues for the state.
Over time the relationship between Norway and Statoil would fundamentally change. At
first, government control was more of a priority than profitability. However, as domestic supplies
began to dwindle the company was forced to begin competing internationally, which created
additional pressures to become more competitive with IOCs. This combined with expanding
neoliberalism globally caused the government to view profitability as the greater priority. The
government of Norway began to operate at more of an arms-length by allowing the firm to
internationalize in the 1990s and to partially privatize in 2001.279 After partial privatization,
Statoil embarked on a wide-ranging program emphasizing global expansion and integration.280
At the turn of the century, overseas production was less than 100 kb/d but by 2014 that figure
reached 744 kb/d.281 Today the company operates in more than 30 countries globally while
producing oil in 11 of them and nearly forty percent of its total production comes from outside
Norway.282 In 2018, the company voted to change its name from Statoil to Equinor, which was
meant as a rebranding amid the push for more renewable energy.283 Equinor, alongside Petrobras,
has risen to be considered one of the world’s top performing NOCs in terms of technical
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expertise (predominantly in the area of deepwater) and global competitiveness with IOCs, both
of which are the beneficiaries of a light touch on the part of their controlling governments.
To be sure, many NOCs around the world are benefitting from less government
intervention and noncommercial burdens. Thus, NOCs have become more competitive globally,
especially those that have partially privatized. While this trend has taken place in the era of
economic globalization and certainly reflects the greater trends towards liberalization,
governments maintain control over their industries. This explains how NOCs have been able to
boost their efficiency while remaining an important source of revenue for their state. However,
this requires extensive discipline on the part of the government. The danger of developing into a
rentier state will always be present, as the resource curse remains relevant. This explains why
some NOCs are more successful, such as Brazil’s Petrobras or Norway’s Equinor, and others
such as Venezuela’s PDVSA, Ghana’s GNPC, or Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGaz are far less so. It
also explains why the data has shown that partially privatized NOCs are generally more efficient
than fully nationalized companies. It may be that partial privatization raises the costs of
government intervention among the minority shareholders, who could divest if governments too
eagerly intervene in business operations. On the other hand, many fully nationalized firms are
among the most competitive companies globally despite this advantage. Thus, NOCs are stronger
players in the global energy industry when they are afforded greater independence from the state.

Strategic Value

State intervention and noncommercial burdens certainly stifle NOC competitiveness, but
they are also the fundamental reason NOCs exist in the first place. As discussed earlier, the rise
of NOCs to begin with can be traced back to a reassertion of national sovereignty over energy
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resources and the wealth that could be derived from them. Thus, there is a paradoxical
relationship between the strength of NOCs and the strength of states. On one hand, the more state
intervention and noncommercial burdens, the less competitive the NOC. On the other hand, the
strategic value that NOCs present states drives their proliferation globally, which puts more
reserves and production in the hands of NOCs rather than IOCs. However, the extent to which a
government interferes with its company’s activity is different from the underlying reasons why
the state nationalizes the industries in the first place. The answer is strategic value, which is to
say that states draw strength from NOCs.
One could argue the existence of IOCs is more of a privilege or a consequence of path
dependency rather than a result of state policy or economic principle. This is because every IOC
that exists today comes from a nation that underwent industrial economic development and had
robust democratic institutions before the era of oil began. Consequently, oil and gas companies
were simply integrated into an already thriving and diverse economic landscape. In the case of
NOCs, these firms exist in states around the world that either industrialized in the late 20th
century or operate with high levels of state intervention as a matter of principle. That being said,
NOCs continue to offer states a means of power that allows them to economically and politically
develop as well as to increase their profile amid contentious regional and global politics. As long
as oil and gas resources remain indispensable to the global economy and are a significant source
of wealth, states will draw strength from NOCs and these firms will in turn continue to dominate
the global energy industry.
States are strengthened by NOCs in three major areas: regime stability, military
capability, and foreign policy. When speaking of regime stability, this refers to the resilience of
regimes in the face of internal political pressures. Those governments that are infused with oil
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and gas wealth have demonstrated a notable difference in longevity when compared to their
regional counterparts that do not have the same resource endowments. In terms of military
capabilities, this is the traditional realist understanding of hard power focusing on a valuation of
military assets. Countries that have been enriched with rents acquired from NOCs have displayed
greater military capabilities, having more money to invest in this area. When it comes to foreign
policy, this speaks toward the uniquely unbalanced nature of global energy trade and how
extreme asymmetries develop in this particular area of global trade. As asymmetries are an easily
exploitable source of power in international relations, NOCs allow states to execute their foreign
policy goals using energy as a lever of influence. In each of these ways, owning and controlling
NOCs profoundly strengthens states, making them valuable strategic assets, which in turn drives
nationalization around the world.
NOCs are particularly valuable assets in the hands of autocrats and dictators because they
confer wealth that can be spent to quell internal political dissidents. These states demonstrate
remarkable stability through the development of rent redistribution on a large scale or through
political patronage.284 Moreover, much of the state-building agenda of these countries
emphasizes societal peace and political acquiescence rather than accountability or transparency
primarily because energy rents displace reliance on civilian taxation.285 According to the Center
for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV dataset, regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
that are endowed with significant oil and gas wealth have stayed in power for decades, with
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some such as Saudi Arabia not having changed since the founding of the state.286 The two
outliers in the data are Iraq and Libya, both of which are explained by foreign intervention. It is
highly likely that both Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Gaddafi would still be in power had
they not been forcibly removed from external forces.
The Arab Spring is a strong example of the disparity in resilience to internal political
instability among MENA countries. Beginning in Tunisia and quickly sweeping across the entire
region in 2011, the uprising brought down a number of regimes, forced constitutional changes,
and produced lasting internal conflicts that are still raging to this day such as in Syria. However,
some nations were able to weather the storm far more effectively than others. More specifically,
it was the monarchies that had profound oil and gas wealth that fared the best.287 In fact, the only
energy enriched monarch that faced any serious threat was Gaddafi in Libya, who likely would
have defeated the rebels if not for western intervention and the establishment of the no-fly
zone.288 He was able to pay numerous mercenaries using the oil wealth he had accumulated while
in power.289 The existence of NOCs in the hands of these regimes makes them more resilient and
generally more politically stable. On the other hand, this can also become a double-edged sword
as a more resilient autocratic regime is also resistant towards democratization and is susceptible
to corruption and kleptocratic governance.290 Nevertheless, those in power tend to want to stay in
power and wealth obtained from NOCs are a proven way to secure one’s longevity.

Center for Systemic Peace, “Polity IV: Regime Characteristics and Transitions Datasets, 1800-2018,”
INSCR Data Page, accessed October 21, 2019.
287
Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” The Journal of Politics 74
(July 2012): 702-722.
288
Michael L. Ross, “Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring: Democracy and the Resource Curse,” Foreign
Affairs 90 (September/October 2011).
289
Jeffery Gettleman, “Libyan Oil Buys Allies for Gaddafi,” The New York Times, March 15, 2011.
290
Hamid Sarmadi, “Negative Correlation Between Economic Structure of Rentier State and NonDemocratization (Case Study: Saudi Arabia),” Humanities and Social Science Research 1 (April 8, 2018);
286

140

NOCs are valuable strategic assets not just because rents can preserve the rule of those in
power but also because it can buttress their military capabilities. In the hands of autocrats and
dictators, wealth obtained from NOCs is often spent on building up the military power of the
state.291 As Jeff Colgan has pointed out, energy has a strong connection to both resource wars
and also what he calls “petro-agression,” the former being an attempt at forceful acquisition of
reserves and the latter having to do with the connection between oil wealth and the domestic
political control of powerful leaders such as Hussein or in Iraq or Khomeini in Iran.292 Not only
are these regimes able to build their political power and military capabilities, they often
aggressively engage in foreign policy adventures. According to Colgan, between one-quarter and
one-half of all interstate conflicts since 1973 are connected to one or more oil-related causal
mechanisms.293
The case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is one example that illustrates this linkage.
While the reasons for the invasion are complicated and certainly many factors played a role such
as Saddam’s tendency to overreach, his presuppositions about the stance of the US, and his
crippling insecurities, one of Iraq’s core grievances against Kuwait had to do with oil. Earlier
that year at the Arab League Summit, Saddam was critical of the Gulf States, particularly
Kuwait. His list of accusations included cheating on OPEC production quotas and keeping prices
low, refusing debt forgiveness with respect to his previous decade-long war with Iran, and failing
to provide reconstruction credits to assist with rebuilding Iraq’s devastated economy.294 Though
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Iraq’s conflict with Iran was a war of aggression, Hussein saw the Sunni gulf monarchies as free
riders that were shielding themselves from the revolutionary Iranian Shiite threat with the
military might of Iraq.295 Since Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were half-hearted when it came time to
provide postwar economic support, Iraq had sought to pay for its economic reconstruction by
reducing OPEC production and increasing the price of oil. This is why his accusations of
cheating on quotas and overproducing carried more weight than usual, as they were a direct
attack on his efforts at economic recovery.
Making tensions even worse, Iraq accused Kuwait of siphoning oil from its side of the alRumaila oil field, to which both countries had a joint claim. According to Saddam, the Kuwaitis
were pumping oil from Iraq’s portion of the field by constructing oil wells on their side of the
border and angling their equipment so at depth they would have crossed into Iraqi reserves.296
For months after the summit he issued various threats in conjunction with military exercises
close to the border, suggesting the possibility of taking military action to resolve the dispute. The
war of words, accusations, and Sabre raddling escalated to the point of Saddam suggesting that
“to have one’s head cut off”297 was far worse than to go without “one’s sustenance,”298 referring
to Iraq’s ability to destroy Kuwait while Kuwait merely had the ability to economically needle
Iraq. A decade later, Iraq’s former Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz who served under Hussein at the
time suggested that actions taken against Kuwait in 1990 were warranted and fully justified,
citing economic warfare via oil prices and theft of Iraq’s resources via slant drilling.299
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While it is quite likely that Saddam was overemphasizing these perceived acts of
sabotage in order to justify his desire for aggression, the conflict would have been far less likely
or perhaps not even possible at all if the country’s oil was in the hands of private companies
rather than an ambitious autocrat.300 Much of Saddam’s domestic political strength and Iraq’s
massive military had been built using rents collected from the energy industry. At home, he
strengthened the power of the Baathist party and his own position by crushing dissent among the
Kurds and the Shiitte Muslims and by investing in cultural myth-making; the latter by
investigating and excavating ruins of old glorious Mesopotamian city-states.301 Particularly, he
likened the new Iraq under his rule to the reestablishment of the great legacies of the region,
including Sargon and the Akkadian Empire as well as Hammurabi and the Babylonian Empire.302
In 1990 before the invasion, Iraq had the most powerful military in the region and one of the
strongest militaries in the world. It was reported at the time that the Iraq military ranked first in
the world in terms of active troops per capita, sixth regarding total active-duty troops, and fourth
concerning defense spending per capita.303 Without the wealth derived from oil and gas, this
clearly would not have been possible.
In addition to regime stability and military capability, NOCs are strategic assets for states
because they can be utilized to accomplish foreign policy goals. Generally speaking, states have
utilized their NOCs in four particular ways. First, one the most traditional uses of NOCs as
foreign policy tools is through international organizations, notably OPEC, that emphasize market
share dominance. This allows the producer states to exert power over international markets in
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their favor. Second, by exploiting windfalls states are able to invest in various strategic
objectives abroad. This is commonly done with the goal of increasing one’s international or
regional profile and tends to involve funding all kinds of nonstate actors. Third, energy
relationships among producers and consumers inclines towards different degrees of asymmetry.
Utilizing NOCs, states can abuse asymmetrical interdependence by engaging in coercion with
vital energy resources as a bargaining chip. Fourth, some states have used their NOCs to invest
in the development of or acquire the rights to energy reserves around the world. This is generally
a strategy to Increase overall access to, and at times direct control over, critical energy reserves.
Because energy resources are so vital for the growth and maintenance of the modern
economy, and because oil and gas are not easily substituted for, oil consumers are significantly
vulnerable to supply shortages and price spikes.304 States that own and operate the energy
companies that do business on the global markets thus possess a source of power that can be
used to the advantage of producing nations and at times to leverage the behavior of import
dependent nations. The nationalization of oil companies and subsequent founding of OPEC was
centered around the recognition of this fact. In fact, the oil dependent western nations that were
weary of the rise of NOCs immediately globalized the oil markets, disallowing the posting of
prices by the major producing companies.
Thus, the rise of OPEC, which directly seeks to control prices via production quotas and
supply management, was tied to this turn of events; and could be described as an ongoing
grappling match between producers and consumers over economic vulnerabilities. The Arab oil
embargo in 1973 and subsequent founding of the IEA, accompanied by strategic petroleum
reserves and oil stocks, was a continuation of this saga. Similarly, hawkish behavior within the
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context of OPEC from other actors such as Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela who seek to increase the
price of oil and further enrich themselves has proved challenging for global energy security.305
They have generally been checked by the more dovish members of the organization like Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE because they depend on the US as a guarantor of Persian Gulf
security.
Today, cooperation among producers to gain the upper hand in terms of market share
remains an important strategy. The Saudi strategy to push prices down by overproducing
between 2014 and 2017 was a clear move to damage booming US production and regain lost
market share,306 as well as a move against Iran and Russia for their activities in Yemen and Syria
respectively.307 As detailed in the previous chapter, the rise of OPEC+ as a response to the
American energy boom has grown the market share of cooperating producers to unprecedented
proportions. After failing at reestablishing market share at the expense of American production,
as the US boom proved more resilient than expected, they sought out cooperation with Russia.
This proved a more successful alternative strategy since the Russians, who have consistently
ranked in the top three globally alongside Saudi Arabia and the US, brought a significant amount
of production to the table. To be sure, it is not clear how effective this new OPEC+ alliance will
be, but without NOCs these states would be unable to influence global markets.
States also utilize their NOCs and the windfalls they receive to project influence abroad.
Colgan has pointed out that, in addition to resource wars and petro-agression, oil wealth has
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allowed states to export favorable ideologies and finances insurgencies in other states to bolster
their own position regionally or globally.308 The Saudis have been known to fund Wahabi
Madrassas across the Muslim world, spreading the Saudi brand of Islamism abroad while giving
the royal family more legitimacy among religious fundamentalists at home.309 Iran is known to
fund Islamist insurgency groups throughout the Middle East such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah
in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.310 This has earned it
the145egin145ous title of “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.”311 When windfalls
swelled the state coffers of Venezuela in the early 2000s, Chavez sought to increase his countries
standing in Latin America, challenging the traditional American hegemony by building oil
pipelines into numerous neighboring countries, offering energy subsidies, and seeking to nurture
its 21st century socialist model of governance throughout the region including fostering close
relations with Cuba.312
The rise of NOCs and their use as foreign policy tools has also allowed states to abuse
interdependence by using energy trade for the purposes of political coercion through threats of,
or actual, supply interruptions. Returning to the example of the Arab oil embargo, this was an
outright cutoff of oil supplies to the US and its western allies for their support of Israel during the
Six Day War. However, the 1973 oil embargo was only somewhat effective at achieving its
desired political outcome, mostly because other producers exploited the crisis to achieve
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different foreign policy goals.313 Additionally, uncooperative OPEC members like Venezuela
saw the price spike as an opportunity to rake in profits by selling to embargoed consumers.
When it came to accomplishing their desired political outcome, which was shifting support away
from Israel towards the Arab states, the strategy was not very successful. On the contrary, the
spike in oil prices created massive windfalls for oil producers, amounting to one of history’s
largest peaceful transfers of wealth and provided new opportunities for oil rich states; in this
sense it was an overwhelming success.314
More recently, Russia’s renationalization of its NOCs in the early 2000s has led to a
number of instances of energy coercion throughout Eastern Europe in many former Soviet
Socialist Republics in the late 2000s and early 2010s. These instances mostly involve gas, which
is more easily used for the purposes of coercion because of the regional nature of the market.
Whereas oil is more complicated because the global market allows for more interconnections
between consumer and producers, the gas market is more restricted because the primary means
of transportation is by pipeline.315 As a result, consumers are more vulnerable to supply
interruptions and producers in turn have more leverage. Consequently, Russia was more
successful in achieving its political objectives than the Arab countries were in 1973.
Alongside the other uses of NOCs as tools of state power, one of the newer developments
and perhaps the most potentially significant is the use of these state firms to acquire access to
and rights over foreign reserves. For the most part, this is being furthered by China and its
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mercantilist-style acquisitions and upstream investments in the resources of Latin American,
African, the Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian offshore energy reserves.316 This phenomenon
is more reminiscent of the age of imperialism, wherein states took control of and dominated the
resources of other lesser developed nations with the purpose of importing those resources back to
the home country, than it is of the age of neoliberalism. This has led some energy analysts to
question the rise of a quasi-mercantilist energy system to challenge the current US-led neoliberal
order.317 Nevertheless, the resurgence of China and the concomitant rise of Chinese oil
consumption has led the nation to utilize its NOCs to engage in a global strategy of resource
acquisitions. This has ultimately increased the value of NOCs as strategic assets.
States have been able to gather immense strength through the acquisition of NOCs and
the wealth that is derived from them. However, this is not without its limitations and drawbacks.
For one, the more reliant a nation is on rents and the less developed its institutions are, the
greater it risks the worst possible manifestations of the resource curse.318 So while regimes may
become more resilient with wealth derived from NOCs, becoming excessively reliant can have
the overall effect of weakening the state and could lead to the eventual collapse the regime, as in
the case of Venezuela. There is also the competitiveness of the company to worry about,
underscoring the balancing act states must perform. Too much intervention and the company will
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become inefficient and bogged down with noncommercial burdens, too little and the company
functions like a private entity without respect to the state’s desired outcomes.
Additionally, the quantity of resources a state has and the nature of its relationships with
its consumers will color how it views its NOC as a strategic asset and the extent to which it can
and will use it as a foreign policy tool. For example, with abundant reserves a state will look for
ways to maximize the benefit of its market share, like with the hawkish OPEC members. On the
other hand, if they depend on their main consumers for security, like the more dovish Gulf states
in OPEC, then taking full advantage of market share is more unlikely. Similarly, energy coercion
requires vulnerability interdependence, described by Keohane and Nye as an extreme scenario in
which one state relies overwhelmingly upon another within the context of asymmetrical
economic interdependence.319 In the case of pursuing a global resource acquisition strategy, it is
the import-dependent actors that generally seek to exploit the opportunity to access cheaper
imports.320 This is the case with countries like Norway, Italy, and most notably China.
To be sure, in overwhelming numbers of states have chosen to pursue the nationalized
model instead of the private. This means that despite the restraints and potential drawbacks of the
utilization of NOCs as strategic assets, the potential benefits are often too tempting for most
countries to abstain. Perhaps within the context of the security dilemma,321 states want to
maximize their power by stockpiling strategic assets through NOCs.322 Notably, many IOCs exist
in nations such as the US, Canada, and countries in Western Europe, where international anarchy
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and the security dilemma have been tempered to some extent. Realist claims about the structure
of the system offer some insight into why most countries ignore the various potential pitfalls
pursuing national control over their energy industry. The most intuitive answer is that the
possible net benefits outweigh the risks, especially when you have to worry about your neighbors
like in the Middle East or when you are economically vulnerable like in Southeast Asia. Internal
instability and corruption likely play a role in lesser developed regions like Latin America,
Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, countries continue to view NOCs as strategic
assets that can strengthen the state. This explains why NOCs have continued to gain ground in
the 21st century and more specifically why states use them within the context of organizations
such as OPEC(+) and why they invest in spare capacity expansion, both of which are a strategy
to dominate the markets and control global supplies and prices.

Conclusion
NOCs in the 21st century have continued to gain momentum in many important areas of
strength. The rise of NOCs was initially the result of major systemic changes following the
collapse of the previous global economic order and the socio-economic ideology adopted by
many states. Similarly, modern globalization is altering the current economic order and the
behavior of states in important ways, which has led to a strengthening of NOCs. First, statism
has been transformed by economic globalization, where state authority has receded in some areas
while expanding in others. The energy industry being one of the chief examples. Countries are
pursuing more refined statist policies that also incorporate market economies into the mix. Thus,
the rise of state capitalism and the new resource nationalism have had similar effects on NOCs,
producing a more sophisticated approach to bargaining with IOCs over development projects and
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sites of production. Instead of solely seeking to establish complete control over their national
resources and expel IOCs, NOCs have sought to maintain the majority controlling interest while
allowing for IOC activity to occur on smaller scales that helps to bolster overall productivity and
development. This has led to a continued expansion of NOCs’ control over the most important
sources of oil and gas around the world, with the exception of unconventional energy.
Second, economic globalization has also reduced the barriers to international economic
activity allowing for the proliferation of MNCs. While IOCs have long operated as multinational
firms NOCs have joined the game more recently. The internationalization of NOCs has led to a
wave of international investment, most notably including M&A activity that has resulted
technology transfers and has seen NOCs’ technical efficiency advance as a result. Additionally,
NOCs are now globally competitive when it comes to overseas production, which the example of
international investment in Iraq has underscored. Moreover, NOCs will often invest in places
that IOCs are unwilling to operate, primarily because of instability and overall risk. This is
because NOCs are often pursuing market dominance strategies or securing access to vital
resources whereas IOCs are solely concerned with profits. Consequently, NOCs are scoring
significant gains in the area of efficiency while also increasing their strategic control over
important oil and gas reserves. As the unconventional boom loses steam, this will serve them
well.
Third, countries have adopted a reformed approach in how they deal with their NOCs. In
the past, statism was more totalitarian in nature, coloring the relationship between states and the
industries they controlled. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general shift away
from stringent statism among many nations has produced a greater liberalization in the
relationship between a significant number of states and their NOCs. The greater restraint that
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many states are showing toward intervening in the commercial pursuits of their energy
companies has served to greatly increase their global competitiveness with IOCs. A number of
NOCs now operate as efficiently as the most impressive IOCs, which says a lot about how far
they have come. Additionally, the 21st century has witnessed the rise of partially privatized
NOCs, which is an important development. As a group, these entities have made even more
impressive gains than NOCs fully owned and operated by governments. This is because only a
handful of the NOCs operate at the highest level, while most companies that have partially
privatized perform well. The notable increase in efficiency of both groups speaks towards the
importance of government intervention and the dampening effect it can have on the
competitiveness of these companies. Therefore, the greater restraint states have displayed
accounts for much of NOCs’ expanding strength.
Lastly, NOCs continue to prove themselves valuable strategic assets for states. While
overreliance on NOCs can trigger the resource curse and weaken a state more than it strengthens
it, a balanced approach can manifest the best of both worlds. NOCs have proven valuable
entities that have been able to provide states with additional power in the areas of regime
stability, military capability, and foreign policy. By contrast, the private oil companies are
significantly more independent of governments and thus cannot be instruments of state power
nearly as much as NOCs. Thus, the national model for the energy companies has come to
dominate the global energy industry around the world. As strategic assets of the state NOCs have
become stronger by increasingly pursuing market dominance strategies such as increasing spare
production capacity and cooperating with other NOCs through organizations such as OPEC(+).
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CHAPTER VI
THE SAUDI ENERGY COLOSSUS

Saudi Aramco has traditionally been one of the world’s biggest and most important
NOCs ever since the Kingdom gradually took possession of the company in the 1970s and
1980s. Not only was it the owner and controller of a vast reserve of hydrocarbons accompanied
by enormous production capacity, but its resources were also the cheapest in the world to
produce. In addition to this massive source of wealth, the Saudis have been fortunate to be able
to focus almost exclusively on economic development. This is because they have not
traditionally had to worry about their security or placating disgruntled civilians. With respect to
security, Saudi Arabia and Iran were beneficiaries of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf as
integral parts of Richard Nixon’s Twin Pillar policy in the 1970s. After the dual shocks of 1979
consisting of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, Washington moved
to significantly develop military capabilities in the Gulf with the overall strategic goal of
securing the region from external threats and to guarantee access to the vital oil that resided
there.323 American commitment to defend the gulf states and Saudi Arabia in particular was
demonstrated when Saddam Hussein was immediately repelled after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
the early 1990s. With respect to placating domestic pressures, the Kingdom’s population was
relatively tiny when compared to other regional neighbors such as Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, or Iran,
which meant that it had relatively low social obligations. Thus, Saudi Arabia could focus almost
exclusively on economic development, including the expansion of its oil production and the
efficient operation of its NOC. While NOCs in Iraq and Iran are heavily encumbered by
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government rents for military and social spending, Saudi Aramco was able to flourish absent
such burdens. The confluence of these factors allowed Saudi Arabia to catapult into economic
modernity, quickly becoming one of the most developed and influential states in the region.
Moreover, within the context of OPEC Saudi policymaking had global reach, as the developed
economies of the world are mostly import dependent.
Despite being tested several times in the last three decades of the 20th century with
multiple episodes of oil price volatility, Saudi Arabia remained more stable than the majority of
analysts had predicted.324 Since the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the Kingdom has generally been
dovish on oil prices and has on multiple occasions used its spare production capacity to provide
the global economy with injections of oil to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions emanating
from other production centers around the world. After the years of unprecedented high oil prices
in the early 2000s and their subsequent collapse following the global recession in 2008, the
Saudis were still in a strong position with around USD $481 billion in net foreign assets in 2011,
constituting 111% of GDP and three times the government budget, and very low domestically
held debt.325 However, some experts questioned the long-term viability of the Saudi model
despite its resilience over the years and relative financial strength. These positions stemmed from
very real concerns over the future of oil production,326 growing population, welfare programs,
and ultimately government spending, which has been rising at an annual rate of about 7% since
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the turn of the century.327 Moreover, in the eyes of the Saudis, America has appeared less
committed than ever to gulf security. This was demonstrated by the seemingly ambivalent stance
of the Obama administration with regards to the Arab Spring, the consequences of the Iran
Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), and the miscalculated withdrawal from Iraq leading to the rise of ISIS.
The situation only marginally improved during the Trump Administration. While ISIS was
mostly eradicated and the US readopted a bellicose stance towards Iran, President Trump has
touted US energy dominance and a diminishing reliance on oil from the Middle East on
numerous occasions.328 Combined together with a general desire in the US to withdraw from the
region, a common thread running through both administrations, forces the Saudis to engage in
additional military spending to ensure their own national security. In short, the two major
advantages the Kingdom enjoyed in the past century have slowly eroded away in the last two
decades.
Saudi Arabia is far from a basket case, but, as many have pointed, out the confluence of
challenges it faces requires bold and concerted action. Moreover, their dependence on the energy
industry means that attempts toward reformation will depend predominantly on the
reorganization and strengthening of their national flagship Saudi Aramco. Unsurprisingly, the
Kingdom has embarked on an ambitious agenda in the past decade to address these challenges,
focusing on their NOC and the national energy industry, making impressive progress thus far.
First, to counter the increasing threats to their national security interests in the region, the Saudis
have begun utilizing their spare production capacity far more aggressively than they have in
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previous decades. Between 1980 and 2010, Saudi Arabia was the most dovish oil producing
nation in OPEC, focusing on servicing global demand rather than achieving political outcomes.
This has shifted dramatically in recent years signaled by events such as the oil glut of 2014-2017
and the rise of OPEC+. Second, they have pursued different government policies in the areas of
domestic energy consumption that reflect a move towards greater efficiency and less government
intervention. Their new policy direction has sought to reconfigure domestic consumption through
expanding non-oil sourced energy inputs, reducing fuel subsidies, and internationalizing the
R&D arm of their operations. These policy shifts have had a net positive effect on the efficiency
of their NOC. Third, as outlined in Mohammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030 plan, the process of
partial privatization of Saudi Aramco finally began in late 2019. This is expected to yield net
increases in operatioinal efficiency making the company even more globally competitive as well
as drawing in additional capitalization especially after it achieved a near USD $2 trillion
valuation, the largest of any global company in history. This case study will detail the emerging
challenges that face Saudi Arabia and its NOC and the various strategies it has employed to
mitigate these growing vulnerabilities.

Energy Foreign Policy

Saudi oil production has always been critical to the global energy markets even before
Aramco became Saudi Aramco. Officially founded in 1870 when Standard Oil Company of
California struck a sixty-year contract for exclusive rights to explore and produce oil from the
Eastern Hasa province, Aramco would begin discovering oil in commercial quantities by the
1930s.329 The Saudis finally took full control of the company’s assets in 1976, catapulting the
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Kingdom to the forefront of international relations in the Middle East and making it one of the
most significant countries for global economic growth. Somewhat ironically, the extremely
hawkish move to enact the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, hastening the Saudi takeover of Aramco,
would make the following three decades of dovish behavior and reliance on a US security
blanket somewhat curious. However, since 2010 oil production policy has proven more
reminiscent of the company’s transition years rather than the following thirty. That is to say, the
Kingdom has more recently been far more concerned with its national interest rather than those
of global consumers. This has dramatically increased the strategic value of the company as the
Saudi regime is not only dependent on energy rents but also because it increasingly sees the firm
as an essential tool for defending national security.
The greater emphasis on hawkish energy policy since 2010 has mostly been a reaction to
the changing balance of power in the Middle East coupled with shifting US foreign policy and
the energy boom. The general status quo since the dual shocks of the Soviet Afghan invasion and
the Iranian revolution had been one of American preeminence, with the US playing the role of
guarantor of many regimes across the region. The Arab Spring was a critical blow to this status
quo as it was the first time since 1979 that the US had allowed an allied regime to collapse.
When the government of Hosni Mubarak fell, it was a signal to the Saudis that the Americans
may no longer be as committed to regional security as they once had been.330 This concern was
exacerbated when the US withdrew from Iraq precipitating the rise of ISIS and the sectarian
battle between Sunni and Shia that would engulf both Syria and Iraq.331 Perhaps most alarming
of all to the Saudis was the JCPOA, which released much of the regime’s accumulated oil wealth
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being held back by years of sanctions.332 Hindsight shows that Saudi Arabia’s concerns were
well-founded as Iran went on to dramatically increase its regional influence through the funding
of substate actors like the various Shia militia groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.333
With Iraq no longer serving as a bulwark against Iran and Shia militia groups proliferating
throughout the region, the Middle East slowly began to be characterized by a greater sectarian
struggle for dominance with Iran and the Shia on one side and Saudi Arabia and the Sunni on the
other. Thus, the combination of increasing US ambivalence and the growth of Iranian influence
has pushed the Saudis to drastically change their approach to national security. As a result, the
Kingdom has adopted a more aggressive approach to energy policy that is more concerned with
how to wield their NOC as a foreign policy tool rather than how to service the global economy.
The first sign that the Saudis were changing the way they approached energy policy was
in November 2014, which kicked off a three year oil glut that saw the price of oil fall from a high
of nearly USD $120 per barrel in the summer of 2014 to a low of just under USD $40 per barrel
by the end of 2015.334 OPEC would meet that November amid already falling oil prices as global
demand was weakening. Many of the poorer members of OPEC would push for production cuts
in order to shore up prices but this move was blocked by the Saudis who were motivated by a
number of political calculations that the others were not.335 Media speculation tended to frame
this as a war on US unconventional production, which was beginning to displace OPEC market
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share and threatening to put the US in contention with Saudi Arabia and Russia for the world’s
top oil producer.336 To be sure, the Saudis were concerned with the unprecedented expansion of
US unconventional oil production but the move to block production cuts and send prices
plunging was far too consequential to only have incorporated the US oil industry into the
calculus. Rather the move was likely more focused on establishing regional foreign policy goals
aimed at maximizing Saudi interests in the Middle East while also offering the additional caveat
of pushing back on US production.337
Iran has always been a nefarious actor in the region, even since the revolution in 1979 as
it has sought to export its Shia revolution across the region. The Saudis have a Shia minority that
populate the eastern province of Hasa that also happens to be the location of their largest oil
fields and have been weary of Iranian influence as a result.338 The growth of Shia militias in Iraq,
Iranian support of the Assad Regime in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the
Houthi rebels in Yemen has the Saudis boxed in geopolitically like never before. To make things
worse, the Russians began their intervention in Syria on the side of the Assad regime putting a
powerful nation on the side of Iran in Syria.339 The Russian intervention was taking place around
the same time that the JCPOA in 2015 was being completed, signaling to the saudis that the US
could no longer be solely relied upon to check nations like Russia and Iran in the region.
However, both Iran and Russia had one particular vulnerability that the Saudis could directly
strike at: their dependence on oil revenues.

Robert McNally, “For Production Cuts, Oil Market Looks to OPEC, but OPEC Looks Toward US
Shale,” Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University SIPA, November 2014.
337
F. Gregory Gause III, “Sultans of Swing? The Geopolitics of Oil Prices,” Brookings Doha Center,
Washington DC, April 6, 2015.
338
Bryan Perazzo, “On Being Shia in Saudi Arabia,” Institute for Gulf Affairs, Washington, DC, 2012.
339
Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria,” Foreign Affairs 95 (January/February 2016).
336

159

According to the World Economic Forum, both Iran and Russia ranked in the top 20
nations for multiple metrics such as fuels as a percentage of total exports and value of crude oil
production as a percentage of GDP.340 Additionally, both nations had very high breakeven costs,
both of which were around USD $100 per barrel in 2014.341 In the case of nations that are
extremely reliant on oil revenues to meet government spending goals, this is an important
indicator that signals the impact of global oil prices on various regimes. In the summer of 2014,
there was around a USD $20 cushion for both countries, yet by the end of the following year the
price of a barrel of oil would fall under USD $40. As a result, both the Russian and Iranian
economies went into recession with GDP contracting by 2.3% and 1.3% respectively.342 Along
with sanctions in response to Crimea, this precipitated a financial crisis in Russia and forced
Putin to slash the federal budget by 10% the following year.343 In Iran the effects were somewhat
mitigated by the exact inverse of the circumstances concerning Russia. After sanctions were
lifted as a result of the JCPOA, Iran initially I financial relief but was nevertheless forced to slash
their budget considerably to deal with very low oil prices.344
In the case of the US oil industry, rapidly expanding unconventional production had
boosted US production from 5.4 Mb/d in 2004 to 8.7 Mb/d 2014.345 The US had come within 1
Mb/d of annual production to the Saudi levels, representing a growing threat to the Saudi market
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share, especially since it was non-OPEC production that was on the rise. However, the cost of
production for unconventional oil was far higher when compared to Arabian light sweet crude.
Since the breakeven oil prices were high for these unconventional American oil wells, similar to
the160egin160eion with Russia and Iran, many saw the oil glut as an assault on the burgeoning
oil production in the US.346 In 2014, the breakeven price for US shale oil production was around
USD $60 per barrel.347 Since oil prices before the Saudi-led oil glut hit a high of USD $120 per
barrel that year, many American companies were comfortably in the profit margin and this in
turn was fueling the expansion of US unconventional oil. However, by the end of 2015 oil prices
had fallen below $40 per barrel and many companies in the US were 160egining to feel the
pinch. US oil production modestly contracted between 2015 and 2016 as a result of many
unconventional oil wells going offline.348 Contrary to the fears of many, the US unconventional
industry adjusted to the lower price environment surprisingly well through company
consolidation and methodological improvements. Ultimately, the breakeven cost for US
unconventional oil fell to around $30 per barrel by the end of 2016 in response to the low oil
prices.349 In the final analysis, this would serve to strengthen the US unconventional industry and
make it more efficient, setting the stage for another boom, which has occurred in the years since
2016.
The Saudi move to flood the global markets with oil certainly achieved the goal of
putting pressure on the Russians, Iranians, and US unconventional companies, but the results
were a somewhat mixed basket. The Russian and Iranian regimes were forced to make difficult
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budget cuts and curtail their regional operations in the Middle East, although their interference
did ultimately persist. This was a strong signal demonstrating both regime’s resolve to remain
committed to their regional operations. In the case of the US companies, they certainly faced an
uphill battle to remain competitive amid low oil prices and many companies were forced to sell
to larger more efficient companies. However, US energy industry as a whole was ultimately
made stronger as a result and national production has since far exceeded the lost oil production
between 2014 and 2016. Despite the mixed results, this Saudi policy was a unilateral measure
that utilized its NOC as a strategic asset to implement foreign policy objectives.
Immediately following the oil glut of 2014 and 2015, the Saudis began negotiating the
formation of OPEC+, making it their second major strategic move of the decade utilizing their
NOC. By the end of 2016, Saudi Arabia had led OPEC into a cooperative production agreement
with important non-OPEC producers, chief of which was Russia. This was a counterintuitive turn
of events considering that the previous two years of Saudi oil policy was driven, at least in part,
as a desire to impose economic reprisals on Russia for their activity in Syria. However, with the
destruction of ISIS due to increased American involvement under the Trump Administration,
perhaps the Saudis were less concerned with the Russian and Iranian support of the Assad
regime. Perhaps also, they saw the opportunity to draw the Russians more into their orbit and
away from the Iranians by establishing cooperative agreements with them. Despite the
abruptness of their policy change, the combined production power of OPEC and the non-OPEC
cooperating parties such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mexico became very important for
reasserting the dominance of NOCs over global market share. The traditional dominance of
OPEC since its rise in the 1970s has been threatened since the turn of the century primarily
because of skyrocketing US and Canadian unconventional production, but also because of rise of
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Brazil’s Petrobras and the collapse of Venezuela’s PDVSA. Thus, the negotiation of OPEC+
signaled a massive swing of market share power back into the hands of NOCs. This strength was
immediately demonstrated in December 2016 when oil prices began to slowly rise to USD $50$60 per barrel.350
For most of the 2010s OPEC’s share of the global supply of oil had been fluctuating
between 33% and 35%.351 Traditionally their share of production had been slightly over 40% but
had fallen because of expanding non-OPEC production. Consequently, when US unconventional
production proved more resilient in the face of low oil prices than initially expected, the strategy
to recapture market share shifted to incorporating more non-OPEC producers rather than waging
a price war against them. On the geopolitical front, the strategy had become feasible because of
the Trump administration, which was far more hawkish towards Iran and serious about
intervention in Syria. This allowed the Saudis to focus less on confronting regional rivals and the
geopolitical landscape and more on reestablishing its strength in the global oil markets.
Ultimately, Saudi negotiations with a number of non-OPEC producers would become known as
the Vienna Group but has been popularly referred to as OPEC+.
Continued cooperation will not be easy to manage. Even among traditional OPEC
members cooperation has always been shaky at best. For example, the Venezuela increased oil
sales to the West during the 1973 oil embargo. This resulted in massive windfalls for PDVSA
and allowed for decades of prosperity and expansion in Venezuela until Chavez came to power.
National interests are likely to always fuel disputes among member states because of the selfinterested nature of nation-states and the unique challenges confronting each member.
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Historically, this has produced two different approaches to energy policy among OPEC
members: price hawks and price doves. While each state is unique and has its own set of interests
that push it in one direction or the other, there are some common threads that tend to cause these
two groups to coalesce. Price hawks tend to be larger countries, both in terms of territory and
population, with larger militaries and greater social commitments. To put it plainly, they spend
more money, so they need more oil revenues to meet their budgetary requirements. Price doves
tend to be just the opposite, which are smaller in terms of territory, population size, and military
capacity. Their smaller population factors into far less social spending as well as a smaller
military, which usually has the additional effect of military dependency on the West and
especially the US. This means that they must incorporate the interests of consumer countries into
their calculus to a far greater extent than the price hawks. Over the years this has resulted in a
rivalry between the price hawks, who push for production cuts that lead to price increases, and
price doves, who push for exactly the opposite.
These internal disputes among OPEC members have diminished cooperation among
member states, manifesting itself in traditional prisoner’s dilemma fashion. In this case, cheating
on production quotas, which has been a longstanding issue among OPEC nations since the
inception of the organization.352 In more recent years, quota cheating has emanated from Iraq and
Nigeria, which the Saudis have so far struggled to curtail.353 Adding more states into the
equation that resemble the more hawkish nations in size, population, and budget expenditure is
likely to make quota compliance even more difficult than it has already proved to be. For
example, since Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mexico began cooperating with OPEC in December
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2016, the only country that has been fully compliant has been Mexico.354 Russia and Kazakhstan
have been far less so, at around 66% and 55% quota compliance respectively.355 Of course,
Mexico has a more developed economy and greater trade activity with the US and Canada, while
Russia and Kazakhstan are far more dependent on oil revenues, so this is a somewhat expected
outcome.
The Russian dependence on oil revenues would play out exactly as one might suspect
when in the midst of the Coronavirus pandemic. At the March 6th 2020 OPEC meeting in Vienna
Russia would refuse to slash production in order to defend prices as a response to falling
demand.356 In response, Saudi Arabia would immediately offer extraordinary discounts to buyers
and threaten to increase its production. The oil price war between the two countries would lead
to the steepest drop in crude oil futures since the 1991 Gulf War, leading to the price of oil
falling below USD $34 per barrel after floating between USD $50-$60 per barrel the previous
year.357 According to Bob McNally of Rapidan Energy Group, “Russia’s refusal to support
emergency supply cuts would effectively and fatally undermine OPEC+’s ability to play the role
of oil price stabilizing swing producer.”358 Yet, while Saudi Arabia may have more tolerance to
hemorrhaging oil revenues than Russia and they have traditionally used this to their advantage as
a coercive negotiating tactic, there is more to loose from allowing OPEC+ to disintegrate. In fact,
the Saudis have proven that they believe this to be true as they were able to negotiate an
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agreement with Russia, Mexico, with the US as mediator only a month later.359 What this
episode highlights is that OPEC relationships are messy and OPEC+ will be no different,
especially considering the new parties are nationally constructed more like price hawks rather
than doves. However, as long as the benefits of cooperation outweigh those of noncompliance,
we can expect these nations to cooperate with one another in order that they will maximize their
strength in the area of global oil prices. It would also be a mistake to confuse inefficiency with
impotence. Their policies will be quite consequential though their internal disputes will certainly
hamstring the overall efficacy of them. Moreover, as long as production from IOCs continues to
threaten the longstanding market share power of NOCs, they will attempt to ban together in
greater numbers to rebalance the scales back in their favor.
When it comes to Riyadh’s use of Saudi Aramco as a foreign policy tool, the last decade
has provided two strong examples of how a NOC can prove itself a strategic asset to the state.
While the Saudis were not able to achieve the most favorable geopolitical outcomes across the
board during the Oil Glut of 2014-2015, they were at worst marginally successful. Without a
doubt, Russian and Iranian activity in the region was curtailed assuming what would have been
possible with far more funds at their disposal. In the case of OPEC+, the Saudis were able to
capitalize on changing US Middle East policy and draw the Russians more towards their sphere
of influence and away from the Iranians, who had found common ground in Syria only a few
years beforehand. Both instances had the added benefit of probing the rapidly expanding US
unconventional oil industry for weakness and rebalancing against it. These examples ultimately
demonstrate the usefulness of Saudi Arabia’s NOC as a strategic asset of the state and more
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generally serves to bolster the attractiveness of the NOC model to many regimes in global
politics.

Government Policies and Efficiency

From the time that the Saudis assumed control of Aramco in the 1970s, government
policies have heavily weighted towards interventionism. In most cases concerning NOCs, heavy
government intervention stifles these companies with respect to operational efficiency, technical
capacity, or global competitiveness, and tends to be more symptomatic of those NOCs that are
the most heavily burdened by their governments. Counterintuitively, the data not only
contradicted this expectation but proved the opposite was true. Saudi Aramco is actually among
the most efficient companies in the industry on par with major US IOCs like ExxonMobil. Of
course, this is in stark contrast with other Gulf states such as Iran or Iraq, whose companies
operate at a far lower level of efficiency. Some of this is explained by the natural advantages
they have enjoyed for so long, but demographics and security dynamics have been shifting.
Another explanation is solid leadership and decision-making behind the veneer of absolute
government control. While countries like Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela were fueling their regional
hegemonic ambitions through very different but expensive spending programs, Saudi Arabia was
building its export capacity and achieving one of the highest scores globally on the Human
Development Index.
On one hand, oil rents still account for around 85% of the Kingdom’s overall revenues,
which translates to about 93% of Saudi Aramco’s profits paid in the form of royalties and
dividends.360 Like the majority of NOCs, even though retained earnings are sufficient for daily
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operations, the company is ultimately dependent on the size of the national budget and the
overriding power of the King if it needs to invest in expanding commercial operations. In other
words, it is the King and not the company executives who has the “final decision-making power
on all matters involving oil production, investment, external policies, domestic energy pricing
and subsidies.”361 On the other hand, Saudi leadership has thus far been very good about not
losing themselves to non-commercial spending. This is predominantly the result of carefully
calculated policies. While Iraq was building a massive military and participating in adventurism,
Iran was funding its regional proxies and weapons programs, and Venezuela was supporting a
massive public welfare system and regional infrastructure, Saudi Arabia kept focused on
servicing the global oil markets. However, growing population is increasing the size of welfare
spending and regional conflicts, particularly in Yemen, have seen military spending increase as
well. In the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been challenged in ways that it never has before.
The last decade has not only seen a change in circumstances but also a change in
leadership. King Abdullah passed in 2015 and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman assumed
power. He is faced with the dual problems of needing to keep Saudi Aramco efficient and
globally dominant as well as the changing needs of the nation that require more government
intervention and expanding the non-commercial burdens it places on the company. The first five
years of his reign have been impressive. The Crown Prince’s Saudi Vision 2030 plan will see a
massive expansion across the entire energy sector in terms of diversification as well as an
emphasis on efficiency. So far, he has continued the Saudi tradition of a greater focus on
commercial spending rather than non-commercial, though operations in Yemen and a resurgent

Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Ellas, “Saudi Aramco: National Flagship with Global Responsibilities,”
Joint Baker Institute/Japan Petroleum Energy Center Policy Report, The Changing Role of National Oil
Companies in International Energy Markets, Rice University, March 2007, 3.
361

168

Iran has put tremendous pressure on the new regime. Much of the continued success of Saudi
Aramco will depend on the current regime’s ability to balance the need to address the novel
challenges it faces while also continuing to spend its revenues wisely, particularly with respect to
non-commercial investments.
One of the first and perhaps most prominent challenges Saudi Arabia faces is its
capability to upkeep and expand its oil exports to service the growing global oil demand. At the
turn of the century, most projections of Saudi oil production were astronomical in comparison to
where they have ended up two decades later. Moreover, many of these projections have been
seriously downgraded over time. For example, in 2004 the IEA predicted that Saudi oil
production would grow to 22.5 Mb/d by 2025.362 For perspective, this figure is nearly triple
today’s production levels and around double the production of both the US and Russia. It would
not take long for these projections to be revised significantly. New unforeseen challenges such as
the global economic downturn in 2008, increasing domestic consumption, and geopolitical issues
in the Middle East, limited the ability of the Saudis to expand production. By 2012, the IEA’s
projections were less than half of what they were in 2004, predicting that Saudi production
would remain around 10.6 Mb/d by 2020.363 This projection would turn out to be mostly accurate
as the Kingdom’s production fluctuated between 8 Mb/d and 11 Mb/d between 2012 and
2021.364 To be fair, many of the projections could not have predicted the 2008 financial crisis,
the unconventional energy boom in North America, or the Coronavirus lockdowns.
When it comes to production capacity, one can observe a similar turn of events. Between
2000 and 2006, the EIA slashed its outlook for 2020 Saudi production capacity from 22.1 Mb/d
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to 14.5 Mb/d.365 So far, their maximum production capacity remained around 12 Mb/d with plans
to marginally expand this capability to around 12.5 Mb/d.366 The inability to meet the earlier
predictions highlights many of the challenges that scholars have begun to point out in the last
decade, much of which centers around rising domestic consumption and a growing dependence
on oil as a primary energy source. Historically, the Kingdom’s depletion rate of oil reserves
stands at about 7-8% annually,367 despite new discoveries in the last decade, as well as
longstanding subsidies for domestic oil prices that have driven up fuel consumption by about
8%.368 This suggests that a huge amount of investment is necessary just to maintain the current
output, let alone expansion.
However, domestic fuel consumption is only one end of the problem. Most domestic
electricity comes from burning oil, amounting to an average of 0.5 Mb/d and topping out at about
0.9 Mb/d during summer months.369 Domestic electricity consumption, along with domestic fuel
consumption, has been exacerbated by the dramatic rise in population, which has grown from a
little over 4 million in 1960 to 33.7 million in 2018.370 This has resulted in a rapid increase in
overall domestic oil consumption representing a nine-fold increase over the last forty years,
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which amounts to about a quarter of its production capacity.371 Some experts even began
predicting that if Saudi Arabia continued to consume over 25%, or about 2.8 Mb/d, of its own oil
production, and that if the alarming rate of consumption continues to increase, then it risks
becoming a net oil importer by 2038.372 It was this set of challenges that Saudi Arabia faced over
the last decade, and has done so by dramatically shifting its government policies concerning its
energy sector and Saudi Aramco.
The Saudis realized that both the efficiency of their NOC could be maximized and export
capacity increased if they simply changed their domestic energy policies. For one, it would be
more costly to invest in expanding production when not dealing with the ballooning consumption
issues. In other words, instead of trying to spend their way out of a deepening hole, they began
looking at how to fill in the hole itself. To give this some perspective, the current cost of
expanding production capacity by 1 Mb/d is estimated to be around USD $20 billion, with about
USD $2 Billion a year in maintenance.373 Thus, the Saudis began looking at how to reduce
domestic consumption through energy diversification rather than purely expanding oil
production. Particularly, natural gas is cheaper, burns cleaner, and has the added benefit of
freeing up crude oil for more efficient uses such as direct exports or for downstream refined
products.
The expansion of Saudi Arabia’s “Master Gas System,” a grouping of non-associated
natural gas mega projects, has been at the forefront of making use of the estimated 219 Tcf of
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conventional reserves.374 These mega projects, including Wasit and Midyan, have already added
about 4 Bcf/d of natural gas production between 2010 and 2018.375 During the same period direct
crude oil burn for electricity generation decreased by 41%.376 The newest natural gas mega
project scheduled for completion by the end of 2019, Fadhili, is estimated to bring an additional
5 Bcf/d of natural gas production at the price tag of USD $13 billion.377 This will have an even
greater impact on domestic crude oil burn for electricity considering the impact of the previous 4
Bcf/d from the previous two projects. So far, the project is half complete reaching the 2.5 Bcf/d
of production in 2020.378 Considering the price tag of USD $13 billion compared to USD $20
billion for 1 Mb/d for crude oil production capacity, Riyadh benefits more from investing in
efficiency rather than expanding production. Moreover, the crude oil that was being used for
domestic consumption, which can top out at nearly 1 Mb/d, is a net benefit saving the Kingdom a
USD $20 billion investment.
More notably, Saudi Arabia has sought to take a page out of the North American
playbook and have begun pursuing unconventional gas production. Establishing a global network
of 11technology offices located at home and abroad in Europe, China, and most importantly
North America.379 According to the Saudi Vice President of Upstream Technologies, “R&D and
innovation underpin our intent to emerge as truly global, integrated energy and chemicals
company by the end of the decade.”380 Out of the many research centers opened around the
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world, perhaps the most consequential was inaugurated on September 19, 2014 in Houston
Texas, the premier hub for the American oil and gas industry.381 The research center is operated
by the Saudi US-based subsidiary Aramco Services Company, whose stated objective is to
conduct upstream unconventional energy research in exploration, drilling, field development,
and project management.382 They have also targeted American expertise through direct and
indirect recruiting efforts, by specifically hiring workers from the US shale industry.383
In the northern region, also known as the Empty Quarter, Saudi Arabia launched its own
unconventional gas program in 2011.384 In 2013, their unconventional gas became operational
and was ready to commit shale gas production to a 1000 Megawatt power plant.385 The Saudi
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ali al-Naimi, has estimated that the Kingdom
possesses around 600 Tcf of shale gas reserves,386 which would give Saudi Arabia the world’s
fifth largest shale gas reserve.387 The following year, Saudi Aramco raised its investment from
USD $3 billion to USD $10 billion to begin seriously developing its unconventional program.388
In their 2014 annual report, the company referred to their shale gas program saying it was
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“continuing to gain momentum,”389 with al-Naimi adding that “the Kingdom has made
promising shale gas discoveries and acquired the technologies to produce it at a reasonable
price.”390 They began commercial production of unconventional gas in 2018391 and have aimed
to seriously ramp up production throughout the next decade a centerpiece of replacing oil in their
domestic energy sector.392 Most recently, the Saudis announced the massive USD $110 billion
Jafurah shale gas field project, set to be the largest site of unconventional gas production outside
of the US.393 According to their production targets, this shale gas field will make Saudi Arabia
the world’s third largest gas producer by 2030.
The Saudis have also tackled increasing domestic energy needs by expanding into
renewables. As part of Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman’s Saudi Vision 2030, the Kingdom
aims to have 58.7 Gigawatts of renewable energy capacity by 2030.394 These will comprise of
solar, wind, and nuclear energy resources and are being directed by the recently created
Renewable Energy Projects Development Office. With a heavy emphasis on solar power, the
Kingdom is planning to have 25% of its total power generation comprised of renewable energy
by the target 2030 date.395 Considering, projections for the Kingdom’s electricity needs are
trending towards doubling between now and 2040, the Saudis are seeking to diversify their
energy consumption to avoid the “net-importer fate” that some have predicted.
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Regarding their domestic energy market, Saudi Arabia has issued government policies
expressly focused on improving operational efficiency in their national energy sector. According
to their National Industrial Development and Logistics Program, they are investing about USD
$26.3 billion to boost the efficiency of electricity generation, ranging from the use of crude oil
and its refined products to the efficacy of their infrastructure.396 Between 2010 and 2016, these
strategic initiatives have succeeded in improving the system’s efficiency from 31.3% to 37.9%
overall and reducing the consumption of about 13 million barrels of diesel fuel per year.397
Perhaps most importantly, the Kingdom has moved to reduce domestic fuel subsidies,
which are the greatest contributor to the nation’s inefficient consumption. According to the 2017
annual BP statistical review of world energy, Saudi Arabia ranked fifth in the world for most
barrels of oil consumed per day behind the United States, China, India, and Japan.398 When
comparing population size, Saudi Arabia is four times smaller than Japan, nearly ten times
smaller than the US, and more than forty times smaller than India and China.399 Yet they
consume about as much oil annually as Japan and India, about a third of what China consumes,
and around a fifth of US consumption.400 In terms of energy intensity, the amount of energy
consumed to produce a unit of GDP, Saudi Arabia is more than double the amount of the OECD
countries.401 The absolutely staggering inefficiency of Saudi domestic oil consumption is borne
out of years of domestic fuel subsidies, which have held gasoline prices artificially below the
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global market average price. As a result, domestic consumption has skyrocketed because
governance inefficiencies are being exacerbated by a rising population.
In response, Saudi Arabia has moved to reverse its longstanding domestic policies. In
2015, they began to seriously address subsidies by releasing a five-year plan to drastically reduce
domestic energy subsidies. The plan’s ultimate goal is to completely eliminate subsidies over
time while balancing the need for cheap energy to support strategic industries.402 However,
subsidies are a difficult addiction to kick. On one hand, the economy has grown comfortably for
years with access to cheap energy but on the other, it has become equally dependent on these low
prices. Changing the status quo can create massive reverberations throughout the system and can
be difficult to juggle alongside intervening variables such as foreign policy, regional dynamics,
and the international energy markets. In fact, when the economy began contracting in 2017 due
to oil output cuts, the Saudis were forced to extend their timeline for subsidy cuts out to 2025.403
Nevertheless, the bold steps taken to phase out government intervention in the domestic energy
markets will greatly increase the efficiency of not only their resource consumption but also their
NOC.
Over the last decade, Saudi government policies have advanced a strategy of greater
efficiency by strategically developing more energy resource alternatives and by lessening
government intervention. While under the new leadership of Muhammad bin Salman,
commercial investment and national transformation are the upmost priority, even considering the
mounting pressure for non-commercial commitments. This best encapsulated in his Saudi Vision
2030 plan and spans from developing natural gas and renewable energy to investing in more
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efficient infrastructure and improving government policies. The scope of these initiatives will
vastly expand the performance of their NOC in a couple significant ways.
First, the wasteful consumption of oil in the domestic energy market will eventually be
replaced by natural gas and renewables. When completely free of oil for electricity generation,
this will free up the 0.5 to 0.9 Mb/d for exports. To date, they have been able to reduce
consumption in this area by about 0.2 to 0.3 Mb/d.404 Second, removing domestic subsidies and
improving domestic infrastructure efficiency will greatly decrease the amount of annual
expenditure on keeping energy prices artificially low, inefficient consumption of energy, and on
expensive annual infrastructure maintenance. These two sets of effects are at the core of Saudi
Arabia’s uneasy future and are central to the Vision 2030 campaign to eliminate the alarming
rise of domestic consumption. Current overall oil consumption increased from 1.6 to 3.8 Mb/d
between 2000 and 2015 but in the last five years has reversed direction, decreasing for the first
time in the country’s history.405 Moreover, these two approaches are expected to reduce domestic
consumption by another 1.5 to 2 Mb/d by 2030,406 which would return national consumption to
levels not seen since the turn of the century.
Ultimately, much of the progress Saudi Aramco has achieved in the last decade is the
product of a massive internationalization effort in the areas of foreign service company
subsidiaries, R&D research institutes, and foreign talent recruitment. This is especially the case
with respect to unconventional energy and renewable energy. Much of the progress the company
has made in the areas of general efficiency are the product of shifts in government policies.
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Specifically, the shifting away from non-commercial intervention and a movement in the
direction of a free market model. This is exemplified in the plan to diminish and ultimately
abolish domestic fuel subsidies. Once realized, these policy goals stand to strengthen the position
of Saudi Aramco considerably in a number ways. For one, less domestic consumption of oil
means more spare production capacity. This directly translates to more oil market power and
reestablishes Saudi Arabia’s role as the global swing producer, both within the context of the
OPEC cartel and the greater global energy markets. Additionally, it means a greater preparedness
for meeting future global energy demand amid a growing need for investment to ensure global
consumption is serviced. More efficient domestic consumption also means more efficient
allocation of financial resources. Instead of reallocating funds from their NOC to subsidize the
domestic market and exacerbating inefficient consumption, which is lose-lose, they can better
invest those funds on expanding operations in upstream or downstream production, on R&D, or
on developing their massive unconventional gas reserves and becoming a major player in global
LNG. So far, the twin strategies of taking advantage of globalization by internationalizing the
activities of their NOC and reforming government policies to increase efficiency have greatly
strengthened Saudi Aramco and will continue to do so into the future.

Partial Privatization

Saudi Aramco became fully owned by the national government in the 1970s, beginning
with the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The embargo caused a spike in oil prices that resulted in
significant windfalls for oil producers around the world, including the Saudi regime which had a
50/50 profit sharing agreement with Aramco. The very same year the Saudis used their newly
acquired wealth to purchase a 25% interest in Aramco’s assets and very quickly increased their

178

interest to 60% the subsequent year. By 1976, the Saudis had purchased the remaining 40%,
making them the sole owners of the company, though Aramco would continue to operate and
service their oil fields for about another decade. In 1988, the Kingdom created the “Saudi
Arabian Oil Company” by royal decree to take control of operational management of the former
Aramco interests, thus creating what is known today as Saudi Aramco.407
While NOCs have tended to be less efficient enterprises in general when compared to
IOCs, Saudi Aramco has traditionally been amongst the most successful and competitive
companies in the world despite the trend. Meanwhile, partially privatized NOCs have quickly
joined the ranks of top performers among all firms in the oil industry, especially with respect to
other national firms. As a result, this particular strategy of increasing the performance of the
NOC has risen to become one of the favorite strategies among nations globally for several
reasons. First, partial sale of a minority interest to private investors or to the greater public
doesn’t involve relinquishing the decision-making powers of the national government, which
maintains a controlling interest in the company. Second, the discipline associated with answering
to shareholders, having to mitigate for stock market forces, and the transparency required to
attract investors all incentivize these companies to strive for more effective business practices
and greater overall efficiency.408 Third, it has the additional benefit of maximizing the
company’s market capitalization. The inflow of new capital can have a substantial effect on the
NOC in terms of expanding production capacity, international operations, or R&D. Though
Saudi Aramco stands to benefit far less in terms of efficiency when compared other country’s
NOCs such as Venezuela’s PDVSA, Nigeria’s NNPC, or Iran’s NIOC, partial privatization
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would have a net positive effect. Moreover, because of the record setting valuation of the
company, around 1.9 trillion USD, the amount of capital the company could attract would be
massive. In short, states are able to take advantage of some perks associated with privatized
firms while not fully surrendering control over their coveted NOC.
The possible benefits of a partial privatization have not gone unnoticed by the Saudi
leadership. In fact, the move towards an IPO for Saudi Aramco was the cornerstone of the
greater national economic transformation project laid out in the Saudi Vision 2030. It was
intended to encourage a deluge of investment that could subsequently provide the necessary
capital to fund all of the different arms of the national transformation plan over the next decade.
The IPO was reportedly ready to go since the beginning of 2018 but was continually delayed.
According to the Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih, the Kingdom has been waiting on the
“optimum time to execute,” referring to the state of the global markets, the price of oil, and
geopolitical circumstances.409 Other critics wondered if Crown Prince Salman had overextended
with his initial expectation of a 2 trillion USD valuation and underestimated bureaucratic
resistance to transparency requirements associated with public offerings.410 Despite the setbacks,
the IPO would go ahead in December of 2019.
A month ahead of the IPO Saudi Aramco announced that it would be offering only a
1.5% share, significantly less that the initially envisioned 5%, and that investors could make
offers within a range of $30-$32 SAU per share.411 An IPO of this magnitude and the offered
price range would be the equivalent of a USD $1.7 trillion valuation. Though less than the
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expected USD $2 trillion valuation, this still generates the greatest market capitalization of any
company in the world. Apple (USD 1.14 trillion) and Google (USD 1.13 trillion) struggle to
compare and the next largest publicly traded oil company ExxonMobil (USD 295 billion) pales
in comparison.412 The IPO went ahead in December 2019, seeing share prices reach their highest
on the 18th at around $35-$38 per share range, but has since contracted back to the initial offering
price because of coronavirus related global market contractions.413 The offering was successful
in raising USD $29.5 billion, a record setting IPO even trumping the USD $25 billion IPO of
China’s Ali Baba.
With the success of Saudi Aramco’s public offering the Kingdom was able to pull off the
first major step towards completing a set of important goals. First, partial privatization will have
a positive effect on the efficiency of the company for all the aforementioned reasons. This will
undoubtedly augment the company’s ability to compete among the world’s elite energy firms.
Second, the IPO was able to raise nearly USD $30 billion, which was necessary to fund many of
the transformational projects envisioned in the Saudi Vision 2030. This involves expanding
renewable energy production, natural gas production, additional upstream production, and
downstream petrochemical products. These projects will drastically increase the efficiency of the
Saudi energy industry, restructure domestic resource consumption, and globally integrate their
NOC in ways it has never been before.
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Conclusion

At the turn of the century, Saudi Arabia was presented with numerous challenges that, if
left unattended, threatened to destabilize the country, its NOC, and the global energy markets.
Many predicted the worst, but the last decade has witnessed ambitious and bold action on the
part of Riyadh to address these challenges. In terms of national security, the Saudis responded to
regional threats by first instigating the 2015 oil glut and then pursuing a greater OPEC+
expansion including Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Russia. These actions have served to increase
their overall market power and their foreign policy objectives. While the greater noncommercial
utilization does not necessarily strengthen the NOC directly, especially with respect to the
company’s commercial activities, it does increase the strategic value of the NOC to the state
which indirectly strengthens it. For example, when the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 was
implemented, the subsequent rise in oil prices generated one of the greatest peaceful transfers of
wealth in history from the OECD countries to the OPEC producers. With respect to government
policies and efficiency, the Saudis have been impressively bold. The effort to internationalize
Saudi Aramco’s operations as well as reduce noncommercial interference in the domestic energy
markets amount to the most consequential reforms to ever be pursued by the Kingdom in its
history. In particular the diversification of energy production in combination with the massive
potential reserves for unconventional gas and solar energy stand to move their energy industry
ahead by leaps and bounds. The revolutionary implications of these policies cannot be
overstated. Finally, the Saudis have experienced great success in the move to partially privatizing
their NOC. The additional transparency requirements associated with IPOs and with being a
publicly traded company will serve as a net positive for Saudi Aramco in the area of efficiency.
Additionally, the investment capital raised from the public offering are providing the seed
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investment funds for many of the aforementioned revolutionary projects. As a result, one of the
world’s largest and most consequential NOCs historically has begun to grow even stronger and
become more influential in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER VII
THE RESURGENCE OF RUSSIA’S NOCS

During the reign of the Soviet Union the energy resources and infrastructure was fully
owned and operated by the regime. Following its collapse in 1991 there was a massive effort to
achieve privatization across a multitude of industries, including the energy industry. From a
macroeconomic perspective, it was part of a larger policy effort on the part of Boris Yeltsin that
represented a capitulation of the Soviet style command economy and a general push towards
something that would resemble a market economy.414 However, this rapid transformation would
play out as a somewhat messy affair and would ultimately exacerbate corruption. One might
describe the Russian economy of the 1990s as a crony capitalist oligarchy. As one scholar has
put it, the process was a transition period in which many “political elites traded their party
credentials for top-paying positions at rapidly privatizing former state-owned enterprises.”415
With respect to the state oil and gas companies, corruption was perhaps the most
transparent considering the Russian “loans for shares” scandal in 1995 and 1996, which was a
scheme by which the government offered shares in these companies for loans from banks in
order to fund the presidential campaign.416 Of course, these so-called “loans” were never actually
repaid which highlighted the scandalous nature of the program. The government was raising
money by auctioning off the nation’s energy assets to various interested parties, mostly elites that
would make up the new class of oligarchs in Russia. By the time Vladimir Putin was elected
president in 2000, many of the former Soviet state-owned energy companies had been fully
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privatized. However, Putin would set himself to the task of reestablishing national control over
these industries as he considered it the cornerstone to rebuilding Russian state power.
The turn of the century marked an important moment of evolution of the Russian energy
sector. Putin would reassert control over the industry by first targeting the most vulnerable oil
and gas companies on the verge of failure. Once the national takeover of these companies was
complete, they would be used consolidate control over the leftover companies that were better
off. The case of Russia’s NOCs is a twenty-year story that involves carefully considered and
implemented strategies that have resulted in the resurgence of their energy firms to global
prominence. This study will examine the three significant aspects of how Russia’s NOCs were
able to regain much of their lost strength and how they have been able to surpass their previous
global prestige during the Soviet Era. First, after coming to power Putin would immediately
begin a gradual process of renationalization of Russia’s NOCs that had been scandalously
auctioned off only 5 years earlier. However, this would not turn out to be a return to the former
Soviet model of complete control over these industries. Rather, he would pursue the partial
privatization model which resulted in the process of renationalization looking more like the new
resource nationalism and less like the old. Second, Russian NOC activity would begin to
internationalize despite massive reserves at home. Their international operations have been most
notably focused on the Middle East, where much of the worlds cheapest energy resides, but also
across Latin America and Africa. Third, Vladimir Putin’s use of Russian NOCs as strategic
assets has been perhaps the most conspicuous of any nation deploying its energy firms in such a
way. Russian NOCs utilization as foreign policy tools have been aimed predominantly at former
Soviet socialist republics and more recently in the context of OPEC+, which has been more
global in nature. In these three ways, Russian NOCs in the 21st have evolved from
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underperforming enterprises hamstrung by severe corruption into partially private,
internationalized instruments of the Russian government that have expressed more strength and
competence in the global energy industry than most NOCs to date.

Renationalization with a Twist

Vladimir Putin held the view that the energy industry was the primary means by which
Russia could reassert its regional and global dominance after the collapse of the Soviet Union.417
In fact, before his rise to power he advanced this argument regarding Russia’s energy companies.
In his dissertation, submitted in 1997 to St. Petersburg Mining Institute, he argued “the process
of restructuring the national economy must have the goal of creating the most effective and
competitive companies on both the domestic and the global markets” and that this was “probably
the best way to reestablish Russia’s status as a superpower.”418 Thus, it was no surprise that
when Putin became president that he would immediately go about reasserting Russia’s authority
over its oil and gas companies. He encountered relatively little political resistance or social
outrage, with the exception of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in the Yukos acquisition, which some
scholars argue is part of a greater socio-political tendency of Russian culture.419
Putin would begin to implement his vision for Russia by first acquiring Rosneft, as it was
the perfect place to start due to its position relative other Russian energy companies. It had fallen
behind the other privatizing firms with respect to commercial skills and competitiveness during
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Russia’s transition to a market system in the 1990s, thus it was Putin’s low hanging fruit.420 The
consolidation of Rosneft’s assets under CEO Sergei Bogdanchikov and the new Russian regime
would begin in 1998. Just two years later, Moscow had acquired up to, and in some cases more
than, 75% of the shares in Rosneft’s remaining holdings by targeting specific assets, utilizing
opaque pricing methodologies, and purchasing the remaining shares at a fraction of the original
value.421 Rosneft’s general underperformance and failures at privatization throughout the 1990s
would make it the least costly, both politically and economically, to subsume by the government
as well as serve as the initial steppingstone from which the other better performing companies
could be targeted.
Following Rosneft’s consolidation, Yukos and its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky would be
the next meal on Putin’s plate.422 The nationalization of Yukos’ assets and the dissolution of the
company itself was the next economic and political stage of Putin’s grand strategy. By 2003,
Yukos had risen to become the best Russian privatized company in terms of market
capitalization and reserves.423 Therefore, Rosneft had much to gain as a result of the takeover as
mergers and acquisitions often benefit NOCs in terms of efficiency and competitiveness.
Politically, Khodorkovsky was keenly aware of Putin’s intentions for the Russian energy
industry and had been financially supporting his political opposition.424 It would follow that
eliminating a political adversary and weakening opposition parties were an added bonus that the
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new Russian regime would not be likely to pass on. Similar to how the Rosneft consolidation had
unfolded, which is to say characteristically authoritarian and abusively corrupt, the Yukos
acquisition would follow. In fact, the actions taken against Yukos by the Russian government
would be described by the International Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration as “not
driven by the genuine exercise of its tax power” and that they “constitute gross abuses.”425
Khodorkovsky would be arrested for tax evasion and Yukos would receive punitive tax penalties
amounting to more than a year’s worth of annual revenue.426 In order to cover the levied
penalties, Yukos would be forced to sell off most of its assets at fractions of their value to
Baikalfinansgroup, who shortly thereafter completed a merger with Rosneft, finalizing the
government takeover.427
The strategy to renationalize Gazprom was similar to Rosneft in that the government used
favorable political appointments and would ultimately use the company as a vehicle to
consolidate the other industries it wanted to nationalize. However, instead of acquiring shares
through a devaluation scheme and installing politically loyal leadership, the reverse was true in
the case of Gazprom. Putin would first orchestrate the takeover of the vast majority of the
company’s management committee with Kremlin loyalists and follow with a government
majority stake. Beginning in 2001 with Dmitry Medvedev, who would go on to become prime
minister a decade later, and shortly after Alexei Miller and his team from St. Petersburg, Putin
had replaced all but three of the original nineteen members of the company’s management
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committee by 2005.428 That same year, following the consolidation of power over the company
leadership, the Russian government would increase its stake in Gazprom to over 50% by
purchasing an additional 10.74% through Rosneft.429 Therefore, the Rosneft nationalization
played a role in the government takeover of Gazprom and produced two major NOCs by which
the government could consolidate most of the remaining elements of the industry. After
Gazprom’s nationalization many of the natural gas elements of the former Rosneft purchases
would be moved under its ownership including those from Surgutneftegas, Slavneft, Sibneft, and
some of the remaining assets from Yukos.430 For perspective, these acquisitions drove
exponential growth of the company’s market capitalization from USD 54.24 billion in 2004 to
USD 270 billion in 2006.431
In 2006, Russia would take two monumental steps forward in strengthening its two
national flagships Rosneft and Gazprom. First, it would make another significant acquisition,
that of TNK-BP at a 51% stake. 432 Up until this point most the of consolidations that occurred
were in the form of mergers and acquisitions that methodically brought much of the formerly
Russian privatized oil and gas assets back under the control of the regime. However, with the
acquisition of TNK-BP and the division of its assets between Rosneft and Gazprom, including
the massive Sakhalin-2 development project, this was the first time a western privatized
company’s holdings were subsumed by Russian NOCs. This would serve to increase their
efficiency by absorbing infrastructure and personnel that operate at higher standards. Second,
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Russia would also begin the partial privatization of its NOCs in 2006. Originally, Putin planned
to merge Rosneft and Gazprom into a single titan of global energy, but rather opted to keep them
separate and focus on improving their efficiency and global competitiveness.433 After the TNKBP acquisition Russia would move to liberalize the foreign ownership rules for shared ownership
and BP would take a significant stake in Rosneft as a result of the TNK-BP deal. Today, of the
49% of the remaining shares about 20% are owned by BP, 19% by Qatar, and about 11% are
publicly traded by numerous smaller shareholders.434 In their IPOs, both Rosneft and Gazprom
would benefit from an influx of investment and market capitalization435 but more fundamentally
the measures the companies would take to attract prospective investors in the first place would
prove transformational. These reforms would amount to a more equitable balance between state
responsibilities and commercial interests as well as increasing transparency, identifying areas of
inefficiency, and nominating politically independent members to the Board of Directors.436
These events – the combination of nationalization via M&A activity and partial
privatization – signified the new attitude of the Russian government with respect to its
companies and to foreign involvement in their energy industry. As one expert has put it, “our
assets for your money but under our control.”437 In a way, this is the essence of the new resource
nationalism of the 21st century. States seek to take advantage of privatization up to a point,
mostly through attracting investment from more liberalized market driven economies, but retain
decision making power through majority ownership so that companies can still be directed in
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accordance with the political objectives of the state.438 Moreover, partial privatization has had
positive effects on these companies. NOCs have been forced to improve their business practices,
resource allocation, and transparency in order to attract investment. These are some of the core
reasons privatized businesses are more competitive and perform more efficiently in the first
place. Strengthening the States’ NOCs while balancing the regulatory authority of the regime and
the commercial activity of the company is no easy task. In this regard, Russia has been less
successful when compared to Saudi Aramco or the Chinese NOCs, mostly stemming from the
Kremlin’s high fiscal dependency on these industries. The chapter 4 datasets confirmed this
reality, where Russian NOCs scored lower in terms of efficiency. However, what has been
achieved should not be taken lightly. Russia’s NOCs have been successful overall in taking
advantage of these two methods of strengthening their energy firms. They are as productive and
far more efficient than at their height under the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the following
sections will address the ways in which they have surpassed their former achievements and now
compete on a global stage with western international companies, at times outdoing the
competition.

Investment Abroad and Offshore

In the years of renationalization, the plan to make Russian energy the nexus of state
power began to take material form. Between 1999 and 2013, the share of Russia’s GDP that was
comprised of oil and gas gradually rose from 12.7% to 16%.439 This sudden expansion of the
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energy sector grew to account for more than 50% of the federal budget and about 70% of
exports.440 However, while production and revenues were reaching historic highs, many of the
West Siberian oil fields that were responsible for the robust expansion were being substantially
depleted. According to the Russian Ministry of Energy, an estimated USD $600 billion would
need to be invested through 2030 to maintain production in West Siberia and to develop East
Siberia and Sakhalin.441 Additionally, Lukoil estimates that about USD $1 trillion in investment
over the next twenty years would be necessary just to maintain production at the current 10 mb/d
level.442 These figures suggest that as domestic depletion continues to become a larger problem,
the amount of upfront investment necessary to maintain and expand production will substantially
increase.
The growing costs of maintaining their position of energy dominance through relying
predominantly on their traditional domestic reserves puts Russia in a difficult position. This is
especially the case for two reasons. First, because energy dominance has been made into the
primary pillar of Russian national power. Therefore, increasing maintenance and expansion costs
forces Moscow to choose between protecting its strategic industry or face a reality where
national power slowly dwindles away. Second, it has been extremely difficult to attract
international investment since 2014 when western sanctions were applied in response to the
Crimean annexation. Without the ability to attract foreign investment, most of the expanding
costs of maintaining the industry have been shouldered by the national government, a less than
ideal scenario for the Kremlin to say the least. These difficulties have generated a powerful
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impetus for Russian oil companies to begin a process of internationalization. Looking to develop
cheap resources both offshore and in other nations has turned out to be a solution that has the
potential to solve both of these challenges simultaneously.
Currently Russian energy firms are involved in upstream projects in nearly every region
of the world with significant projects in 15 countries.443 Perhaps most notably, are those that
have been negotiated in the Middle East. More than anywhere else in the world, the Persian Gulf
contains the cheapest energy to produce and refine. In fact, there is no larger supply of light
sweet petroleum anywhere else on the planet. Other continents may contain comparably large
supplies but often these reserves are either heavy or sour in nature, both of which increase the
costs of production. Consequently, Russian NOCs’ international expansion have especially
focused on the Gulf states as well as areas that western IOCs tend not to go because of risk or
international sanctions, such as Venezuela. Their companies are currently active in every Persian
Gulf nation albeit to varying levels.
Iraq is one country where Russian NOCs are highly active, and for good reason. Because
of historical circumstances, it has become the largest and cheapest undeveloped source of oil in
the world. Years of underinvestment under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war in the
1980s, international sanctions in response the invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s, and the invasion
by the US during the 2000s has meant that one of the most opportune sources of energy in the
world has sat idly by decade after decade. However, as the US occupation was nearing its end
and the Iraqi government was establishing its new Oil Ministry, much of the world looked to
capitalize on many of the new oil contracts that were being offered. As the Iraqi oil industry
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grew into a center of international investment, one of the chief foreign investors has been Russia
through their internationalizing energy firms.
Iraq’s West Qurna oil field is thought to be the world’s largest undeveloped conventional
oil field, with a reserve of about 13 billion barrels. In 2009, Russia’s Lukoil won the contract to
develop the West Qurna-2 oil field, with an aim to invest about USD $4.5 billion and to raise
production up to 1.2 mb/d.444 In the initial contract Lukoil partnered with Norway’s Statoil,
holding 56.25% of the project while Statoil held 18.75%. However, in 2012 Statoil transferred its
stake in the project to Lukoil.445 In March 2015, oil production in the West Qurna-2 project came
online for the first time. That same month, Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov met with the Iraqi
Oil Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi in Baghdad about the second phase of development and
explicitly stated the long-term status of the burgeoning relationship.446 In 2019, Lukoil
commenced the drilling of 57 new production wells as part of the second development phase,
which aims to expand production by 80 kb/d in 2020.447
In addition to the massive West Qurna-2 project, Moscow has eyed the hydrocarbon
riches in the autonomous region of Kurdistan. In October 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, along with a delegation that included the head of Gazprom Neft, Rosneft, and
Soyuzneftgaz, met in the Kurdish capital Erbil reaffirming previously negotiated bilateral energy
projects negotiated in 2011.448 Since the original negotiations, Russia’s Gazprom Neft have taken
significant shares of three development projects in the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq. In the

Lukoil, “West Qurna-2,” Business, accessed June 16, 2020.
Bob Tippee, “Lukoil gets Statoil's West Qurna 2 Oil Field Stake,” Oil & Gas Journal, June 1, 2012.
446
Daniel J. Graeber, “Russia’s Lukoil Committed to Long Term to Iraq,” UPI, March 24, 2015.
447
Lukoil, “West Qurna-2.”
448
Interfax, “Lavrov Reaffirms Fulfillment of Military-Technical Contracts with Iraq,” October 6, 2019.
444
445

194

Halabja and Shakal blocks the company owns an 80%449 as well as a 40% share of the Garmian
block and a 30% share of the Badra block.450
Russian NOCs have also expanded operations in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia. Rosneft’s first presence in the Middle East was in the UAE, established in 2010 when the
company entered into a joint venture with Crescent Petroleum to develop the Emirate of
Sharjah’s onshore concession.451 Rosneft was awarded a 49% share in the concession and has,
along with Crescent, invested around USD 60 million thus far in accordance with the joint
investment plan.452 In Saudi Arabia, the Russians are assisting in natural gas development,
which, as noted in the previous chapter, is a massive piece of the Saudi Vision 2030 development
strategy for the future of the country. They have been operating in close partnership since 2002
when the Russians began offering the Saudis their technologies associated with oil and gas
extraction.453 In 2004, Lukoil was awarded the contract for the Rub-al-Khali field and
subsequently signed a 40-year contract to develop the “Zone-A” natural gas field as well as
having recently announced plans for two unconventional exploration wells.454
Russia has also been keen to invest in nations under international sanctions such as Iran,
Venezuela, and Cuba,455 as there is limited competition from other companies who are willing to
disregard the demands of the international community and also because they themselves are
under sanctions and considered an international pariah by many western nations since the
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annexation of Crimea. Thus, attracting other geopolitical pariahs into the Russian sphere of
influence has played a role in directing the pattern of internationalization of some Russian
NOCs. Initially, many Russian companies including Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, and
Surgutneftegas collectively committed to a massive development project with Venezuela’s
PDVSA projecting a USD $20-30 billion investment over a 25-year period. 456 However, as the
domestic stability of Venezuela has frayed since the original negotiations, Rosneft bought out the
other companies stake in 2014 for around USD $800 million.457 As of July 2019, Rosneft has
invested a total of USD $1.1 billion in the Venezuelan oil fields, primarily in the area of
upstream development.458 Interestingly, the Kremlin has adjusted its strategy for investment in
Venezuela overtime, first shielding many of its NOCs aside from Rosneft in 2014 and later took
the step of fully privatizing much of the investments in order to avoid the escalating US
sanctions and further shielding Rosneft in 2020.459
Russia’s strategy concerning Iran has been similar to that of Venezuela although with
more mixed results. In 2007, Lukoil expanded their presence into Iran signing agreements to
invest directly into their oil fields.460 Two years later, Gazprom Neft signed an agreement with
Iran’s NIOC to jointly develop the oilfields Azar and Shangule.461 Under the agreement
Gazprom would develop the North Azadegan field, build an oil refinery, and handle trans-
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Caspian energy transportation, a deal analysts projected to be worth about USD $3 billion
annually.462 However, Russian investment in Iran has been more uncertain than with Venezuela,
primarily because the Iranian regime has been more difficult in negotiations. In 2010, Lukoil
ceased operations on the oil project citing international sanctions as the primary cause.463 After
Iran forced out Gazprom and replaced it with a consortium of Iranian companies it became clear
that international sanctions were not the sole cause of the breakdown in relations.464 Since this
incident, relations have been inconsistent. In February 2013, Iran invited Russian companies
once more to invest in Iranian oil fields, this time with the added caveat of making domestic
legislative changes that would allow Russian companies to acquire ownership stakes of
extraction sites.465 However since 2014, tightening of international sanctions have halted most
international activity in Iran once again.466 In 2018, relations began to warm again with Russian
NOCs signing a USD $4 billion deal and beginning negotiations on an additional set of deals
worth around USD $10 billion while simultaneously announcing their willingness to commit up
to USD $50 billion in total to the Iranian energy industry.467
Another way that Russia has directed its international investments has been to gain
influence with its possible competitors in the natural gas industry, a market with tighter regional
structures than that of the more global oil market. This empowers monopolistic actors, such as
Russia’s NOCs, to more effectively dominate various nodes in the regional energy markets
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around the world. While Russia wields its NOCs for political purposes more so than perhaps any
other nation, which will be examined more fully in the next section, it has some relevance here
as well. This is because the expansion of LNG as well as alternative pipeline networks threaten
Russia’s market dominance and jeopardize the political power they expect to gain.
Qatar has been a primary target for these reasons as it has become the premier LNG
exporting country, ranking first among all other nations. Qatar currently hosts six LNG plants,468
and in 2010 increased its share of the European market by 49%, rising fastest in countries
importing LNG such as the UK and Belgium.469 Unsurprisingly, Russia’s Gazprom suffered a
25% decrease in exports to Europe that same year when compared to 2009. 470 Thus, over the last
two decades as Russia consolidated power over its energy industry and began internationalizing
operations, the Kremlin has sought to maintain close ties with Qatar. In April 2010, the RussianQatari committee for cooperation in gas and energy was formed.471 This was an initial step in
what many thought would materialize into a greater OPEC-like cartel for natural gas.472 Two
months later Gazprom joined a consortium conducting a geological-economic evaluation of
Qatar’s north field “Block D.”473 In 2013, Gazprom opened a representative office in Doha and
the board chairman Viktor Zubkov stated that the company “will contribute to stronger
partnership ties and will provide an additional impetus to closer mutually beneficial cooperation
with the states in the region.”474 The potential for Russian-Qatari cooperation with the additional

Global LNG Info, “Global LNG Database,” accessed June 19, 2020.
Interfax, “Gazprom Maintained Market Share in Most of Europe in 2010 – IEA,” Russia & CIS
Business and Financial Newswire, Mar 15, 2011.
470
Yulia Latynina, “The Main International Confrontation of the XXI Century is Between Hydrocarbon
Despotism and Pipeline Democracies,” Novaya gazeta, March 29, 2011.
471
Interfax, “Russia, Qatar Ink Joint Gas-Cooperation Declaration,” April 18, 2010.
472
Vladimir Socor, “A Russian-led "OPEC for Gas?" Design, Implications, Countermeasures,”
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 20 (2008): 112-119.
473
Interfax, “Gazprom May Join Consortium to Bid in Qatar,” March 23, 2010.
474
“Gazprom Sets up Shop in Qatar,” UPI, February 12, 2013.
468
469

198

nation of Iran at the time had the potential for unrivaled control over in the European, Asian, and
other Pacific Rim countries’ markets for natural gas.475 However, international sanctions on
Russia and Iran alongside a souring of relations between the GCC and Qatar and Iran have
dampened the prospects of this geopolitical alignment.
Bahrain has also been a target of Russia for similar reasons as Qatar, but to a far lesser
extent. In December 2008, Gazprom and Bahrain’s National Agency for Oil and Gas signed a
letter of intent to jointly explore various emerging opportunities in the oil and gas markets that
could benefit both countries. 476 The agreement was expanded in the following two years, most
notably with respect to exploration and development of the Awali field.477 Since the original
agreement, this relationship has developed at a far slower pace than many of Russia’s other
relationships, primarily because of geopolitics. The Arab Spring in 2011 saw Saudi tanks rolling
into the Bahraini capital Manama in order to shore up the Sunni monarchy that rules over a Shia
majority. This was a status quo move to protect the GCC and prevent another gulf nation from
falling under the influence of Iran. Additionally, Bahrain is home to the largest US naval
presence in the Persian Gulf. Thus, Bahrain is careful not to appear to be drifting into the
Russian sphere of influence. Nevertheless, in March 2012, cooperation continued to progress as
Bahrain discussed imports of 400 million cf/d of LNG from Russia’s Gazprom478 through a new
terminal which began operations at the end of 2019.479
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Lastly, Russia has pioneered Arctic offshore operations to a far greater extent than any
other country. This area of energy exploration and development has the greatest future potential
yields, as it contains one third of the world’s remaining natural gas and thirteen percent of the
world’s remaining oil.480 This will increasing become the next great frontier in energy
geopolitics as Arctic ice recedes and the costs of exploration and extraction decrease. As of
January 2019, Rosneft alone has 56 licenses for offshore development projects, more than half of
which are in the Artic, amounting to 730 billion barrels of oil reserves.481 So far, Russia has
shown itself the standalone innovator in this area of international energy and it will certainly pay
massive dividends in the future.
Internationalization, while spurred on by rising domestic maintenance costs and
difficulties attracting foreign investment, has strengthened Russian NOCs over the last decade to
a considerable extent. Possibly the most profound development was the ability of these
companies to capitalize on the US opening of the Iraqi energy industry to foreign investment.
While investing nothing in the liberation of the nation and the quelling of the insurgency, Russia
was able outbid US companies in the most lucrative contracts offered by Iraq. Additionally,
Russian NOCs have slowly internationalized their operations over the last ten years operating in
numerous countries across the world, dwarfing the scope of operations that their companies had
ever achieved previously. As a consequence, their national energy firms have not only
maintained their status as some of the world’s largest energy producers, but they have been able
to accumulate power for the Russian state unlike ever before.
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Russian Energy Coercion

The linkage of the energy sector to the governing regime leads to what many energy
experts refer to as politicizing energy. While this often carries a number of consequences for the
state itself, the inverse is also true. On one hand, the realization of Putin’s mission to rebuild
Russian national power and global prestige through establishing elite energy companies certainly
has made Russia stronger than it was in the 1990s. On the other, the companies themselves are
far more powerful as well as having been particularly consequential in the arena of foreign
policy.482 While Putin’s vision was to reestablish Russian superpower status, his goal was
intrinsically tied to first rebuilding and strengthening its NOCs and to subsequently utilize this
strength to further expand the influence of these companies over regional and global markets.483
In fact, Putin explicitly stated his ideas on energy in 1999 when he said that Russia’s vast energy
resources can serve “as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy.”484 It’s unclear
the extent to which he understood at the time these policies would become energy 200entric as a
consequence of the marriage of energy firms and the state. Nevertheless, this process works to
further expand and strengthen a state’s NOCs as the strategic interests of the firm become that of
the state as well. In the case of Russia, this process is more apparent than any other in the world.
To be more precise, Russian NOCs have engaged in energy coercion on at least 55 occasions in
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the post-Cold War period, often as a punishment for non-compliance with broader political or
economic demands.485
Initially, a number of factors allowed for Moscow’s strategic power over its European
and Asian neighbors. These include the tightening of the global energy supply, Russian control
over strategic transit chokepoints in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, and Europe’s overwhelming
reliance on Russian energy.486 This was primarily a consequence of the economic development
around energy and resources in these regions occurring during the 20th century in the Soviet Era,
when many of the former socialist republics followed the dictates coming from Moscow. Thus,
Russia is beneficiary to a legacy inheritance in which much of the energy transit infrastructure
throughout Eastern Europe and Eurasia was constructed with a Russia-centric frame that has
allowed its NOCs to play a powerful role in regional and global markets.
Between 2004 and 2006, Moscow began deploying its NOCs aggressively using energy
diplomacy to reassert greater control over the regional energy markets of many states from the
former territories in the Soviet Union.487 Much of the post-Soviet era saw these former socialist
republics receiving gas for cheap, which Putin saw as an attempt to subsidize these former
nations and keep them in the Russian sphere of influence.488 As a means of expansion and further
aggrandizement of its NOCs, Russia began elevating these gas prices and reducing them again
once their demands were met. These demands usually involved accumulating greater control
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over the energy infrastructure running through these nations, a move aimed at expanding the
power and influence of Russian NOCs over strategic regional markets.
Beginning with Belarus, Gazprom was embroiled in a dispute with the pipeline
infrastructure running through the country. The Russian company sought to reacquire the assets
at book value, which Belarus refused to accept. However, as a monopolistic supplier, Russia via
Gazprom was able to coerce the country. In January 2004, Gazprom shut off gas deliveries to
Belarus in a campaign to force the nation into compliance.489 Negotiations continued and two
years later, after another threat to cut off supplies in 2006, the two countries were able to come to
an agreement. The next year they signed a five-year contract where Belarus would get the
cheapest natural gas compared to any other the former socialist republics in exchange for
Gazprom acquiring a fifty percent stake in the Belarusian pipeline company Beltransgaz.490
During the same two-year period, Gazprom was also working to absorb much of its lost
infrastructure in Georgia and Armenia. In the case of Georgia, who refused to cede any control to
the Russian firm, faced a near doubling of natural gas prices. In 2005, the Georgians were paying
a rate of USD $60 per Tcf of natural gas, but the following year were required to pay USD $110
per Tcf.491 Similarly, Armenia saw a rise from USD $65 per Tcf to $110 per Tcf.492
Perhaps most infamously of all, the Russian-Ukrainian dispute saw multiple instances of
energy supplies being cut which also had serious impacts on western European customers further
downstream. In 2005, Russia entered into negotiations with Ukraine to raise the price of gas in
line with the price raises to Belarus, Armenia, and Georgia. However, Ukraine rejected the
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proposal leading to the first supply cutoff in January 2006.493 Ukraine responded by siphoning
gas meant for central and western Europe from pipelines passing through their country. Gazprom
accused Ukraine of stealing gas supplies by insisting that all contractual volumes to other nations
were being met. Meanwhile, Ukraine denied taking any extra gas for itself that it was not entitled
to. Of course, the implication made by Ukraine was that it was entitled to take a portion of the
gas moving through its country, 15% to be exact.494 Negotiations would continue for years and in
2009 Russia would again cutoff supplies to Ukraine to punish their noncompliance. Eventually,
the nations would come to an agreement which saw Ukraine paying the highest price of all the
CIS countries at USD $230 per Tcf.
In 2007, a dispute between the Czech Republic, the United States, and Russia flared over
the issue of NATO’s eastern expansion and missile defense. As the US began to negotiate the
placement of interceptor missile systems and radar facilities in Poland and the Czech
Republic,495 Russia responded aggressively. In addition to threats of missile development
programs aimed at circumventing NATO defense systems and the deployment of long-range
missiles at Kaliningrad, Moscow immediately announced disruptions to energy exports to the
Czech Republic the same day they announced their participation.496 Broader fears arose that
Russia’s energy coercion would expand to Western European nations in response to NATO
naval operations in the Black Sea.497 Russia was able to extract a great deal of concessions out of
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the US both because of its energy diplomacy and because of the incoming Obama
administration’s Russia Reset policy.
Undoubtedly, some Russian political influence was exchanged for greater control over
adjacent regional energy markets as well as some significant profit windfalls from nearly
doubling natural gas prices across the board. Eliminating the longstanding subsidized energy for
the CIS countries has already led to new geopolitical formulations, such as the Three Seas
Initiative.498 In the Russian calculus however, this expenditure of “soft power” was a worthwhile
exchange for more fungible power resources such as buttressed cashflow that would be used to
rebuild and modernize the military, balance the federal budget while stabilizing the Russian
economy, and secure Russian energy dominance over specific regional markets while
strengthening their NOCs.499 In fact, the focus on reigning in CIS countries and reasserting
control over these existing pipeline infrastructure transit routes was coupled with an agenda
aimed at negotiating new pipelines projects that would further increase their companies’
bargaining power. This would be accomplished by using the new projects to circumvent the
existing infrastructure in place in the CIS countries that gave them bargaining power as transit
nations to Western Europe.
The Nord and South Stream pipeline projects were Moscow’s initial vision for
implementing this expansion. The Nord Stream pipeline was a Baltic Sea transit project
negotiated with Germany that would simultaneously allow Russia to bypass Ukraine and Poland
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when supplying Western Europe and create a new complex web of interdependence with the
Baltic States.500 Much of the political nature of the project was revealed when the German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the Shareholders’ Committee Chairman and Matthias
Warnig, the Board Chairman of Dresdner Bank and alleged former friend of Vladimir Putin
during their time in East Germany, was made the Managing Director.501 The South Stream
pipeline had some initial success but was competing with the Nabucco pipeline, whose purpose
was to counter expanding Russian influence.502 However, Moscow was able to prevail by
bringing Turkey into the fold. By signing an agreement to disallow the construction of the
Nabucco through Turkish territorial waters and instead constructing the formerly proposed South
Stream now entitled the Turkish Stream through Turkey, the Russians were able to triumph.503 In
Russia’s acquisition of supply routes to Europe and the recent projects allowing for an expansion
of market-making monopolistic capabilities, Gazprom has concurrently either intervened in or
played middleman between Europe and other producing nations.504
The Russian expansion over various regional energy markets, especially the European,
has not gone unfettered and is worth mention. While Moscow has been successful when it comes
to pipeline politics, they have been less so concerning the growth of LNG. As discussed in many
other portions of this study, the American energy boom has had multiple implications across a
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number of aspects of global energy and in this case, LNG exports from the US have been one of
the only checks on monopolistic Russian expansion. Alongside the US, LNG exports from Qatar
have also played a role, which is why Russia has been courting Qatar so closely. Between 2008
and 2018, Russia’s share of the EU market increased slightly to around 40%, with the lowest
point falling to 35% in 2010 and the highest rising to just over 45% in 2013.505 During that
period, Qatar’s exports to the EU more than doubled. This development, as Günther Oettinger,
the EU CommissIoner for Energy put it, has already decreased prices, dampening Russian
leverage.506 Moreover, during this time the US boom was beginning to substantially expand as it
was becoming a net exporter as well as planning the construction of numerous LNG export
terminals. The first LNG shipments began arriving in 2016 and have grown exponentially in the
last few years. In 2017, US LNG accounted for 4% of EU imports but by 2019 this figure grew
to 16%.507 Nevertheless, Russia has been able to maintain a powerful stranglehold over the EU
market, primarily because of economic growth increasing overall demand coupled with gas
replacing coal in the greater energy mix.508
In addition to energy coercion, Russia’s strategic use of NOCs in the context of OPEC+
should also be mentioned. Because the previous chapter highlighted this newly expanded
institution from the original OPEC in detail, it will only be mentioned briefly here. Russia’s
NOCs will have far greater global reach in the context of OPEC+, especially when compared to
the first decade of the century as they mostly were at the whims of OPEC in the same way that
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many IOCs were. However, in the context of this institution Russia will be able to play an active
role in setting global energy supply and price through cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the
other OPEC members. The dispute during the economic turmoil in the initial weeks of the
Coronavirus pandemic was a sign that internal disputes will always be a messy affair, but the
final analysis suggests that Russia will ultimately favor cooperation over noncompliance as long
as expanding the strength of its NOCs remains a national priority.
Energy foreign policy is one of the few ways in which the marriage between energy firm
and state can buttress the strength of a NOC. The interests of the firm become that of the state as
well. As the state becomes more concerned with protecting and aggrandizing its strategic
industry, it will utilize its other power resources to bolster these efforts. In the case of Russia’s
NOCs, Moscow has shrewdly conducted energy foreign policy, expanding its NOCs control over
the energy infrastructure and neighboring regional markets utilizing energy foreign policy. While
increasing competition from the US in the last few years is threatening to jeopardize these
efforts, the jury is still out on how much the American companies will cut into European
markets, especially, if hostile legislation on fossil fuels continues to gain popularity. In the area
of global oil, Russia is seeking greater influence over global supply and price controls through
the context of OPEC+. These two developments have positioned Russia’s NOCs to play
monopolistic roles in a number of regional gas markets as well as to oil policies that will have
greater global reach than ever before.

Conclusion

The energy firms of the Russian Federation have achieved a level of strength that is
unmatched in their previous history, even when compared to the height of the Soviet period. This
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was achieved through renationalization in congruence with the new resource nationalism that
transitions NOCs towards a partially privatized model, internationalization of NOC operations,
and the strategic utilization of energy as a means of aggrandizing the influence of their NOCs. In
the 21st century, state-owned enterprises and their national controllers have learned to co-opt the
free market economies to their own advantage instead of pursuing autarkic self-sufficiency.
Russian NOCs have done a good job of this, though they do not lead the pack. In terms of
internationalization, they have been strikingly impressive expanding throughout the energy-rich
Middle East, capitalizing on the opening of the Iraqi energy sector more so than any other nation,
and investing in places where Western companies avoid for political and economic reasons. With
respect to utilizing energy as a foreign policy tool, Russia has been able to vastly expand the
influence of its NOCs over regional and global energy markets. It has been more successful in
this area than any other nation in the last twenty years. These three factors have produced
stronger, more competitive, and strikingly more influential Russian NOCs than have existed in
the past.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE GROWING POWER OF CHINESE NOCS

In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping began a series of economic reforms in China intending to open
its markets to the larger global economy. Growth was slow but steady through the 1990s and
early 2000s but began skyrocketing year over year around 2005. In terms of GDP growth, the
Chinese economy grew from USD 2.3 trillion in 2005 to USD 11.2 trillion in 2015.509 Since it
began integrating into the global market, becoming the largest center of manufacturing in the
world, the national market has grown fifteen-fold and is now the second largest economy in the
world.510 As a further compounding factor, it is a nation of 1.4 billion people that is rapidly
transitioning economically from one whose population was predominantly rural to one that is
becoming increasingly urban. Since the initiation of economic reforms, the share of China’s
population living cities has grown from around 18% in 1978 to a little over 60% in 2020.511 This
amounts to 700 million people transitioning from rural to urban life. For perspective, that’s twice
the size of the entire US population.
What the Chinese have been able to achieve in such a short time is extraordinarily
impressive. However, these transformations can be a double-edged sword. Robust economic
development on this scale combined with rapid urbanization of such magnitude requires
substantial material and more importantly energy inputs to initiate and expand the transition.
This has led to skyrocketing energy demand in China, as it has become the second largest oil
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consumer behind the US and the largest overall energy consumer in the world.512 Unfortunately
for China its energy reserves are nowhere near sufficient to supply their growing domestic
consumption. In terms of oil reserves, China has only 25.9 billion barrels or about 1.5% of total
proved reserves globally.513 With respect to conventional natural gas, they are in a better position
with a little under 300 Tcf or about 3% of the total global reserves.514 Considering their upside
for production is severely limited due to their lacking domestic reserves, it comes as no surprise
that their national production figures fall drastically short of covering their consumption. To
date, China has only been able to supply about 35% of its oil consumption and about 57% of its
natural gas consumption from domestic sources. As a result, China has become the most import
dependent nation in the world by far.
The severe import dependence that China is faced with has produced a powerful sense of
insecurity within the regime and has provided the impetus for raising up a set of NOCs that can
provide the sorely needed resources from abroad. The natural gas shortfall is more easily solved
than that of oil. To meet their energy needs the Chinese have turned to coal, producing 1.8 billion
metric tons accounting for nearly half of global production.515 While this has some serious
ramifications environmentally in terms of air and water quality as well as contributing to global
carbon emissions, the country has nevertheless solved electrical component of its energy
dilemma. Therefore, Chinese NOCs have not expanded their operations in the areas of natural
gas in the way that has been observed in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Russia. The overall
makeup of China’s energy inputs are a somewhat separate problem and are not examined here.
Concerning oil, which cannot be substituted for like electricity inputs, imports have been
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growing at a staggering pace. Between 2000 and 2014 imports grew from 29% to 60% of annual
consumption.516 In 2019, China imported 10.1 Mb/d accounting for 75% of its consumption that
year.517
The extreme nature of Beijing’s oil insecurity has led to a global strategy that utilizes NOCs
to secure oil reserves abroad and they have thus far been very successful. The
internationalization of their NOCs has seen numerous projects in nearly every major region of
the world including Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and even North
America. Additionally, China’s NOCs operate with a surprising level of efficiency, despite being
fully nationalized, that are on par with the most competitive companies in the world. This is
primarily a result of the allowances China’s government policies grants to these companies to
operate in ways that mirror the practices of fully privatized firms as well as their international
merger and acquisitions strategies that secure groundbreaking technologies and methods. Lastly,
China intentionally uses these companies as strategic assets. This often involves targeting some
of the most promising contracts across the world by outbidding their privatized competitor, at
times even overpaying for contracts that are deemed strategically valuable. In this way, Chinese
NOCs have ascended to rival the most dominant oil companies in the world as both CNPC and
Sinopec are listed among the top ten oil producers globally.
The “Going-Out Strategy” and China’s NOCs
Unlike any other country, China’s NOCs have embarked on a rapid and extensive
international expansion that has seen successes to such an extent that these companies,
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comparatively irrelevant just two decades ago, now compete and outperform many of the world’s
largest and most prominent oil and gas companies. The move to expand the operations of their
NOCs abroad was a center piece of the “going-out strategy” adopted in 2003 and a large part of a
greater foreign policy objective that seeks to expand and magnify China’s political and economic
influence internationally.518 This topic is discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
However, it is important to note that the rapid internationalization of China’s NOCs is driven by
this strategic objective before discussion the extent to which they have internationalized and how
much these companies have strengthened as a result.
It should also be pointed out that the going-out strategy China adopted at the turn of the
century is fundamentally related to the oil shortages produced by economic growth.519 This is
because a disruption in the supply of oil or a stark rise in prices, both of which China has little
control over, could precipitate a collapse of the national economy as well as endanger the power
of the regime. Oil markets are infamously tight, meaning supply and demand rarely deviate too
far from one another, primarily because of the oversight of the OPEC oil cartel that closely
manages supply so as to express its power over market price. This can affect countries in
different ways as discussed earlier. Mostly it depends on whether a nation is a net importer or
exporter and the extent to which the government and/or economy is dependent on those
imports/exports. In the case of China, the extreme import dependence of the national economy
makes for a severe insecurity. Thus, Beijing resolved itself to expand its NOCs abroad as a
counter to this new reality.
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Less than a decade after the initiation of the so-called going-out strategy, China had
already scored a number of wins. By 2011 Chinese NOCs, including Sinopec, CNPC and
CNOOC, had operations in over 30 countries while possessing equity stakes in oil production in
at least 20 of them.520 According to an EIA analysis, Chinese overseas production, which was
nonexistent in 2009, reached 2.1 Mb/d in 2013,521 (see figure 13) which is roughly equivalent to
the production of such major oil companies as ExxonMobil (US), Petrobras (Brazil), ADNOC
(UAE), Chevron (US), and Pemex (Mexico).522 In addition to equity stakes in overseas
production, Chinese NOCs have also pursued a loan-for-oil strategy to lock in oil supplies in
cases where they are not allowed to buy equity shares. Since 2009, Beijing has concluded at
least 12 of these loan-for-oil deals that rest on promises to sell an agreed amount of oil directly to
China instead of selling it on international energy markets or to other countries. The Chinese
government has politically and financially backed these deals between its NOCs and a variety of
countries in the former Soviet Union, Africa and Latin America, and they accounted for more
than $90 billion in 2010.523 It should be noted that Chinese NOCs often overpay for oil equity
positions by around 10% or in extreme cases 20-30% compared to IOCs,524 while often
suffering losses.525 Nevertheless, these firms have been able to absorb up-front losses with
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support from Beijing in order to meet China’s burgeoning energy consumption through the
internationalization of their companies.

Figure 13. Chinese NOCs’ Overseas Oil and Gas Production
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have also bolstered China’s NOCs globally. According
to the IEA, Chinese NOCs invested an estimated USD $73 billion in global upstream M&A deals
between 2011 and 2013.526 Moreover, they have been successful in acquiring some
unconventional upstream production in North America and Canada. Between 2015 and 2018
Chinese NOCs production grew from around 180 Kb/d to 375 Kb/d in North America.527 In
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particular, the Nexen deal for USD $15.6 billion represents a substantial penetration of Canada’s
energy industry,528 and is China’s largest overseas acquisition to date.529 It is worth pointing out
that breaking into foreign markets in the Global South is one thing but entry into the North
American market represents a more substantial play for power and influence. Moreover, it
requires operating at the highest levels of efficiency and facing down serious market competitors
whereas in developing countries where the energy industry is relatively dilapidated do not
require the highest level of competitiveness for survival. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret
success in North America as a significant sign that China’s NOCs have indeed risen to new
levels of prominence.
One of the most critical regions of investment for Chinese NOCs in recent years has been
the Middle East. They have been successful at integrating themselves in terms of upstream, midand downstream production through various partnerships and agreements with IOCs and other
NOCs. CNPC holds the most equity production and investment in the region of all the NOCs,
although Sinopec and CNOOC as well as a handful of smaller companies also participate.
Similar to the Russia case, Iraq has become the primary country of interest as it holds the world’s
last known large scale cheap-to-develop oil fields in the world. In the first oil field auction in
2009, China’s NOCs won a number of the country’s most important oil contracts. CNPC in
partnership with BP won the contract to Iraq’s biggest oil field in Basra to expand production
from 985 Kb/d to 2.85 mb/d within seven years at a cost of USD $15 billion.530 For perspective,
this would make the Basra oil field the world’s second largest oil field behind Saudi Arabia’s
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Ghawar. Sinopec alongside ENI, Oxy, and Kogas won out on the bid for the Zubair oil field with
a proposal of USD $10 billion to raise production from 195 Kb/d to 1.1 mb/d, another massive
production site along with the previous Basra deal.531 A consortium of CNPC, France’s Total,
and Malaysia’s Petronas won the bid for Iraq’s Halfaya oil field to increase production from 3.1
Kb/d to 535 Kb/d. 532 In May 2010, CNOOC and Turkey’s TPAO were awarded the contract to
the Maysan complex of oil fields along the Iran-Iraq border region, which proposed an expansion
of 350 Kb/d of production.533 Iraq has become such a focal point that in 2013 it accounted for
about 26% of all Chinese overseas oil production.534
Upon completion, the Chinese NOCs’ Iraq projects have the potential to increase access
to as much as 1.9 mb/d, which would turn Iraq into China’s largest supplier of crude oil. As of
2020, this figure was around 1.05 Mb/d behind Saudi Arabia’s 1.24 Mb/d and Russia’s 1.37
Mb/d after falling about 20% from the previous year due to the OPEC+ supply reduction
agreement.535 Seemingly foreshadowing China’s preeminent role in Iraq’s energy industry,
PetroChina announced a USD $50 billion investment project at the West Qurna field, a deal that
would elevate the company to the single biggest foreign investor in Iraqi oil.536 The company has
also been holding talks with Ko Lukoil OAO Holdings, Russia’s second-biggest oil producer,
over joint development of the currently stalled West Qurna-2 project after Norwegian oil
company Statoil ASA sold its 18.75% stake in 2012.537 Ko Lukoil head Vagi Alekperov told
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Reuters in January 2013 that an “attractive partner for us would be China, where there is stable
demand growth.” Due to the massive and virtually untapped potential, West Qurna was vital to
Iraq’s goal of increasing production from about 3 Mb/d to 12 Mb/d by 2017. Of course, many of
these projects were delayed first because of the rise of ISIS during this period, especially those in
the west of the country where the Islamist group was most active, and second because of shifts in
OPEC+ policies to moderate production in the face of shifting political-economic environments
and Covid lockdowns. Nevertheless, Iraq has still managed to rise to become the world’s seventh
largest producer and the long march to rival Saudi Arabia and Russia continues. Additionally,
Chinese NOCs will undoubtedly continue to play the central role in this process.
Chinese NOCs, through the process of internationalization, have largely outmaneuvered
IOCs, which will likely bolster these companies’ profitability going forward. This is true across
many vital regions of the world were there exists sizable untapped and newly discovered
resources. It was most apparent in the example of Iraq, where one would expect IOCs to benefit
from the work of the US and its allies in liberating the country. Yet NOCs, mostly those of
Russia and China, capitalized more so than any of their competitors. In addition to higher
profitability, the most significant benefit is gaining greater control over reserves and production,
which will expand the influence of these Chinese companies in global markets.
China’s Mixed Model of Governance
The scope of China’s foreign exploits via their internationalizing NOCs as well as their
meteoric rise in the Middle East energy industry has brought serious notoriety. But less attention
has been given to these companies for their surprising efficiency, both technical and operational,
and competitiveness vis-à-vis IOCs. In chapter 4 dealing with efficiency as an indicator of
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strength, the studies measuring efficiency have scored the Chinese NOCs among the most
efficient companies in the industry. Exempting CNPC, which scores moderately, both CNOOC
and Sinopec rank among the best performing firms in the industry. Particularly, Sinopec is one of
the four most efficient companies in the world alongside ExxonMobil, BP, and Statoil. These
developments are the result of Beijing’s shifting policy prescriptions with regard to their energy
companies. The broader Chinese economic reforms that have opened up the economy and
afforded companies far more autonomy to operate free of government intervention than ever
before have certainly played a dramatic role. 538 This has allowed for a partial privatization
model that still maintains full government control but limits intervention with the exception of
strategic acquisitions.539
Efficiency scores and gains have varied across the energy industry more broadly.
Partially privatized NOCs such as Sinopec, PTT, and Statoil have achieved the same efficiency
score as the most efficient IOCs. On the other hand, Russia’s Rosneft and Lukoil have benefitted
to a lesser extent, for reasons discussed in the Russia case study. Thus, the extent to which an
NOC will improve relies primarily on the relationship between the government and the company.
In the case of China, there is mounting evidence that the government has increasingly afforded
its NOCs a great deal of autonomy.540 One study, comparing the NOCs of India and China,
found that Chinese NOCs are particularly competitive because the government rarely steps in as
a veto player but rather opts to assume the role of resource (capital) supplier.541 Interestingly, the
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authors coin a phrase “coopetition,” referring the co-existence of both cooperation and
competition that arises between increasingly entrepreneurial companies and partially supportive
national governments. The tension between private and public decision-making is important to
highlight because in a world where ownership is increasingly mixed between the two, this
friction becomes a deciding factor. That is, political considerations still stifle commercial
activities regardless of whether an NOC is public or partially private.
The unique mix of government intervention and private enterprise is worth teasing out in
the case of China because it is central to the profound success of the country’s NOCs thus far.
These companies have increasingly been characterized “as complex political economic agents
that carry dualistic features of furthering political mandates and simultaneously showing
autonomy from the government to gravitate toward corporate objectives.”542 A study
investigating both sides of the literature, that is studies focusing on the attainment of strategic
assets and studies focusing on natural resource acquisition, offers a mixed hypothesis to explain
how China’s NOCs have overcome the latecomer’s comparative disadvantage.543 Coining the
“sectoral strength” hypothesis, the authors argue that Beijing’s approach utilizes both strategies
based on circumstance. When it comes to upstream production, NOCs and subsidiary firms will
employ the natural resource acquisition strategy, while those that engaged in downstream
production will pursue the attainment of strategic assets. Their findings are significant because
they highlight the mixed approach that has been largely pioneered by China. This unique
approach utilizes clearly identified national strategic goals as a broad directive to the companies,
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representing a form of government intervention, but allows the firms to go about achieving these
goals in a manner that corresponds with free enterprises. Moreover, the government provides upfront funding for many of these acquisitions that would otherwise be considered unwise
economic decisions from a business standpoint. Therefore, Chinese NOCs are able to secure
profitable deals in the long-run even if they have to overpay in the short-run, while the national
government covers the up-front losses.
As a general rule, limiting government intervention will seriously improve operational
efficiency but is only a part of the overall picture. Acquiring the technical expertise and
intellectual know-how plays an equally significant role when it comes to industry competition
and market dominance. Developing technical capabilities and groundbreaking innovations is
usually the result of investment in R&D but it can also occur as the result of technological
transfers via partnerships as well as mergers and acquisitions. China has pursued both strategies
with full force. Regarding traditional R&D, China’s NOCs have completely restructured their
technology innovation systems from the ground up. One study focusing on the analysis of these
systems indicated that there was a strong emphasis on establishing a stable stream of investment
in R&D, technical talent, and the commercialization of new indigenous technologies.544
Particularly, the development of entire industries around the NOCs themselves, such as
innovation labs and pilot projects in both upstream and downstream, have played a pivotal role.
With respect to technological transfer via M&A, China’s NOCs have aggressively sought
technical expertise and intellectual know-how by targeting well-developed firms across the
world.545 The aforementioned case of the Canadian Nexen acquisition was the most noteworthy
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because it was one of the most efficiently operated companies in the world prior to the deal. In
addition, due to the predominance of tar sands and oil shale reserves in Canada, the company
was among the pioneers of IOCs that specialize in unconventional technologies. Considering that
unconventional energy technology was the primary means by which IOCs have seen a
resurgence in the last decade, gaining access to this expertise is a monumental achievement.
While the outward push to partner with, and in some cases acquire control of, IOCs
abroad have accelerated the transfer of important cutting-edge technologies, the opposite is also
true. The increased activity of IOCs in China itself has also allowed for similar partnerships that
facilitate the transfer of methods and technologies, albeit to a lesser extent. China’s energy needs
have not only driven interest in developing access to resources abroad but also at home. While
Chinese energy companies have the technical capacity to exploit coal to a high degree, which
explains why they have solved their electricity needs primarily utilizing this resource, they lack
the capacity to exploit unconventional sources of oil and gas. The ability to exploit these
resources will be key for ensuring stable and more environmentally sustainable energy for the
national economy going forward. Since there is an estimated 1695 Tcf of unconventional natural
gas in China,546 there is tremendous upside to developing their capacity in this area of the energy
industry. China has sought to acquire this expertise by going abroad, as discussed above, but also
by allowing those with the expertise to come to China. According to the IEA, IOCs such as
Shell, ConocoPhillips, Eni and Total have signed agreements with NOCs in China to conduct
seismic surveys, exploration, and joint research to develop shale oil and gas blocks.547
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To be sure, China’s NOCs have greatly benefitted from the government’s unique model
of partial privatization. It is interesting to observe that among their three most prominent NOCs,
Sinopec, CNOOC, and CNPC, each company’s performance has a strong negative correlation to
the level of government intervention that exists. The studies examining NOC efficiency have
clearly highlighted that Sinopec, which enjoys the most commercial freedom and the highest
efficiency score, has a different relationship with the government than that of CNOOC or CNPC.
In fact, they seem to operate under a tiered system where Sinopec operates almost fully free of
intervention, CNOOC partially free but favoring commercial priorities, and CNPC partially free
but favoring intervention. This is best explained by China’s dual-purposed objectives that try to
maximize global competitiveness on one hand and make strategic acquisitions on the other.
However, it should be pointed out that strategic acquisitions, while stifling operational efficiency
on the front-end, have the added benefit of assisting in technological transfers and buttressing
intellectual know-how on the back end.
The Strategic Necessity of China’s NOCs
There is little doubt that China’s NOCs are strategically valuable to the regime. For
example, the pursuit of strategic acquisitions has contributed to the growing control of reserves
and production abroad as well as technological transfers. But these are fundamentally a smaller
part of the larger trends of internationalization and partial privatization. Strategic value as a
component of NOC strength, similar to the case studies of Saudi Arabia and Russia, highlights
the importance of these firms to the state itself in terms of political and economic interests,
which drives the state to protect, fund, rely on for rents, empower, and/or utilize as foreign policy
and geopolitical tools. While this component of strength has typically taken the form of “energy
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foreign policy,” as described in the Saudi and Russian cases, the Chinese case differs in a very
important way. The previous two countries have relatively small national economies and overall
GDP with less domestic energy consumption. In other words, they are net energy producers
critical to the global energy ecosystem. Conversely, China is a net energy consumer with a
massive domestic economy that craves stable, uninterrupted supplies of cheap energy. This
creates a very different set of dynamics between the state and the NOC.
The combination of net consumer status and extreme import dependence drives Beijing to
view its NOCs through a strategic lens that differs substantially from the previous two case
studies and more generally most NOCs across the world. Usually, NOCs are significant sources
of rents that tend to fund substantial portions of a country’s annual budget. This forces the state
to adopt a parasitic relationship with the energy firms under their authority. However, China has
an expansive economy with well-developed industries outside of energy. In fact, instead of
extracting rents from its NOCs, China injects funding to bolster their activity abroad. Another
strategic use of NOCs involves utilizing the companies and their associated infrastructure,
usually pipelines, as a means of controlling the supply, price, and flow of energy resources. This
has been referred to as energy foreign policy but generally entails leveraging these industries to
maximize political power in a bilateral context, in particular regions, or over global markets.
Here China also does the opposite of the norm. Instead of using outward flows of energy to
enhance its political influence over other nations or the global market, it uses political and
economic influence to redirect bilateral, regional, and global energy flows back home.
It is this second aspect of China’s NOCs strategic value that is of significance here as it is
the nexus of Beijing’s strategic thinking concerning these companies. It begs questions such as
(1) to what extent are these NOCs engaged in genuine mercantilist style economics, neoliberal
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global economics, or both; (2) what circumstances would push the regime to favor one system
over the other; and (3) how do the current global flows of energy structure the strategic thinking
of China and what do they gain from trying to alter the status quo? In order to highlight the
strategic value of China’s NOCs, these relationships must be broken down and analyzed in detail
because they are at the heart of a number of intersecting interests that ultimately constrain the
regime’s behavior. Thus, it follows that if they are successful at disentangling themselves from
dependence and vulnerability, there is much to be gained strategically.
First, consider the dual problems of the present state of import dependence and flows of
energy to China. In 2019, oil imports grew to about 70% of total consumption amounting to
about 10.1 Mb/d on average.548 Of the imported oil, 62% comes from the Middle East and
Africa,549 all of which is transported through the Strait of Malacca, a strategic chokepoint located
between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. From there it travels through the South China Sea
and the Taiwan Strait, another strategic chokepoint, where it ultimately is delivered at Shanghai
and the province of Shangdong. Therefore, Beijing’s energy security faces a multi-tiered threat.
Imported oil must face the threat of the Indian Navy, a major rival of China, as it passes through
the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the straits of Malacca and Taiwan present an even greater threat
as both Singapore and Taiwan are US allies who regularly participate in joint naval exercises.
Even the South China Sea, which China has been readily militarizing with the aim of increasing
energy security, faces freedom of operation missions by the US Navy. China as far back as 2003
recognized this vulnerability when then President Hu Jintao coined the phrase “The Malacca
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Dilemma.”550 In fact, much of China’s initiatives, including the “Going-Out Strategy,” “New
Silk Road,” “String of Pearls,” and the past two decades of development concerning their NOCs
have been driven by this sense of energy insecurity.551
These policies, especially over the last decade, seek to use their NOCs and the foreign
deals they execute to not only increase the reserves and production China has control over but
more importantly to tactically shift the flow of energy to China away from the strategically
vulnerable Southeast Asian sea lanes to pipelines through Central Asia, Russia, Pakistan, and
Myanmar. Beijing has struck deals with each of these countries to create new energy corridors
that serve two important strategic goals.552 First, they reduce their near complete reliance on the
aforementioned sea lanes. In particular, the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline in Pakistan will be able to
deliver energy from the Persian Gulf while completely circumventing the Indian Ocean and the
strategic chokepoints in Southeast Asia. The Myanmar-China Pipeline still requires traversing
the Indian Ocean. The various pipelines though Central Asia and Russia will further diversify
their energy inflows. These are all important because in times of conflict a naval blockade of
these sea lanes would devastate the Chinese economy in mere months. The other strategic benefit
is the ability to shift more energy imports from tankers to pipelines. This is beneficial because it
makes the flow of energy less elastic, which means the transport of these resources cannot be
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shifted easily even under extreme conditions. Events that may spark supply disruptions or price
spikes in the global market are less impactful on the regional markets that remain inelastic due to
the rigid nature of pipeline systems.
Second, the extent to which China is utilizing its NOCs to establish a neo-mercantilist
energy system to exist outside of, or in opposition to, the current neoliberal global energy market
is mixed. On one hand, it has been well documented that China, through its NOCs, is dominating
energy resources at home and abroad as well as appropriating assets worldwide in accordance
with long-term state objectives.553 On the other hand, China has so far forcibly shipped relatively
little energy resources back home, instead opting to sell the majority on the open markets.554 This
is because of the economic realities associated with profitability. Therefore, in order to
understand exactly how to define Beijing’s strategy it is important to consider the circumstances
under which they comply with or challenge the current global economic status quo.
From a regional perspective, China seems to lean towards participating in the global
markets in some areas while in others their behavior looks more like a neo-mercantilist model.
For example, in the Middle East and Central Asia, where China is constructing a new energy
corridor, much of the infrastructure being built will funnel resources to China’s western
provinces via pipelines. Specifically, these pipelines do not divert resources towards any other
major consumer markets in Asia, such as India, South Korea, or Japan. Moreover, pipelines lock
resource supply and price into particular regional ecosystems that often function, to varying
extents, outside of the larger global market. However, their interests in Africa and Latin America
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are the opposite. These resources are sold on the global market and shipped via tankers through
maritime trade routes that are flexible in where they can export and whose supply and price are
subject to the global system. Therefore, Beijing’s mixed approach to energy imports can best be
described as a strategy to reduce their dependence on the global market system rather than to
fully upend it.555
However, the threat of China’s energy foreign policy to the prevailing economic order
has become very real in the case of oil transactions. Between 2012 and 2013 Beijing began using
its own currency, the Yuan, instead of the dollar, to buy oil from Iran and Russia.556 This is a
potential mechanism by which China could circumvent the global markets to obtain energy,
especially with respect to sanctioned energy exporting nations. In the case of Iran, China has
been able to purchase oil from Iran, outside of the global economic system and international
sanctions, which fundamentally undermines the established US-led order. Before the
reapplication of sanctions in 2016, Iran quickly grew to become the third largest supplier of
crude oil to China.557 While Beijing cooperated to some extent with the economic sanctions
between 2016 and 2020, it continued to purchase crude oil from Iran, albeit to a lesser degree.558
Moreover, China has rapidly increased the purchasing of Iranian crude oil after the 2020
election, despite ongoing negotiations between the Biden administration and Tehran.559 Insofar
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as practices, such as utilizing NOCs to purchase global energy assets and equity oil alone, are
aimed at bypassing the prevailing system, the picture is murky. However, when combined
together with the practice of increasingly purchasing energy in the Chinese Yuan, especially in
defiance of international sanctions, a more confrontational strategy seems to come into focus.
This is not meant to suggest that Beijing is pursuing a grand strategy that seeks a toppling of the
international economic order. Rather, it appears to be using small-scale tactics that can chip away
at the hegemony of the neoliberal order and market mechanisms while also reducing the regime’s
overall reliance on the system.
Third, reducing their reliance on the global energy markets via NOCs is key to alleviating
their strategic vulnerability that constrains their capability to act on other foreign policy goals.
Beijing’s foreign energy policy could signal a future age of neo-mercantilism backed by
countries deploying a state-led capitalist economic model intent on challenging the status quo.
However, a more accurate analysis would underscore the particular strategic goals of pursuing
this kind of policy. For one, it can begin to limit the economic vulnerabilities associated with
being a net energy importer. Oil supply disruptions or price spikes in the international markets
could quickly bring the Chinese economy to a halt. Very much like the US, net oil consumer
economies are very reliant on the stability of the global market. History shows that the US has
been forced to constantly involve itself in the regional politics of the Middle East because of this
dependence. China, in reducing their reliance on this system, both mitigates the possible
economic damage from a market crisis scenario while also reducing the necessity of involving
itself too much in the unstable Middle East. The ability to circumscribe the market crisis scenario
is particularly salient to explaining Beijing’s mixed approach. In times of normalcy, it makes
more economic sense to utilize the free-market approach but in times of crisis a separate
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mercantilist-style system can operate as a failsafe. In these scenarios it makes more sense from
the perspective of national security to have the option to either pursue profit maximization or to
guarantee consumption needs based on the circumstances of the global system.
In addition to operating as a failsafe under market crisis scenarios, the mercantilist
approach allows Beijing to expand state autonomy, enabling the regime to pursue controversial
foreign policy goals that risk international conflict. If a nation is highly dependent on material or
resource imports, without a significant naval presence to function as a guarantor, its economic
vulnerability is extreme. Take for example the Germans in the world wars, particularly in the
first world war. Nations that cannot maintain economic stability without a large quantity of
foreign imports cannot pursue a foreign policy that risks international conflict. This is the
fundamental analysis of neoliberal institutionalists with respect to the mitigation of international
conflict via trade.560 On the other hand, measures that China is taking to reduce its reliance on
the system reflects the regime’s intent to diminish the constraints of economic interdependence.
Copeland’s theory of trade expectations, which argues that states reduce interdependence when
they expect future conflict,561 suggests that Beijing may hold the view that many of their foreign
policy goals carry a high risk of conflict. This greater autonomy allows China to both pursue
highly contested energy-related and nonenergy-related claims abroad.
The rise of Chinese NOCs and Beijing’s desire to control energy resources and assets
abroad is a driver of numerous territorial disputes in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Some
scholars, while acknowledging that conflict between states has become less likely overall in
recent decades, argue that energy security has become an area where conflict is actually more
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possible.562 Beijing’s pursuit of energy abroad has the potential to intensify conflict with nations
such as Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia.563 In the South
China Sea, Beijing has already made claims to vast tracts in the area that contains most of the
region’s energy resources where many in China expect to make significant additional discoveries
in the future.564 Pressing these claims alongside the ongoing militarization of the artificial islands
in the area has been a serious point of contention with rival claimants.565 To date, the most
serious clashes have been with Vietnam.566
The same is true of the East China Sea, where the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute has
flared tensions on numerous occasions between China, Japan, and Taiwan. 567 Additionally,
historical grievances and memories of past Japanese aggression add to potential conflict over
disputed territories.568 There is also the increasing rhetoric coming from Beijing referring to the
unification of China and Taiwan,569 suggesting that China is seriously considering the possibility
of engaging in regional conflict to reacquire the island. Moreover, the US has a number of longstanding security treaties with many of the nations in the region and a potential conflict has the
potential to escalate into a larger Sino-American war. This poses a critical risk to many of the sea
lines of communication that China relies on to import much of its energy because of US naval
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power.570 Therefore, because many of China’s regional claims pose a serious risk of conflict and
threaten to cripple the regime in the event of a naval blockade, they stand to gain a great deal of
autonomy to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy by reducing their economic dependence on
the global system.

Conclusion

In the last two decades China has massively grown its economy as well as experienced a
rapid urbanization of its population. While their economic development has been impressive,
they have also become the world’s largest energy importer as a result. This extreme dependence
on the international economic system has made Beijing vulnerable to the vagaries of the global
energy markets as well as serving to shackle their foreign policy. In response, China has pursued
an international policy utilizing NOCs to achieve a more dominant position in global energy.
This result has seen its three primary NOCs added to the ranks of the world’s most prominent
energy companies in terms of control over supplies and production. Moreover, the unique
Chinese model of governance that maintains state control but allows for considerable autonomy
for companies has allowed their NOCs to quickly become some of the most profitable,
competitive, and efficiently operated companies in the world. These factors have proven
successful at strengthening their NOCs to the extent that two of the three are regularly ranked in
the top ten oil and gas companies globally. Additionally, these companies provide immense
strategic value to the regime which guarantees a steady flow of financing from the regime. These
NOCs allow China to reduce their reliance on the global system and reduce their economic
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vulnerability overall. Not only have China’s NOCs grown in strength considerably when
compared to IOCs but have contributed to a massive shift in the balance of power between NOCs
and IOCs more generally. NOCs in the Middle East, Latin America, and Russia have been
around for some time and IOCs have maintained a relevant position while competing over the
years. However, the rise of Chinese NOCs adds a number of highly competitive and influential
firms that have greatly contributed to tipping the balance of power away from the western IOCs
and towards NOCs.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to complete three objectives. The primary objective was to
measure the extent of NOC dominance in detail, to tease out the nuances of this apparent
hegemony. The 20th century saw the rise to prominence of NOCs but the 21st century has, thus
far, had a somewhat different story to tell. This study aimed to chronicle the important events of
this story. If indeed these companies had risen to prominence, then in whose stead had they
gained this power? This question underpinned the reasoning for the comparison with IOCs, who
had ruled over the industry prior to the 1970s. Therefore, a diachronic comparative approach was
deemed most appropriate for engaging with the primary objective. This approach was buttressed
with five variables, referred to in this study as indicators of strength: (1) reserves, (2) production,
(3) unconventional capability, (4) spare capacity, and (5) efficiency.
The secondary objective was to engage with and explain the findings of the first
objective. These explanations were derived from the data of the diachronic comparative
assessment. While the primary approach simply deployed a quantitative method of measuring the
power of energy firms, the secondary approach used a qualitative method. Here the goal was to
examine some of the divergences among NOCs and IOCs expressed in the data and formulate
observations that hold explanatory power. Arising out of the data, four explanations for the
strengthening of NOCs became apparent: (1) the resurgence of the state, (2) internationalization,
(3) government policy, and (4) strategic value. The study then moved to three prominent case
studies, that of Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China, which provided an in-depth look at these
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nations’ NOCs and how the previous explanations specifically applied to each of the case
studies.
The third objective was to draw on some of the broader implications of the first two
objectives with respect to the structure of the global political economy and to the centrality of the
state in modern politics. To what extent is the global economic order neoliberal? Does the further
strengthening of NOCs and the fundamental transformations of these firms in the 21st century
represent a rising challenge to this international system? If so, then how? Has the state truly
become anachronistic as many globalists claim? These questions formed the basis of this final
objective. Admittedly, this goal got the least attention of the three objectives, as no chapter was
itself dedicated to this pursuit. Rather attempts at alluding to some of these implications were
made throughout the dissertation particularly with respect to the first and fourth sections of
chapter 5. These chapters dealt with the resurgence of the state and the strategic value of NOCs
as explanations for NOCs’ strength. Each contained discussions of how these explanations
translated regarding the three case studies. However, some additional effort at tying together
some of these threads is necessary.
When it comes to measuring the strength of energy firms in the 21st century, this study
has found that, on the whole, NOCs have risen to become the dominant and most influential
actors in the global oil and gas industry. These firms have maintained a leading position in the
areas of global reserves, production, and spare capacity. Additionally, some NOCs have scored
important gains in the areas of unconventional capability and efficiency, while others have
lingered behind. On the other hand, IOCs have reinforced their position by dominating in the
areas of unconventional capability and efficiency, which has likely prevented their passing into
obscurity over the last two decades. The unconventional energy boom in North America was
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especially significant in this respect. However, the majority of projections indicate an upcoming
ceiling to the growth of the unconventional revolution at around 2030, with the effects beginning
to significantly taper off in the 2040s. It should also be noted that there is a much greater
variance among NOCs’ performance than among IOCs. For instance, all IOCs generally operate
with high levels of efficiency and unconventional capability, but many NOCs underperform
across various measures of strength while some have exceeded what experts though possible.
This is especially true in the area of efficiency, where some NOCs have risen to the level of
IOCs while others remain significantly behind.
Concerning explanations, the first major conclusion to draw is that state-centric
governance has undergone both a transformation and a resurgence. This is fundamentally due to
the rise of state capitalism and, as it is expressed in the energy industry, the new resource
nationalism. These processes, instead of favoring either market dominance or state control, have
opted for a blending of the two. State-centric approaches to economic globalization describe state
authority as a voluntary process that expands and contracts whenever and wherever necessary in
order to produce a more stable and powerful polity. The energy industry has become one of the
chief examples in the modern global economy where states have expanded their control and
influence. Secondly, economic globalization has reduced barriers to international economic
activity and has led to the proliferation of internationalized NOCs. This turn of events is
significant as it has allowed NOCs to encroach in areas where IOCs have traditionally
dominated. Moreover, it has contributed to increases in technical capacity, which is related to
unconventional capability, and operational efficiency primarily because of mergers and
acquisitions. Thirdly, government policies that stifle NOCs with noncommercial burdens have
lessened over time. Those NOCs that have made significant gains in strength over time,
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particularly in the area of efficiency, are those that have either partially privatized or have state
controllers that refrain from intervention more so than in the past. Lastly, the strategic value of
NOCs gives states the impetus to exert control over these industries, driving the process of
nationalizations globally. The ability for states to utilize their energy firms as instruments of
political and economic power has manifested itself in the form of production cartels that can
express control over global pricing and supply mechanisms such as with OPEC(+), asymmetrical
interdependence between producers and consumers that can be exploited advantageously, and
control over strategic flows of energy that can be shifted or regionally locked so as to increase or
decrease interdependence in accordance with the interests of the regime. Additionally, these
firms can be a necessary source of capital that can be temporarily deployed to fortify regime
stability and augment the state’s military capabilities.
Regarding the presumed challenge to the prevailing economic order and the centrality of
the state in modern politics, these are two separate though somewhat interrelated issues. First, the
idea of a prevailing neoliberal economic order is a tenuous claim and, by extension, that of a
rising neomercantilist order that seeks to undermine or challenge it. From its inception at Bretton
Woods there was already a powerful challenger in the Soviet-led centrally planned communist
international, which persisted until 1991. While the collapse of the latter led many to proclaim
the triumph of neoliberalism, the results have been mixed with respect to both democratization
and trade liberalization. However, it is fair to say that the global economy has been liberalized to
a greater extent than ever before. It is most certainly more so when compared to the Europeanled mercantilist order of the 19th century. Moreover, while the collapse of the Soviet-led system
may not have been the triumph as it was proclaimed, many states have undoubtedly abandoned
centrally planned economics and import substitution industrialization. Therefore, to the extent
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that the global economic order is predominantly characterized by a particular ideology,
neoliberalism would qualify as the prevailing force. So then, what to make of claims that the
spread of state-led capitalism, and in this case the new resource nationalism, raises the specter of
a neomercantilist challenge to the prevailing order? This study suggests that the strengthening of
NOCs around the world plays a significant role. The rise of OPEC+ and its unprecedented power
over global price and supply is one major example. Another is the increasing frequency that
states are utilizing asymmetrical interdependence in global energy to extract political and
economic concessions out of others. Perhaps the strongest example is that of China, where
attempts to structure the strategic flows of energy to reduce their dependence on the international
system, coupled with the trade of oil in Yuan, allows them to bypass sanctions and undermine
the US petrodollar. However, one should remain modest in asserting that the global economic
order is in fact fully neoliberal or ever was to begin with. One should be equally modest to claim
that a rising neomercantilist order seeks to topple it. Neoliberalism has been challenged since its
inception and continues to be. The rise of state capitalism and resource nationalism are just the
newest challenges in a long line of contenders that may or may not overcome neoliberalism as
the prevailing characteristic of the global order.
Second, the centrality of the state in modern politics is a debate primarily arising out of
the globalization literature. Since the end of the Cold War, economic globalization has been one
of the most defining features of the international economy. This has led some to conclude that
the power of the nation-state has been undermined as a result of markets shifting control away
from the state. Some hyper-globalists have even suggested that non-governmental actors, such as
trans- and multi-national corporations, are replacing nation-states as the dominant economic
actors in the international system. It appears that some scholars have already written the epitaph
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for the nation-state. Yet, this study tells a different story. While oil, and to a far lesser extent gas,
are global commodities traded on de-territorialized markets which have diminished state power,
the rise of NOCs, and particularly production cartels, have strengthened the ability of states to
influence these markets. Additionally, it is true that trans- and multi-national corporations have
reduced the importance of national economies while magnifying those of the global and regional
economies. It is also fair to say that many of these companies have divided interests that no
longer lie solely with the nation. However, in the critically important energy industry states have
magnified their power through NOCs. The reduction in non-commercial burdens via partial
privatization and more hands-off government policies has done well to increase efficiency but
have not necessarily reduced instances of utilizing these firms as a means of magnifying political
and economic state power. Moreover, the internationalization of NOCs has increased the number
of trans- and multi-national firms that operate with a greater focus on state interests. To be sure,
the state has lost some ground in certain areas and the debate over its centrality is a much larger
and more complex issue than purely political-economic considerations. Nevertheless, the rise of
NOCs in the energy industry provides an interesting example of a counter narrative that is
beyond being dismissed as inconsequential.
Finally, the broader implications of the rise of NOCs regarding the global energy industry
itself should be mentioned. First, NOC dominance over the world’s reserves and supply make
them critical for investment and expansion of commercial activities and, in turn, meeting future
demand and maintaining price stability. Whether or not they can meet this challenge is less clear
given relative efficiency and the staggering pace of development in China and India. This means
these firms will require massive investments and these economic burdens will fall on the states
who control them. The more demand rises without a subsequent rise in supply, the more prices
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will also rise. When prices rise too high, countries begin seeking alternatives, which is even more
problematic for energy producing states as their most lucrative export loses its importance.
Second, while NOCs hold the dominant position, it is not as if IOCs have nothing to offer.
Indeed, both NOCs and IOCs stand to gain much by increasingly working together as the former
needs access to greater technical methods and intellectual know-how and the latter needs access
to resources. In this way a symbiotic relationship can form between the two company types over
time, where IOCs can gain access and profitability allowing them to continue to innovate and
NOCs can pay a modest premium to have these cutting-edge methods put into practice for them.
Third, the strategic value of NOCs creates an energy-security intersection. Unlike other
commodities, oil and gas are a major factor in international politics and security. Resource
nationalism at home and mercantilism abroad have boosted autocrats by putting more money and
power in their hands. From Eurasia to the Middle East to Southeast Asia, the likelihood of NOCs
being deployed for political and economic power is increasing. Fourth, the divergence among
NOCs, particularly in areas of unconventional capability and efficiency, is significant. Whether
or not many of the NOCs that are lagging behind catchup will have tremendous consequences in
the future. Take for instance Venezuela’s PDVSA, the sheer size of reserves going unexploited is
putting serious upward pressure on prices.
As long as economic growth and development are powered by hydrocarbons, NOCs’ and
their controlling states will be the most essential actors in the area of global energy. This will
remain the case for the next few decades for a couple reasons. First, while environmental
imperatives have gained steam in western countries, international cooperation still escapes the
global community. Countries such as Russia, China, and India have little impetus to sign on to
any form of climate accords or to comply with such measures. Russia’s economy is too
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dependent on the export of hydrocarbons and both China and India are focused on economic
development. In fact, Russia and China didn’t even show up to the most recent 2021 COP26 UN
climate summit. Second, hydrocarbon substitutes, nuclear energy aside, are intermittent on the
supply side. Therefore, they cannot deliver a steady supply of energy to power most cities. If
battery technology advances this may help solve the problem of storage, but this solution leads to
other problems. For example, batteries are made from rare earth minerals, an environmentally
destructive mining process, whose global reserves are overwhelmingly owned by China, which
will have political and strategic consequences. Thus, nearly all projections still weigh heavily in
favor of the continued use of hydrocarbons up to and beyond 2040. As a result, the NOCs that
control the overwhelming majority of the world’s oil and gas reserves will be the most critical
energy suppliers and the lifeblood for sustained global economic growth for the foreseeable
future.
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